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I. INTRODUCTION
Year in Review contains brief summaries of selected decisions
handed down in 1998 by the Alaska Supreme Court, the Alaska
Court of Appeals, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and
the U.S. District Court for the District of Alaska.  The summaries
focus on the substantive areas of the law addressed, the statutes or
common law principles interpreted, and the essence of each of the
holdings.  Attorneys are advised not to rely upon the information
contained in this review without further reference to the cases
cited.
The opinions have been grouped according to general subject
matter rather than by the nature of the underlying claims.  The
summaries are presented alphabetically in the following eleven ar-
eas of the law: administrative, business, civil procedure, constitu-
tional, criminal, employment, family, insurance, property, torts,
and trusts and estates.
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II. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
A. Public Contracting
In Walleri v. City of Fairbanks,1 the Alaska Supreme Court
held that a challenge of the Fairbanks’ sale of certain utilities, ap-
proved by popular vote, is not an “election contest” because the
allegation goes to the validity of the contract and not the result of
the election.2  Walleri challenged the sale of utilities to private
business interests on the ground that some of the terms of the con-
tract were at odds with the terms disclosed to voters when the con-
tract was submitted for public approval.3  The lower court dis-
missed Walleri’s claims, holding that each constituted an election
contest, and that Walleri failed to meet the procedural require-
ments for election contests.4  The supreme court disagreed, stating
that none of Walleri’s claims amounted to an election contest be-
cause they did not challenge the validity of the election result.5
The court explained that the election result had a significance out-
side of the validity of the contract, and that if Walleri’s challenge
was successful, there was “no legal impediment” stopping the city
from renegotiating its contract in a way that fully complied with
the terms approved by the voters.6  The court also held that
Walleri’s challenge was not a “nonjusticiable political question”
because the challenge was centered on alleged procedural viola-
tions and breaches of duty, not the “rightness or wrongness” of the
policy to sell utilities.7
In Brady v. State,8 the supreme court rejected several claims
brought by a disappointed applicant for the negotiated sale of dead
and dying trees, holding that Brady’s general grievances with the
state’s forest policies did not amount to any actionable claim.9  The
Department of Natural Resources (“DNR”) decided to entertain
Copyright © 1999 by Alaska Law Review.  This article is also available on the
World Wide Web at http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/16ALRYIR.
1. 964 P.2d 463 (Alaska 1998).
2. See id. at 466.
3. See id. at 465.
4. See id.
5. See id. at 466.
6. Id.  The court later rejected an argument raised by the City that because
the contract preceded the election, Walleri could only have challenged the elec-
tion.  The court considered it irrelevant that the contract preceded the election.
See id. at 467.
7. Id. at 467-68.
8. 965 P.2d 1 (Alaska 1998).
9. See id. at 6.
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proposals for ways to deal with a beetle epidemic.10  Brady made a
proposal and received indications from DNR that it would enter a
contract with Brady when certain regulatory issues were resolved.11
To aid with the regulatory procedures, Brady performed some data
collection work, which the state eventually used in developing a
plan for the forest area in question.12  Afterwards, DNR elected
not to enter into the contract with Brady and refused to compen-
sate the plaintiff for his expenditures in collecting the data.13  The
court rejected Brady’s breach of contract claims, holding that there
was no promise to sell, only a promise to negotiate a sale.14 The
court also rejected Brady’s negligence claim.  The court ruled that
the state enjoys discretionary-function immunity for setting forest-
management policy.15
B. Land Use and Resource Management
In Bering Straits Coastal Management Program v. Noah,16 the
Alaska Supreme Court upheld a decision by the Alaska Coastal
Policy Council that a proposed trapping cabin is consistent with the
Alaska Coastal Management Program (“ACMP”) and the Bering
Straits Coastal Management Plan.17  The ACMP is a statewide
regulatory scheme designed to protect the “use, management, res-
toration, and enhancement of the overall quality of the coastal en-
vironment,”18 while the Bering Straits plan is a regional scheme in-
corporated into the ACMP.  A dispute arose between the Bering
Straits Coastal District, which oversees the Bering Straits plan,19
and the Alaska Department of Natural Resources (“DNR”), which
granted a permit for a private trapping cabin in the Koyuk River
area.20  Coastal District believed that the cabin did not conform to
10. See id.
11. See id.
12. See id. at 6-7.
13. See id. at 7.
14. See id. at 8.
15. See id. at 16.  The court distinguished acts of policymaking, for which the
state is immune from tort suits, from operational acts of implementation.  Ac-
knowledging that there is a “sometimes vague and wavering line” between the
two, the court decided that most of the plaintiff’s claims fell on the policymaking
side, and that all other claims for which the state was not immune were meritless.
Id. at 16-17.
16. 952 P.2d 737 (Alaska 1998).
17. See id. at 738.
18. Id. at 739 (quoting ALASKA STAT. § 46.40.010(a) (Michie 1996)).
19. See id. at 740.
20. See id. at 740-41.
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its local standards for land use.21  It appealed DNR’s decision to
the Alaska Coastal Policy Council, but the decision was upheld.22
On appeal to the supreme court, the issues were whether the
Council failed to give due deference to Coastal District’s com-
ments during its hearing, and whether the Council’s determination
upholding the permit was reasonable.23  The court ruled that the
Council was justified in holding a de novo review of DNR’s deci-
sion pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act,24 without giv-
ing special deference to Coastal District.25  Also, the Council’s de-
cision was reasonable, because the proposed cabin was not in an
important use area,26 nor would it adversely affect subsistence use
or wildlife in the area.27
In Suydam v. State,28 the supreme court held that past partici-
pation points may be accrued for the purpose of qualifying for a
Prince William Sound herring purse seine entry permit in seasons
where the fisher does not actually attempt to harvest herring, so
long as the fisher is present on the fishing grounds with an intent to
harvest the resource.29  The Alaska Commercial Fisheries Entry
Commission had denied Suydam past participation points because
he voluntarily chose not to fish while a fisher strike was under-
way.30  However, the supreme court overruled the commission be-
cause Suydam had arrived on the grounds intending to fish even if
he had never actually cast a net.31
In Rutter v. State,32 the supreme court held that the Board of
Fisheries is not required to treat “guided sport fishing” and “sport
fishing” as separate categories for purposes of allocating fishery re-
sources.33  In 1994, the Board allocated twenty percent of the har-
vestable chinook salmon to the sports fishery and eighty percent to
the commercial troll fishery, adjusting the previous allocation of
seventeen percent and eighty-three percent, respectively.34  In af-
firming a summary judgment upholding the new allocation, the
court held that the reasonableness of the Board’s classification of
21. See id. at 740.
22. See id. at 741.
23. See id. at 742-43.
24. ALASKA STAT. § 46.40.100(b) (Michie 1996).
25. See Bering Straits, 952 P.2d at 742.
26. See id. at 743.
27. See id. at 744.
28. 957 P.2d 318 (Alaska 1998).
29. See id. at 324-25.
30. See id. at 324.
31. See id. at 325.
32. 963 P.2d 1007 (Alaska 1998).
33. See id. at 1008.
34. See id. at 1007.
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guided sport fishing as a type of sport fishing rather than commer-
cial fishing did not constitute a question of fact for trial.35  Addi-
tionally, the court held that, under Alaska Statutes section
16.05.251(e), the Board has discretion to treat sport fishing and
guided sport fishing as separate categories for allocation, but that it
is not required to do so.36
In Baxley v. State,37 the supreme court held that the Alaska
Department of Natural Resources Commissioner acted within his
authority under the Alaska Land Act when he negotiated an
amendment to the “net profit share” provision of a state oil and
gas lease.38  The state entered into a lease with Amerda Hess
whereby Amerda would develop the Northstar Unit oil field and
the state would receive eighty-nine percent of the net profits after
expenses.39  After Amerda sold its lease to British Petroleum,
British Petroleum informed the state that it would be uneconom-
ical to develop the field unless the “net profit share” was re-
negotiated.40  The Commissioner negotiated a new rate, which was
approved by the legislature and signed into law by the governor.41
Baxley brought suit against the state, asserting standing as a citi-
zen-taxpayer.42  The court held that the Commissioner did not ex-
ceed his authority under Alaska Statutes section 38.05.180(g)43 by
re-negotiating a net profit share provision, subject to ultimate ap-
proval by the legislature.44
C. Administrative Procedure
In Stalnaker v. Williams,45 the Alaska Supreme Court held that
the Public Employees’ Retirement Board had applied an incorrect
standard in determining occupational disability eligibility,46 and
that the Board’s practice of counting tie votes as votes to affirm
did not deserve deference from a court.47  Williams appealed the
Board’s decision to uphold a finding that she was not eligible for
35. See id. at 1008.
36. See id.
37. 958 P.2d 422 (Alaska 1998).
38. See id. at 422.
39. See id. at 426.
40. See id. at 427.
41. See id.
42. See id. at 428.
43. ALASKA STAT. § 38.05.180(j) (Michie 1996).
44. See Baxley, 422 P.2d at 431-32.
45. 960 P.2d 590 (Alaska 1998).
46. See id. at 594-95.
47. See id. at 597.
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occupational disability benefits.48  In order to receive occupational
disability benefits, Williams was incorrectly required by the Board
to prove that her disabling condition was permanent, instead of
“presumably permanent,” as required by Alaska Statutes section
39.35.680(26).49  Further, the superior court did not have to defer to
the Board’s decision that a tie vote of its members effectively af-
firms the decision under review.50  The Board’s practice of affirm-
ing on tie votes was an informal and unwritten rule that was not
embodied in any agency regulation.51
In Lucas v. Anchorage Police & Fire Retirement Board,52 the
supreme court held that a municipal retirement board periodically
may examine benefit recipients to ensure that their disability con-
tinues.53  The Board awarded Lucas non-occupational disability
benefits in 1982, after a psychologist found that Lucas had a psy-
chological disorder that made him incapable of working as a police
officer.54  The Board conducted periodic reviews of Lucas’s eligi-
bility after that date, and in 1993 terminated Lucas’s benefits on
the basis of another psychologist’s conclusion that Lucas was no
longer disabled.55  Lucas argued that the Anchorage Municipal
Code, which provides for periodic review of recipients whose con-
dition can improve, did not give the Board the power “to revisit
original findings of permanent disability.”56  The court determined
that Lucas’s interpretation was based on the faulty premise that a
“permanent disability” is one that lasts forever.57  The court agreed
with the Board’s interpretation of a “permanent disability” as one
that continues for life or until the recipient is capable of resuming
duties.58  Because a “permanent disability” can be rehabilitated
over time, the court found that it was proper for the Board peri-
odically to review permanent disability benefits.59
In McGhee v. State,60 the supreme court held that a change in
the formal conviction date for a prior driving while intoxicated
(“DWI”) conviction did not entitle the driver to a shorter license
48. See id. at 592.
49. Id. at 593-95; see also ALASKA STAT. § 39.35.680(26) (Michie 1996).
50. See Stalnaker, 960 P.2d at 597.
51. See id. at 596-97.
52. 960 P.2d 1151 (Alaska 1998).
53. See id. at 1154.
54. See id. at 1152-53.
55. See id. at 1154.
56. Id. at 1155.
57. See id.
58. See id.
59. See id.
60. 951 P.2d 1215 (Alaska 1998).
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revocation period for a subsequent DWI conviction.61  McGhee’s
driver’s license was revoked following his 1994 arrest for DWI.62
At an administrative hearing, the Department of Motor Vehicles
ordered a license revocation period of three years due to
McGhee’s two prior DWI convictions in 1985 and 1989.63  Later, at
a hearing regarding the 1994 charges, the district court granted
McGhee’s motion to vacate the 1989 conviction because the court
had failed to advise McGhee expressly of his right to a jury trial.64
McGhee immediately re-entered a no contest plea to the 1989
charge and pled no contest to the 1994 charge as well.65  McGhee
then sought a reduction of the three-year license revocation pe-
riod, reasoning that because the re-entry of the 1989 no contest
plea post-dated the 1994 charge, he now had only one DWI convic-
tion that pre-dated the 1994 charge.66  The court rejected this rea-
soning, observing that while the formal dates of convictions may
have changed, McGhee remained convicted for the same two of-
fenses at the time he sought the reduction.67
D. Miscellaneous
In Board of Trade v. State Dep. of Labor,68 the Alaska Su-
preme Court held that the Department of Labor (“DOL”) could
extend the scope of the Little Davis-Bacon Act (“LDBA”)69 to
cover “on-site” workers who do not work within the physical foot-
print of a public construction project,70 but those workers must
work in close proximity to the footprint for the LDBA to be appli-
cable.71  The LDBA provides that public construction workers
must be paid the prevailing wage and requires that workers be
“on-site” to qualify for such protection.72  The DOL promulgated a
regulation extending the definition to cover property “adjacent or
nearby” the physical footprint of the construction project.73  DOL
61. See id. at 1217.
62. See id.
63. See id.  The period of revocation is 90 days for a first offense, one year for
drivers with one DWI conviction within the previous 10 years, and three years for
drivers with two DWI convictions within the previous 10 years.  See ALASKA
STAT. §§ 28.15.165(d), 28.15.181(c)(1)-(3), 28.35.030(o)(4)(A) (Michie 1996).
64. See McGhee, 951 P.2d at 1217.
65. See id.
66. See id.
67. See id. at 1219.
68. 968 P.2d 86 (Alaska 1998).
69. ALASKA STAT. §§ 36.05.010-110 (Michie 1996).
70. See Board of Trade, 968 P.2d at 92.
71. See id.
72. See id. at 90.
73. Id. (quoting ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 8, § 30.910(a) (1996)).
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then tried to apply this regulation to workers at a quarry thirteen
miles from the site of the Nome airport project.74  The court held
that the regulation was sufficiently consistent with the LDBA to be
valid.75  It compared the LDBA to the federal Davis-Bacon Act
and found that the Alaska version eliminated language present in
the federal law that required workers to be directly on-site.76  The
court found this persuasive evidence of a legislative intent to
broaden the coverage of the LDBA to include workers who would
not be covered under the federal act.77  After holding the regula-
tion to be valid, the court nonetheless found that DOL interpreted
its regulation incorrectly by applying it to the Nome quarry work-
ers.78  The court read the regulation, particularly the language
“adjacent and nearby,” as establishing a “geographical restriction
for determining whether public construction is ‘on-site.’”79  The
court recognized that it could not establish a bright-line rule for
proximity, and laid out a factor test for the agency to consider in
the future.80
In United States v. Bering Strait School District,81 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that a school
district did not qualify for a “state” exemption from the reim-
bursement provisions of the Indian Health Care Improvement
Act.82  The action was brought by the United States under 25
U.S.C. § 1621(e)(a)83 for reimbursement of expenses incurred by
the federal government in providing free health care to the school
district’s native employees.84  Under the statute, health insurers are
required to reimburse the United States for health care provided
by the government to Native Americans who are covered by an in-
surance plan, just as the government would reimburse non-
governmental providers.85  The act originally exempted states and
their political subdivisions, but later was amended to include only
74. See id. at 88.
75. See id. at 92.
76. See id. at 91.
77. See id.
78. See id. at 93.
79. Id. at 92.
80. See id. at 92-93.  Some of the factors suggested were the normal meaning
of the terms “on-site,” “adjacent,” and “nearby”; whether the activity could have
been carried out at an alternative site closer to the construction; the physical lay
of the land; and whether the land was developed or undeveloped.  See id.
81. 138 F.3d 1281 (9th Cir. 1998).
82. See id. at 1284.
83. See 25 U.S.C. § 1621(e)(a) (1997).
84. See Bering Strait School District, 138 F.3d at 1282.
85. See id. at 1283.
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states.86  The court, citing the plain meaning of the statute and rec-
ognition of school districts as independent entities, held that school
districts do not qualify as “states” under the Act.87
III. BUSINESS LAW
In Johnson v. Olympic Liquidating Trust,88 the Alaska Su-
preme Court held that in cases where portions of a debt are found
to be invalid due to fraud, the debtor may not avoid repaying the
portion of the debt that is valid.89  The appellants claimed that
businessman Peter Zamarello fraudulently misrepresented the
amount of debt owed to him during some of their business deal-
ings.90  The validity of some portions of the debt was not disputed.91
The court acknowledged the general rule that a contract induced
by fraud is voidable at the election of the defrauded party.92  How-
ever, when only a severable portion of the contract is voidable due
to fraud, that portion should be severed, and the remainder of the
contract should be considered.93  Therefore, appellants had no right
to avoid the valid portions of the debt.94
In Munn v. Thornton,95 the supreme court held that the parties
had entered into an enforceable oral contract, that an implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing had not been breached,
that a builder’s lien on the home was enforceable, and that the
contract did not fall under the Alaska Unfair Trade Practices Act.96
Munn accepted Thornton’s bid to rebuild a fire damaged house,
but when costs significantly exceeded projections, Munn refused to
pay and Thornton brought suit.97  The supreme court considered
testimony concerning contract formation, documentary evidence,
the parties’ prior dealings, and their subsequent words and actions.
Based on this evidence, the supreme court held that the trial
court’s decision that Munn and Thornton had entered into an oral
cost-plus agreement that provided a flat rate of $30 per hour for
labor was not clearly erroneous.98  Unless a contract expressly pro-
86. See id.
87. See id. at 1284.
88. 953 P.2d 494 (Alaska 1998).
89. See id. at 495.
90. See id. at 495-96.
91. See id. at 498.
92. See id. at 497.
93. See id.
94. See id. at 498.
95. 956 P.2d 1213 (Alaska 1998).
96. See id. at 1215.
97. See id. at 1215-17.
98. See id. at 1219.
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vides that a fiduciary relation exists between a contractor and
home owner, the court will not create such a relation.99  While
Thornton was bound by an implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing, no evidence indicated a breach of the covenant.100  Thorn-
ton, as a provider of labor and materials, could enforce a para-
mount lien against Munn’s home in spite of the homestead exemp-
tion granted by Alaska Statutes section 09.38.010(a).101  Finally, the
court held that Thornton’s monthly billing for labor and expenses
could not justify characterizing the contract as an installment sale,
and thus the transaction did not fall under the Unfair Trade Prac-
tices Act.102
In Pieper v. Musarra,103 the supreme court held that a deduc-
tion for a non-existent real estate commission should not be in-
cluded in the calculation of each party’s interest upon the dissolu-
tion of a partnership.104  After several years of financial and
interpersonal difficulties, Mussara sued Pieper to dissolve their
partnership operating a recreational vehicle park.105  The trial court
found that Musarra should be allowed to purchase Pieper’s interest
and calculated the partnership value.106  The judge’s calculation in-
cluded a reduction in value due to an estimated real estate com-
mission, despite the lack of evidence that the property would be
sold.107  The court found that without a finding that the property
would indeed be sold, it was erroneous to deduct an expense that
the parties were not likely to incur.108
In Alaska Tae Woong Venture v. Westward Seafoods, Inc.,109
the supreme court held that a jury’s award should not have been
subjected to remittitur110 and that the non-breaching party in a con-
tract dispute was entitled to a limited future damages award.111
Alaska Joint Venture Seafoods (“AJVS”) agreed to deliver king
crab to Westward Seafoods’ new plant in exchange for a guaran-
teed market for AJVS’s pollock catch.112  Delay in opening the
99. See id. at 1220.
100. See id. at 1221.
101. See id.; ALASKA STAT. § 09.38.010(a) (Michie 1996).
102. See id. at 1222; ALASKA STAT. §§ 45.50.471-.561 (Michie 1996).
103. 956 P.2d 444 (Alaska 1998).
104. See id. at 447.
105. See id.
106. See id.
107. See id. at 446.
108. See id.
109. 963 P.2d 1055 (Alaska 1998).
110. See id. at 1062.
111. See id. at 1064.
112. See id. at 1058.
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plant caused AJVS to sustain substantial financial losses.113  AJVS
assigned its claim to Alaska Tae Woong Venture (“ATWV”),
which sued Westward to recover the losses.114  The jury awarded
lost profit damages to ATWV in the amount of $568,964, the exact
amount of net annualized average cash flow calculated by an ex-
pert witness.115  Westward claimed that the jury had confused aver-
age cash flow with lost profit, and the trial judge ordered remitti-
tur.116  However, because remittitur cannot reduce an award below
the maximum possible amount supported by the evidence and an-
other expert testified that the company could have generated up to
$700,000 in additional revenues, the trial court erred in ordering
remittitur.117  Furthermore, ATWV was entitled to recover future
damages because it had been forced to sell one of its boats as a re-
sult of Westward’s breach.118  However, future damages were lim-
ited to lost profits claimed prior to the sale of the boat because af-
ter the sale, the head of the company voluntarily “wound down”
the company’s business.119
In State Dept. of Revenue v. OSG Bulk Ships,120 the supreme
court held that the Internal Revenue Code (“IRC”) exemption of
foreign shipping income from taxation implicitly is excepted from
the Alaska Net Income Tax Act (“ANITA”).121  The Alaska De-
partment of Revenue audited OSG Bulk Ships and assessed it ad-
ditional taxes for excluding from gross income all income derived
from vessels owned by its foreign subsidiaries.122  OSG protested,
arguing that Alaska had incorporated the IRC’s exemption on
shipping income.123  Under Alaska Statutes section 43.20.021(a),
only those IRC provisions that are not excepted to or modified by
ANITA and other tax-related state legislation become incorpo-
rated into state law.124  Although the court found no express excep-
tion to the IRC, it found an implied exception.125  ANITA uses an
apportionment factor to limit what foreign shipping income can be
attributed to Alaska for tax purposes and prevents multiple taxa-
113. See id. at 1059.
114. See id. at 1057.
115. See id. at 1060.
116. See id.
117. See id. at 1061-62.
118. See id. at 1063.
119. Id. at 1064.
120. 961 P.2d 399 (Alaska 1998).
121. See id. at 404.
122. See id. at 401-02.
123. See id. at 402.
124. See id; ALASKA STAT. § 43.20.021(a) (Michie 1996).
125. See id. at 404.
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tion.126  According to the court, this provision respects federal leg-
islators’ intent of avoiding multiple taxation while still preserving a
benefit for Alaska.127  Conversely, allowing an exemption on state
as well as federal tax returns would afford double protection to
foreign shipping income.128
In Kotzebue Lions Club v. City of Kotzebue,129 the supreme
court held that charitable gaming activities are subject to city mu-
nicipal sales tax.130  Kotzebue amended its sales tax ordinance to
expressly subject the Lions Club’s pull tab and bingo operations to
a municipal sales tax, rather than applying its general sales tax or-
dinance.131  The court found that Kotzebue’s sales tax ordinance is
not preempted by state law because it is intended only to raise
money and has no regulatory component.132
IV. CIVIL PROCEDURE
A. Costs and Attorney’s Fees
In Dansereau v. Ulmer,133 the Alaska Supreme Court held that
where public interest litigants prevailed on only one of three is-
sues, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in calculating rea-
sonable attorney’s fees.134  The court upheld the superior court’s
conclusion that only 430 of the 1,135.7 hours claimed by public in-
terest litigants were reasonable and thus compensable.135  However,
the superior court’s apportionment of fees based on the number of
issues prevailed upon was reversed.136  While courts have discretion
to apportion fees of prevailing public interest litigants, it should be
exercised only in exceptional circumstances.137
In Nielson v. Benton,138 the supreme court held that a trial
court was within its discretion to award a prevailing party half of
that party’s attorney’s fees under Alaska Civil Rule 82.139  Rule
82(b)(2) mandates that a judge award twenty percent of attorney’s
126. See id. at 404-05.
127. See id. at 405.
128. See id. at 406.
129. 955 P.2d 921 (Alaska 1998).
130. See id. at 922.
131. See id.
132. See id. at 923.
133. 955 P.2d 916 (Alaska 1998).
134. See id. at 920.
135. See id. at 918-19.
136. See id. at 920.
137. See id.
138. 957 P.2d 971 (Alaska 1998).
139. See id. at 973.
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fees necessarily incurred to a prevailing party who recovers no
money judgment.140  However, the trial court may vary this fee
award upon consideration of factors that include efforts to mini-
mize fees, reasonableness of claims and defenses, work performed
in relation to matter at stake, and other equitable factors.141  The
trial court awarded half of attorney’s fees to the defendant based
on these factors.142  In addition, the mere fact that the plaintiff pre-
vailed on some of the defendant’s counterclaims was insufficient to
reduce the award under an abuse of discretion standard.143
In Walton v. Ramos Aasand & Co.,144 the supreme court held
that the plaintiff’s unsupported claims that he had been over-
charged and billed for unnecessary work could not defeat a sum-
mary judgment motion, that there was no mutual assent to the
terms of a settlement agreement, and that an award of attorney’s
fees was appropriate.145  Walton retained Ramos Aasand & Co.
(“RACO”) to perform accounting work, but refused to pay on the
ground that he had been overcharged and billed for unnecessary
work.146  He brought suit to examine RACO’s records and RACO
counterclaimed for the sum owed by Walton.147  The court upheld
summary judgment against Walton on the issue of his liability to
RACO for services performed because RACO offered detailed
evidence showing it had billed only for appropriate work per-
formed.148  No genuine issue of material fact existed because Wal-
ton offered no admissible evidence, offering only statements of
belief and suspicion.149  The court also upheld summary judgment
against Walton on his claim that RACO had accepted a settlement
agreement on RACO’s counterclaims.150  Because RACO believed
that the settlement agreement disposed of all claims and Walton
only intended to settle RACO’s counterclaim, there was never mu-
tual assent to the essential terms of the settlement agreement that
RACO initially accepted.151
In Mackie v. Chizmar,152 the supreme court held that  Alaska
Civil Rule 68 penalties do not apply to recoveries obtained through
140. See ALASKA R. CIV. P. 82.
141. See id.
142. See Nielson, 957 P.2d at 973.
143. See id.
144. 963 P.2d 1042 (Alaska 1998).
145. See id. at 1043.
146. See id.
147. See id.
148. See id. at 1044.
149. See id.
150. See id. at 1043-44, 1046.
151. See id. at 1046.
152. 965 P.2d 1202 (Alaska 1998).
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alternative dispute resolution (“ADR”).153  Before trial, Mackie of-
fered to settle Chizmar’s claims for $25,000.154  After ADR pro-
ceedings, Chizmar was awarded $15,000, and Mackie sought to re-
cover attorney’s fees and costs under Rule 68.155  The court held
that an offer of judgment generally remains valid after appeal and
remand,156 noting that this interpretation furthers the rule’s pur-
pose of encouraging settlement and is consistent with its federal
analogue.157  However, the court also held that Rule 68’s penalties
apply only to those who pursue traditional litigation instead of ac-
cepting a reasonable settlement, noting that this comports with the
rule’s purpose by encouraging dispute resolution methods that
avoid litigation.158
In Bobich v. Hughes,159 the supreme court held that Alaska
Civil Rule 68 penalties do not apply to settlement offers that do
not address claims for liquidated damages.160  Alvie and Wanda
Hughes sued Bobich seeking unpaid overtime wages and medical
benefits.161  In 1992, Bobich submitted offers of judgment of
$10,000 for Alvie and $20,000 for Wanda “inclusive of all attor-
ney’s fees.”162  Three years later, Bobich submitted offers of judg-
ment in the amount of $3,000 to Alvie and $9,000 to Wanda, speci-
fying that it did not include “interest, liquidated damages, costs or
attorney’s fees.”163  The Hughes accepted and the court awarded
attorney’s fees.164  Bobich argued that the award of attorney’s fees
violates Rule 68 because his original settlement offer exceeded the
final judgment.165  The court held that if the original offer might be
read to exclude liquidated damages, it is ambiguous and unen-
forceable.166  However, if the original offer is unambiguous, it must
be read to include all damages, including liquidated damages.167
Since the actual award of liquidated damages must be added to the
153. See id. at 1203.
154. See id.
155. See id. at 1203-04.
156. See id. at 1204.
157. See id. at 1205.
158. See id. at 1206.
159. 965 P.2d 1196 (Alaska 1998).
160. See id. at 1198.
161. See id. at 1197.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. See id.
165. See id. at 1197-98.
166. See id. at 1199.
167. See id.
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Hughes settlement for overtime wages, the awarding of attorney’s
fees was appropriate.168
In State v. Johnson,169 the supreme court held that the superior
court retained its jurisdiction to award attorney’s fees even where
it had relinquished jurisdiction over the property in a civil forfei-
ture proceeding.170  The state had filed a complaint seeking civil
forfeiture of $66,020 in cash pursuant to Alaska Statutes section
17.30.100.171  Johnson petitioned for release of the currency be-
cause the state had held it for more than forty-eight hours without
court authorization in violation of AS 17.30.114(a)(3).172  Although
the superior court ordered the release of the assets on this ground,
the state ultimately released the currency to an I.R.S. agent who
had a seizure warrant from the district court.173  Johnson filed a
motion for recovery of attorney’s fees under Civil Rule
82(b)(3)(C).174  The supreme court upheld the superior court’s
award of attorney’s fees on the ground that it retained jurisdiction
over the state even if it later relinquished its jurisdiction over the
property by ordering the release of the currency.175  The court fur-
ther held that the designation of Johnson as a prevailing party for
purposes of awarding attorney’s fees under Rule 82 was not an
abuse of discretion where the state was directed to release cur-
rency on account of its tardiness, even though the currency was ul-
timately seized by the federal government.176
In Native Village of Venetie I.R.A. Council v. Alaska,177 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the
Indian Child Welfare Act (“ICWA”)178 created a federal right that
was enforceable by private actions under section 1983, and there-
fore successful claimants are entitled to an award of attorney’s
fees.179  The Native Alaskan villages of Venetie and Fort Yukon re-
ceived declaratory relief for a claim under the ICWA and sought
attorney’s fees, an award accorded to relief granted under section
1983.180  The court noted that even though a federal cause of action
could be implied from the ICWA, the ICWA did not have a reme-
168. See id.
169. 958 P.2d 440 (Alaska 1998).
170. See id. at 443.
171. See id. at 441 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 17.30.100 (Michie 1996)).
172. See id. at 442 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 17.30.114(a)(3) (Michie 1996)).
173. See id.
174. See id. at 443 (citing ALASKA R. CIV. P. 82(b)(3)(C)).
175. See id.
176. See id. at 443-44.
177. 155 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 1998).
178. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(d) (1997).
179. See Venetie, 155 F.3d at 1153.
180. See id. at 1151-52.
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dial scheme sufficiently comprehensive to preclude enforcement
through section 1983.181
B. Summary Judgment
In Himschoot v. Dushi,182 the Alaska Supreme Court held that
summary judgment should not have been awarded on a breach of
contract claim in the absence of any supporting materials admissi-
ble as evidence.183  Dushi brought suit against Himschoot for the
latter’s failure to make cash payments agreed to as consideration
for signing a noncompete covenant.184  Dushi moved for summary
judgment, submitting a memorandum of law without any support-
ing documents, relying instead upon assertions of fact in the
pleadings and his legal memorandum.185  The trial court granted the
motion,186 but the supreme court reversed, holding that Dushi was
required to submit additional admissible evidence which supported
a prima facie case for breach of contract.187
In Parson v. Marathon Oil Co.,188 the supreme court held that
an ex-wife was wrongfully denied relief under Rule 56(f).189  Parson
sued Marathon Oil for the wrongful death of her ex-husband Wil-
son, who died of a heart attack on an oil platform owned by Mara-
thon.190  After Marathon moved for summary judgment, Parson ob-
tained several extensions of the supplemental briefing deadline
and finally filed a motion to compel depositions and to reschedule
briefing.191  The trial court implicitly denied her motion by granting
summary judgment to Marathon.192  The supreme court observed,
however, that requests made under Rule 56(f) should be granted
freely, and should be denied only to lazy or dilatory parties.193  Par-
son’s motion to compel constituted a Rule 56(f) request, even
though Parson did not initially characterize it as such.  Parties need
not identify specifically Rule 56(f) when seeking a continuance;194
181. See id. at 1152-53.
182. 953 P.2d 507 (Alaska 1998)
183. See id. at 509-10.
184. See id. at 508.
185. See id.
186. See id.
187. See id. at 509-10.
188. 960 P.2d 615 (Alaska 1998).
189. See id. at 616.
190. See id.
191. See id. at 618.
192. See id.
193. See id.
194. See id. at 619.
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rather it is sufficient to explain “why the party cannot produce
facts necessary to oppose summary judgment.”195
In Demmert v. Kootznoowoo, Inc.,196 the supreme court held
that the superior court’s conversion of a motion for judgment on
the pleadings to a motion for summary judgment was proper, but
found reversible error in the subsequent granting of the motion
because the opposing party did not receive reasonable opportunity
to oppose the converted motion.197  The plaintiffs in this class ac-
tion challenged the defendant corporation’s practice of paying the
travel costs of shareholders employed as longshoremen by a joint
venturer of the corporation at a distant site.198  Defendant
Kootznoowoo moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that
the complaint was in the nature of a derivative action, not dis-
criminatory dividends, and thereby could not constitute a class ac-
tion.199  The superior court announced it would treat the motion for
judgment on the pleadings as a motion for summary judgment,
then ruled that the challenged payments were not dividends.200  The
supreme court found the conversion proper under Alaska Civil
Rule 12(c), which requires conversion whenever matters outside
the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court.201
However, these circumstances did not trigger a plaintiff’s duty to
anticipate an unannounced conversion.202  Rather, the plaintiffs
were entitled to a reasonable opportunity to present matters perti-
nent to the converted motion before the judge ruled on it.203  Be-
cause the plaintiffs received no such opportunity, the supreme
court vacated the judgment and remanded the case for considera-
tion as a motion for summary judgment with the attendant Rule 56
requirements.204
C. Timeliness of Prosecution and Appeal
In City of Fairbanks v. Amoco Chemical Co.,205 the Alaska
Supreme Court held that a municipality’s claims for negligent and
intentional misrepresentation did not accrue simultaneously and
195. See id. (quoting Gamble v. Northstore Partnership, 907 P.2d 477, 485
(Alaska 1995)).
196. 960 P.2d 606 (Alaska 1998).
197. See id. at 607.
198. See id.
199. See id. at 608.
200. See id. at 608-09.
201. See id. at 609.
202. See id. at 611.
203. See id. at 612.
204. See id. at 612-13.
205. 952 P.2d 1173 (Alaska 1996).
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that the six-year statute of limitations governing claims by munici-
pal corporations overrode the two-year statute of limitations set
forth in the Alaska Unfair Trade Practices Act (“AUTPA”).206
Plastic pipes purchased by the city of Fairbanks from Amoco in
1974 began to collapse in 1978.207  In 1986, the city discovered con-
fidential Amoco documents about the pipes that it believed estab-
lished Amoco’s scienter and indicated intentional misrepresenta-
tion.208  A year later, the city sued Amoco for intentional
misrepresentation and violation of the AUTPA.209  Amoco moved
for summary judgment, claiming that the statute of limitations be-
gan to run with the collapse in 1978.210  The federal district court
certified questions to the supreme court, asking for its interpreta-
tion of Alaska Statutes section 09.10.120,211 which set the six-year
limitations period for suits brought by municipalities,212 and its re-
lation to the AUTPA.213
The supreme court interpreted the limitations statute to begin
to toll only when there is actual notice of the elements of the cause
of action.214  Because scienter is an element of intentional misrep-
resentation but not negligent misrepresentation, it is possible that
the period of limitations may toll at a different time for the two
causes of action.215  As to the second question, the supreme court
interpreted the six-year limitations statute to override the
AUTPA, because the six-year statute specifically applies to mu-
nicipalities, and the AUTPA has no language specifying that its
limitations period applies to municipalities.216
In McDowell v. State,217 the supreme court held that when de-
termining which statute of limitations to apply, the nature of the
alleged injury, rather than the technical cause of action, controls.218
After his land was contaminated by an oil spill, McDowell brought
suit under Alaska Statutes section 09.10.050, which provides for a
six-year statute of limitations for actions alleging trespass upon
real property.219  The State argued that the action actually was one
206. See id. at 1175.
207. See id.
208. See id. at 1176.
209. See id.
210. See id.
211. ALASKA STAT. § 09.10.120 (Michie 1996).
212. See id.
213. Id. § 45.50.471.
214. See City of Fairbanks, 952 F.2d at 1175.
215. See id. at 1178.
216. See id. at 1180-81.
217. 957 P.2d 965 (Alaska 1998).
218. See id. at 968.
219. See id. at 967; see also ALASKA STAT. § 09.10.050 (Michie 1996).
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for trespass on the case, and consequently was governed by the
two-year statute of limitations under AS 09.10.070.220  The court
held that, because common usage of the word “trespass” included
all actions that allege an interference with property rights, the six-
year limitation should control.221  The court also expressed a pref-
erence for longer statutes of limitations, because the statute of
limitations is a disfavored defense and because alleged injuries to
property generally involve documentary evidence that remains re-
liable after the passage of time.222
In Roach v. Caudle,223 the supreme court held that the six-year
statute of limitations for legal malpractice claims begins to run
when a person has sufficient information to prompt an inquiry into
a cause of action.224  Roach hired Caudle to appeal a federal bank-
ruptcy court’s decision, but the appeal was dismissed for failure to
file a timely notice.225  Caudle never informed Roach of the dis-
missal, and Roach did not learn of it until four years later.226
Roach filed a legal malpractice suit within six years of this discov-
ery but more than six years after the actual dismissal.227  The court
found that the statute of limitations began to run when Caudle dis-
covered his potential cause of action, not when the dismissal actu-
ally occurred.228
In Fred Meyer of Alaska, Inc. v. Adams,229 the supreme court
held that the statute of limitations period was tolled from the date
of an initial class complaint.230  Adams filed a class action suit
against Fred Meyer of Alaska, Inc. in 1991 claiming violations of
the Alaska Wage and Hour Act.231  An initial motion to certify
three classes was denied without prejudice on the ground that fur-
ther discovery might justify certification.232  In 1994, Adams moved
for certification of three reformulated classes and certification was
granted to two of the classes.233  Meyer appealed, arguing the two-
year statute of limitations period for claims brought in this suit
220. See McDowell, 957 P.2d at 969; see also ALASKA STAT. § 09.10.070 (Michie
1996).
221. See McDowell, 957 P.2d at 970.
222. See id. at 971.
223. 954 P.2d 1039 (Alaska 1998).
224. See id. at 1041.
225. See id. at 1040.
226. See id.
227. See id.
228. See id. at 1041.
229. 963 P.2d 1025 (Alaska 1998).
230. See id. at 1026.
231. See id.
232. See id. at 1027.
233. See id.
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should be calculated from the date of the second motion for certi-
fication because the first motion for certification was denied.234
The statute of limitations for class action claims are tolled from the
date of the filing of the class action until the court denies certifica-
tion at which point class members may intervene to preserve their
rights.235  The court, however, noted that the superior court did not
definitively deny certification to the classes.236  Rather, because the
superior court reserved the possibility of moving for certification
after discovery revealed more evidence in its denial of the initial
motion to certify, and because the second motion for certification
was based on the original class complaint, the class action pro-
ceedings were viewed as ongoing.237  Accordingly, the statute of
limitations was properly tolled from the date of the original class
complaint.238
D. Miscellaneous
In Mundt v. Northwest Explorations, Inc.,239 the Alaska Su-
preme Court held that an intervenor may exercise the right to a
peremptory change of judge even after an initial judgment.240
Northwest and Ashbrook litigated over some parcels of land, in-
cluding those that previously had been deeded to Mundt.241
Northwest and Ashbrook entered into a settlement agreement that
quieted title and voided the deed from Ashbrook to Mundt.242
Mundt sought a change of judge under Alaska Civil Rule 42(c).243
The court held that Mundt was entitled to seek a change of judge
because her interests were different than those of Ashbrook.244
Nothing in Rule 42(c) prevents intervenors from changing judges
even if they have entered the case in the post-judgment stage,245
and possibilities of prejudice to other parties does not alter the
right to change judges.246
234. See id. at 1028.
235. See id.
236. See id. at 1029.
237. See id.
238. See id. at 1030.
239. 963 P.2d 265 (Alaska 1998).
240. See id. at 266.
241. See id. at 267.
242. See id.
243. See id.
244. See id. at 268.
245. See id. at 268-69.
246. See id. at 269-70.
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In Gates v. City of Tenakee Springs,247 the supreme court held
that a properly appointed pro tempore judge was a de facto judge
with authority to enter findings on remand, even if he failed to
meet state residency requirements.248  Gates claimed that because
Judge Schultz had been a resident of California for three years, his
service as an Alaska pro tempore judge was inappropriate.249
However, the court stated that an acting judge who has colorable
authority due to his appointment is a de facto officer whose acts
have binding authority if done within the scope and by the appar-
ent authority of his office, even though the judge’s actual authority
suffers from procedural defect.250
In Sykes v. Melba Creek Mining, Inc.,251 the supreme court
held that an order precluding the use of expert witnesses is an im-
proper sanction for failure to file witness lists in a timely fashion.252
Sykes, a defendant in a breach of contract action, wished to call
expert and non-expert witnesses to support his defense of incapac-
ity, but he did not meet the trial court’s deadlines for filing his wit-
ness list.253  The trial court issued an order precluding the use of
expert witnesses, an action that “amounted to a sanction” in the
eyes of the supreme court.254  The supreme court did not question
whether Sykes’ conduct was sanctionable, but instead decided that
the chosen sanction was improper.255  Typically, a trial court has
broad discretion in choosing a sanction, but that discretion is more
limited when the sanction’s effect is to decide the outcome of a
central issue in the case.256  In these instances, the sanction is
proper only if applied to a party that willfully fails to comply with
the court order.257
In Parker v. State,258 the supreme court held that an Alaskan
court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident for
purposes of a paternity and child support action where that person
had engaged in intercourse with an Alaskan resident while in
Alaska.259  Parker, a California resident, challenged an Alaskan
court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over him in a suit con-
247. 954 P.2d 1035 (Alaska 1998).
248. See id. at 1039.
249. See id. at 1037.
250. See id at 1038.
251. 952 P.2d 1164 (Alaska 1998).
252. See id. at 1171.
253. See id. at 1166.
254. Id. at 1169.
255. See id. at 1171.
256. See id. at 1169.
257. See id.
258. 960 P.2d 586 (Alaska 1998).
259. See id. at 588-89.
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cerning a child he conceived with an Alaskan resident while sta-
tioned in Alaska with the coast guard.260  The court found specific
jurisdiction because Parker purposefully had directed his activities
at a resident of the court’s state, and he therefore should have an-
ticipated possible litigation resulting from those activities.261
In Tope v. Christianson,262 the supreme court held that an envi-
ronmental remediation claim not preserved in a prior bankruptcy
proceeding was barred by res judicata.263  Tope Equipment Com-
pany became delinquent on a promissory note to Christianson for
two property lots on which leaking storage tanks had been discov-
ered.264  Christianson sued for the amount owed on the note, while
Tope sought environmental remediation costs in a counterclaim.265
Subsequently, Tope filed for bankruptcy.266  The bankruptcy action
involved the same parties as the remediation claim, and the court
found that the confirmation of a reorganization plan that con-
cluded the bankruptcy action constituted a final judgment.267  The
remediation claim and the bankruptcy action both arose out of the
same transaction involving the same factual issues: The date of
property purchase, price, condition of the land at the time of pur-
chase, and knowledge of the tanks.268  Furthermore, policy reasons
supported the decision that res judicata bars raising the remedia-
tion claim after the bankruptcy proceedings: “Adequate informa-
tion regarding the assets of the estate in the plan of reorganization
and disclosure statement is important to creditors who vote on the
plan.”269
In Christensen v. NCH Corp.,270 the supreme court held that an
attorney’s submission of a document listing categories of withheld
documents provided the plaintiff with sufficient notice of the na-
ture of the documents and the basis for withholding them.  The
court also held that no grounds justify requiring a court to conduct
a more extensive in camera review of the withheld documents and
that no genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether defen-
dants intentionally interfered with an employee’s medical treat-
ments in regard to work related injuries.271  Christensen had diffi-
260. See id. at 587.
261. See id. at 588.
262. 959 P.2d 1240 (Alaska 1998).
263. See id. at 1241.
264. See id.
265. See id.
266. See id.
267. See id. at 1243.
268. See id. at 1244.
269. Id.
270. 956 P.2d 468 (Alaska 1998).
271. See id. at 473-74, 476.
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culties getting authorization for back surgery following a work-
related back injury and alleged that his employer and insurer con-
spired to delay medical treatment and that his insurer’s attorney
impeded discovery.272  The court found that the attorney’s submis-
sion of a list of document categories withheld from discovery satis-
fied the superior court’s demand that a list of withheld documents
be supplied.273  Further, no grounds supported the contention that
the superior court was required to make a more extensive in cam-
era review of the withheld documents than it did or that it should
have ordered disclosure of the withheld documents.274  Although
Christensen’s insurer did contact some of Christensen’s examining
physicians, that was insufficient to support a claim of intentional
interference with his medical treatment.275
In Collins v. Arctic Builders,276 the supreme court held that a
judge must notify a pro se litigant of the specific defects in his no-
tice of appeal and provide an opportunity to remedy these de-
fects.277  The court reaffirmed previous holdings that pro se litigants
should be held to less stringent standards than lawyers.278  Fur-
thermore, the court recognized a distinction between a pro se liti-
gant who files defective materials and one who files none at all.279
Where pro se litigants have failed to file at least a defective plead-
ing, judges are not required to warn them on aspects of proce-
dure.280
In Moudy v. Superior Court,281 the Alaska Court of Appeals
held that the attorney-client privilege did not shield a lawyer from
divulging whether she or other lawyers in her office conversed with
the client regarding his trial date.282  The superior court asked
Moudy, an assistant public defender, whether she or other lawyers
in the public defender’s office informed her client about the trial
date, which he missed.283  Moudy refused to answer, invoking the
attorney-client privilege, and was found to be in contempt.284  The
court of appeals rejected Moudy’s claim of privilege on two sepa-
rate grounds.  First, the court held that a conversation regarding
272. See id. at 471, 473.
273. See id. at 473.
274. See id. at 474.
275. See id. at 475.
276. 957 P.2d 980 (Alaska 1998).
277. See id. at 982.
278. See id. (citing Breck v. Ulmer, 745 P.2d 66 (Alaska 1987)).
279. See Collins, 957 P.2d at 983.
280. See id. at 982 (citing Bauman v. State, 768 P.2d 1097 (Alaska 1989)).
281. 964 P.2d 469 (Alaska Ct. App. 1998).
282. See id. at 471.
283. See id. at 469-70.
284. See id.
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the date of trial is not a “confidential conversation made for the
purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional legal services
to the client.”285  Second, the court held that the privilege does not
protect a lawyer from divulging information about the fact of
whether a conversation occurred.286
V. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
A. Due Process
In State v. Bowen,287 the Alaska Supreme Court held that the
Alaska Personnel Act (“APA”) does not entitle a terminated
Alaska National Guard employee to a pretermination hearing, but
the due process clause of the Alaska Constitution does require
such a hearing.288  Bowen claimed that he was deprived of a prop-
erty interest in full severance pay plus a liberty interest in his repu-
tation and opportunity for future employment after he was termi-
nated from the Alaska National Guard.289  Bowen argued that a
pretermination hearing was required by both the APA,290 which
provides certain protections to terminated state employees, and
the due process clause of the Alaska Constitution, which provides
that “no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property with-
out the due process of law.”291  While the court found that Bowen
was a state employee, it did not find that this conferred APA pro-
tection, because Alaska Statutes sections 26.05.340 and 26.05.060
specify that Alaska National Guard employees are subject to fed-
eral laws and regulations.292
Turning to the constitutional issue, the court agreed that
Bowen was deprived of a liberty interest in his reputation.293  The
court was persuaded that “every time [Bowen] seeks future em-
ployment or attempts to pursue his chosen profession[,] . . . he may
be obliged to explain why a previous termination of employment
was for acts of ‘misconduct.’”294  It found that “misconduct” was a
285. Id. at 470 (quoting ALASKA R. EVID. 503).
286. See id. at 471.
287. 953 P.2d 888 (Alaska 1998).
288. See id. at 901.
289. See id. at 891.
290. See ALASKA STAT. § 39.25.010 (Michie 1996).
291. See Bowen, 953 P.2d at 891; ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 7 (1997).
292. See id. at 899-900; see also ALASKA STAT. §§ 26.05.340, 26.05.060 (Michie
1996).
293. See Bowen, 953 P.2d at 901.
294. Id. at 900.
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sufficiently stigmatizing reason for termination to implicate a lib-
erty interest triggering due process protection.295
In Leisnoi, Inc. v. Stratman,296 the supreme court held that the
superior court was responsible for providing the hearing proce-
dures and due process required by a lease administered by a native
village corporation.297  Stratman held a grazing lease for land origi-
nally owned by the federal government but eventually conveyed to
Leisnoi, Inc., the corporation for the Native Village of Woody Is-
land.298  Although Stratman’s rights under the federal grazing lease
were maintained in the conveyance document, Leisnoi assumed
the duty of administering the lease.299  Accordingly, when Leisnoi
sought a writ of forcible entry and detainer against Stratman based
on lease violations, the superior court dismissed, finding that the
lease could not be terminated without providing due process.300
The supreme court remanded, finding that Stratman’s due process
rights under the Alaska Constitution could be met by providing a
hearing before the superior court regarding whether Leisnoi may
properly end the lease.301
B. Double Jeopardy
In State v. Esmailka,302 the Alaska Court of Appeals held that
where a convicted criminal defendant challenges the constitution-
ality of an administrative penalty arising out of the same offense,
the proper remedy may be revocation of the penalty, but may not
be reversal of the criminal conviction.303  Esmailka was arrested
and eventually convicted of underage consumption of alcohol.304  In
addition to the normal criminal penalty for this offense (a fine of
$100 or more), the Department of Public Safety is authorized to
revoke the offender’s driver’s license or, as in Esmailka’s case, is-
sue an order preventing the offender from obtaining a license.305
Esmailka claimed that the administrative penalty violated the
double jeopardy clauses of the state and federal constitutions and
argued that her conviction should be overturned.306  The court
295. See id. at 901.
296. 960 P.2d 14 (Alaska 1998).
297. See id. at 17-18.
298. See id. at 16.
299. See id.
300. See id.
301. See id. at 18.
302. 961 P.2d 432 (Alaska Ct. App. 1998).
303. See id. at 435.
304. See id. at 433.
305. See id.
306. See id.
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found her position to be logically flawed, because one cannot
challenge the legitimacy of one penalty while asking for the revo-
cation of another penalty whose legitimacy is not questioned.307  In
doing so, the court disavowed its earlier suggestion in Rexford v.
State308 that an unconstitutional administrative revocation of a per-
son’s driver’s license would immunize the offender from prosecu-
tion for the underlying criminal offense.309
C. Right to Jury Trial
In State v. Dutch Harbor Seafoods Ltd.,310 the Alaska Supreme
Court held that entities charged with strict liability commercial
fishing violations were not entitled to a jury trial.311  Dutch Harbor
was charged with unlawful failure to register a vessel under 5
Alaska Administrative Code 28.020(a) and (c) and unlawful pos-
session of fish taken by an unregistered vehicle under code section
39.197.312  The court held that Dutch Harbor was not entitled to a
jury trial under Article I, section 11 of the Alaska Constitution be-
cause strict liability fishing violations are not criminal prosecu-
tions.313  Applying the three-part test of Baker v. Fairbanks,314 the
court concluded that neither the fine nor the connotation of crimi-
nal conduct was sufficient to qualify it as a criminal prosecution.315
In addition, the court held that prosecutions for strict liability
commercial fishing violations are not civil cases, so the right to a
jury trial under Article I, Section 16 of the Alaska Constitution did
not apply.316
D. Miscellaneous
In In re K.A.H.,317 the Alaska Supreme Court held that law-
yers cannot advance living expenses to their clients and that this
rule does not unconstitutionally interfere with a litigant’s access to
the courts.318  Markham, the appellant, represented the estate of
the minor child K.A.H. in a wrongful death suit.319  After the case
307. See id. at 435.
308. 941 P.2d 906 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997).
309. See Esmailka, 961 P.2d at 436.
310. 965 P.2d 738 (Alaska 1998).
311. See id. at 739.
312. See id. at 739-40.
313. See id. at 743.
314. 471 P.2d 386 (Alaska 1970).
315. See Dutch Harbor, 965 P.2d at 742-43.
316. See id. at 744.
317. 967 P.2d 91 (Alaska 1998).
318. See id. at 92.
319. See id.
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was settled, Markham unsuccessfully applied to the court to use
the settlement to reimburse himself for loans he paid to K.A.H.’s
mother for living expenses.320  The lower court ruled that Alaska
Rule of Professional Conduct 1.8(e) prohibits the advance, and the
supreme court agreed.321  The court found the rule’s language to be
“unambiguous” on the subject of living expenses.322  Since the loans
did not fit into one of the exceptions to Rule 1.8(e)’s prohibition of
financial assistance, they were forbidden.323  The court then held
that Rule 1.8(e) does not unconstitutionally deny a plaintiff’s ac-
cess to the courts and that no fundamental family concern was at
stake.324
In Sonneman v. State,325 the supreme court upheld the constitu-
tionality of a statutory amendment that ended the practice of ro-
tating the order of candidates’ names on election ballots and re-
placed it with a random and fixed determination of the order of
names.326  A citizen-taxpayer claimed that the amendment imper-
missibly burdened the right to vote and violated the state constitu-
tional requirement that elections be based on the will of the peo-
ple.327  In analyzing the right to vote claim, the court declined to
use strict scrutiny because the state “only impose[d] a minimal,
reasonable, and nondiscriminatory burden” on the right to vote.328
The court concluded that the state’s interest in reducing the cost of
printing ballots and preventing voter confusion was legitimate and
important, and thus did not impermissibly burden the right to
vote.329  With respect to the second claim, the court rejected the
citizen-taxpayer’s argument that allocating full positional advan-
tage to one candidate could determine the outcome of an election
and would thwart the concept of election by the will of the peo-
ple.330  The court found that the concept of the people’s will
“encompasse[d] all who vote, those who are careless and unin-
formed as well as those who are more thoughtful and knowledge-
able.”331
320. See id.
321. See id. at 94.
322. Id. at 93.
323. See id. at 93.
324. See id. at 94-95.
325. 969 P.2d 632 (Alaska 1998).
326. See id. at 634.
327. See id.
328. Id. at 639.
329. See id. at 640.
330. See id.
331. Id. at 640-41.
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In Kenai Peninsula Borough v. Arndt,332 the supreme court
held that post-assessment changes in the ownership, value, and si-
tus of taxed property “require[d] no change in tax for the corre-
sponding assessment year.”333  Arndt owned a boat that he sold in
May 1991.334  Because he owned the boat as of the assessment date,
the borough sent him a tax bill for the full year.335  Arndt refused to
pay the bill and argued that the borough’s failure to apportion
violated the Due Process Clause and the Commerce Clause of the
United States Constitution.336
The court held that the Due Process Clause only bars taxation
of personal property that is permanently outside the jurisdiction of
the taxing authority and does not require states to limit their tax
assessments to the portion of the year in which the property is lo-
cated within the boundaries of the state.337  The assessment at issue
was governed by Alaska Statutes section 29.45.110, which requires
assessment to be based on property values and ownership as of
January 1 of any tax year.338  Consequently, the tax “accrues” in full
on January 1 of each year and apportionment is not required.339
The court noted that the limitations to the tax system imposed
by the Commerce Clause require only that a tax not discriminate
against interstate commerce, and that this doctrine is violated only
by a showing that property taxed in one jurisdiction could be taxed
elsewhere.340  The tax assessment at issue did not violate the Com-
merce Clause because it retained the need to establish a valid tax
situs, a nexus between the property and the borough.341  Further-
more, the threat of multiple taxation is minimized because a simi-
lar rule for tax assessment prevails nationwide.342
In Laborers Local # 942 v. Lampkin,343 the supreme court held
that Fairbanks North Star Borough’s decision to require successful
bidders on a construction project to enter into a project labor
agreement (“PLA”) with local labor unions did not violate the
Alaska Constitution or the Borough procurement code.344  The
332. 958 P.2d 1101 (Alaska 1998).
333. Id. at 1105.
334. See id. at 1102.
335. See id.
336. See id.
337. See id. at 1103.
338. See id. (citing ALASKA STAT. § 29.45.110 (Michie 1996)).
339. See id. at 1104.
340. See id. at 1103 (citing Gulf Oil Corp. v. State, 755 P.2d 372, 383 n.33
(Alaska 1998)).
341. See id. at 1104.
342. See id. at 1105.
343. 956 P.2d 422 (Alaska 1998).
344. See id. at 438.
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Borough undertook a massive renovation of a local high school
and included the PLA as a bid specification for the project.345  First,
the court held that even if the PLA impaired the rights of nonun-
ion workers to engage in economic endeavors, it did not violate
their equal protection rights under the Alaska Constitution.346
Using a sliding scale approach to evaluate this purported loss of
equal protection rights, the court identified an important govern-
mental interest in ensuring that the project be completed on
schedule and within budget, particularly since the project involved
a school and its effect on 1,400 students.347  The court was satisfied
with the nexus between that interest and the challenged PLA.348
The court also held that the PLA did not violate the Bor-
ough’s procurement code.349  The procurement code expresses a
policy of encouraging “maximum practicable competition.”350
However, such a policy does not require “unfettered competi-
tion.”351  To the contrary, the procurement code observes that en-
couraging maximum open competition must be weighed against
satisfying the borough’s minimum needs, which can include school
construction with the least disruption possible.352  The question be-
came whether the Borough had a reasonable basis to use the PLA,
and the court found that it did due to the unique issues raised by
the school construction project.353
In Methvin v. Bartholomew,354 the supreme court held that an
employee’s letters addressing personal conflicts with his supervi-
sors did not raise issues of public concern and thus did not impli-
cate First Amendment protections.355 Methvin, an employee of the
State Department of Transportation and Public Facilities, wrote
letters to the Governor and Lieutenant Governor of Alaska rec-
ommending that his supervisors be fired.356  Methvin’s claim, upon
being terminated, that he had engaged in protected whistleblower
activity was discounted because the court found the letters to be
part of an internal office dispute.357
345. See id. at 427.
346. See id. at 432.
347. See id. at 429-31.
348. See id. at 431.
349. See id. at 432.
350. Id. (quoting Fairbanks North Star Borough Code § 16.35.010 (1993)).
351. Id. at 434.
352. See id.
353. See id. at 435.
354. 971 P.2d 151 (Alaska 1998).
355. See id. at 156.
356. See id. at 153.
357. See id. at 155.
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In Vaska v. State,358 the Alaska Court of Appeals held that
where a judge’s law clerk is found to have either actual bias or a
reasonable appearance of bias with regard to the outcome of a
case, any of the court’s rulings in which that clerk is shown to have
participated significantly are presumptively invalidated.359  Vaska
appealed a conviction for sexual abuse of a minor, claiming the
judge’s rulings were tainted by a law clerk who was discovered
both to have passed a memorandum expressing partisanship to the
district attorney and to have had sexual relations with an assistant
district attorney.360
VI. CRIMINAL LAW
A. Constitutional Protections
1.   Search and Seizure.   In Cowles v. State,361 the Alaska
Court of Appeals held that a theater box office does not provide a
reasonable expectation of privacy to someone who works there.362
Cowles, a box office manager at the University of Alaska-
Fairbanks, was convicted of theft for taking funds from the box
office for her personal use.363  Acting on a tip from university
officials, police installed video cameras inside the box office that
taped Cowles committing the theft.364  Cowles argued that the use
of video equipment was an unreasonable search violating Article I,
Section 14 and Article I, Section 22 of the Alaska Constitution.365
To determine whether Cowles was protected from unreasonable
government intrusion under the circumstances, the court applied
the test established in State v. Page,366 which protects a person’s
privacy only when that person’s subjective expectation of privacy is
reasonable.367  The court gave two reasons for its holding that the
box office did not provide a reasonable expectation of privacy.
First, the box office had a large window in front and a door that
was usually open, and was frequented by other employees
throughout the day.368  Second, the box office was a place where
358. 955 P.2d 943 (Alaska Ct. App. 1998).
359. See id. at 947.
360. See id. at 944.
361. 961 P.2d 438 (Alaska Ct. App. 1998).
362. See id. at 443.
363. See id. at 441.
364. See id.
365. See id. at 442.
366. 911 P.2d 513 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996).
367. See Cowles, 961 P.2d at 442 (citing Page, 911 P.2d at 515-16).
368. See id. at 443-44.
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money was exchanged and stored, and these activities often are
accompanied by security measures, including videotaping.369
In State v. Prater,370 the court of appeals held that an investiga-
tive stop made by a police officer in reliance upon a dispatcher’s
bulletin is justified if the dispatcher who broadcast the information
had a reasonable suspicion of imminent public danger justifying
the stop.371  Officers had stopped Prater after hearing from a dis-
patcher of a Report Every Drunk Driver Immediately (“REDDI”)
report regarding a driver in a car whose description matched that
of Prater’s.372  The officers making the stop did not possess addi-
tional information  known to the dispatcher, including that Prater
was driving with a suspended license and that he had previous ar-
rests for driving while intoxicated.373  The court held that informa-
tion known by a police dispatcher may be imputed to a police offi-
cer who is making an arrest, even if the police are not part of the
same “police team” as the arresting officer.374
In Snider v. State,375 the court of appeals held that a police offi-
cer has probable cause to conduct a warrantless search of a person
for narcotics where the officer reasonably believed that the person
was intoxicated or where a search incidental to the arrest revealed
the likelihood that the suspect possessed narcotics.376  An officer
responded to a report that Snider was waving a handgun on a pub-
lic road and appeared to be hallucinating.377  Upon arresting Snider
for possession of a gun while intoxicated, the officer conducted a
search to discover whether Snider possessed any other weapons.378
During this search, he discovered a crack pipe and a small box that,
upon examination, contained crack cocaine.379  The court held that
the discovery of the pipe during the weapons search rendered rea-
sonable a search of Snider’s person for drugs incident to the ar-
rest.380  Alternatively, since the officer’s observations of Snider’s
behavior provided probable cause for the belief that Snider was
using cocaine, and since Snider ultimately was arrested for posses-
369. See id. at 444.
370. 958 P.2d 1110 (Alaska Ct. App. 1998).
371. See id. at 1113 (citing United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221 (1985)).
372. See id. at 1111.
373. See id.
374. Id.
375. 958 P.2d 1114 (Alaska Ct. App. 1998).
376. See id. at 1118.
377. See id. at 1114-15.
378. See id. at 1115.
379. See id.
380. See id. at 1118.
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sion of a weapon while intoxicated, the officer objectively was jus-
tified in conducting a drug search.381
In Michel v. State,382 the court of appeals held that “no tres-
passing” signs do not manifest a homeowner’s intent to keep away
all visitors.383  The Michels were visited by state troopers acting on
a tip that the Michels were growing marijuana.384  They claimed
that the troopers unreasonably intruded on their property, arguing
that the “no trespassing” signs posted on their property created a
reasonable expectation in their minds that police would not enter
their property.385  The court disagreed, finding guidance from an
Alaska Supreme Court decision, Pistro v. State.386  The court inter-
preted Pistro to suggest that “no trespassing” signs would not, by
themselves, insulate homeowners from all unsolicited visits by the
public; specifically, they would not exclude visitors who enter the
property for a legitimate purpose.387
In State v. James,388 the court of appeals held that the condi-
tions of a probationer’s agreement authorized warrantless home
searches by the probation officer.389  James’s probation agreement
stated that “[u]pon the request of a probation officer, [James must]
submit to a search of [his] . . . residence . . . for the presence of con-
traband.”390  After smelling marijuana from within James’s home,
James’s probation officer conducted a home search over James’s
objection.391  The court rejected James’s argument that if the pro-
bationer breaks the promise to waive all Fourth Amendment
rights, then the probation can be revoked, but no warrantless
search can be conducted.392  Instead, the court found that the provi-
sion authorizes probation officers to conduct searches even if the
probationer refuses to consent at the time of the search.393
2.   Miscellaneous.   In Titus v. Alaska,394 the Alaska Supreme
Court held that jury deliberations involving pre-existing juror
knowledge of facts not presented at trial concerning an alleged
381. See id.
382. 961 P.2d 436 (Alaska Ct. App. 1998).
383. See id. at 438.
384. See id. at 437.
385. See id.
386. 590 P.2d 884 (Alaska 1979).
387. See Michel, 961 P.2d at 437.
388. 963 P.2d 1080 (Alaska Ct. App. 1998).
389. See id. at 1084.
390. Id. at 1081.
391. See id.
392. See id. at 1083.
393. See id.
394. 963 P.2d 258 (Alaska 1998).
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crime may constitute extraneous prejudicial information for
purposes of finding juror misconduct.395  Titus was convicted of
sexual assault by a jury drawn from a small community in which he
was generally known.396  Jury deliberations involved discussion of
his drinking habit, an issue not raised at trial, and several jurors
suggested Titus was drinking when the alleged crime occurred.397
Alaska Rule of Evidence 606(b) disallows juror testimony about
jury deliberations except where such deliberations involved
extraneous prejudicial information.398  The court concluded that the
extraneous prejudicial information exception should include “only
knowledge of specific facts surrounding the alleged crime and the
defendant’s connection to it”399 in order to protect the defendant’s
constitutional right to confrontation over specific allegations.400
General knowledge of the defendant or charge does not come
within the exception because it would undermine the ability of
small communities to hold jury trials.401  Because it was unclear
whether the jurors claimed to know Titus was drinking or were
merely speculating based on general knowledge, the court
remanded to the superior court for further proceedings.402
In Hosier v. State,403 the Alaska Court of Appeals held that a
court abuses its discretion when it releases a defendant on bail
during a merit appeal if the same defendant would be ineligible for
release during a sentence appeal.404  Hosier challenged the superior
court’s denial of bail during his merit appeal in accordance with
Alaska Statutes section 12.30.040(b),405 which denies bail in merit
appeals following a class A felony conviction.406  Since he would
have been eligible for release on bail if he had filed a sentence ap-
peal, Hosier argued that the law penalizes defendants who file
merit appeals in violation of the equal protection clause of the
Alaska Constitution.407
The court reaffirmed its holding in Debrova v. State408 that, in
the absence of a constitutional provision or governing statute, the
395. See id. at 255-59.
396. See id. at 259.
397. See id.
398. See id. at 260.
399. Id. at 263.
400. See id. at 262.
401. See id. at 263.
402. See id. at 264.
403. 957 P.2d 1360 (Alaska Ct. App. 1998).
404. See id. at 1365.
405. ALASKA STAT. § 12.30.040(b) (Michie 1996).
406. See id.
407. See Hosier, 957 P.2d at 1362.
408. 694  P.2d 157 (Alaska 1985).
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judiciary retains its power to declare the common law and promul-
gate rules to govern litigation.409  However, the court found that a
trial court abuses its discretion and violates equal protection where
it exercises its common law power of bail in a manner that treats
merit-appeal defendants less favorably than sentence-appeal de-
fendants.410  Furthermore, AS 12.55.120(c) reflects a legislative in-
tention that defendants who cannot obtain bail during merit-
appeals under AS 12.30.040(b) should not gain any advantage by
attacking their sentence on appeal.411  Consequently, when a de-
fendant requests bail release during a sentence appeal, the court
must not release the defendant if he would be barred from ob-
taining bail during a merit appeal.412
In State v. Ladd,413 the court of appeals held that Alaska Stat-
utes section 47.12.030(a),414 requiring juveniles charged with a seri-
ous felony but convicted of a lesser offense to prove amenability to
juvenile treatment,415 does not violate the equal protection clause
of the Alaska Constitution.416  Ladd originally was charged with
first-degree assault, a felony that placed him within the scope of
the statute.417  He was acquitted of that charge but was convicted of
fourth-degree assault, a misdemeanor.418  Under Alaska juvenile
delinquency laws, a juvenile charged with and convicted of fourth-
degree assault does not have to prove amenability.419  The court
acknowledged that AS 47.12.030(a) makes a distinction between
groups that are similarly situated at the time of sentencing and
subjects them to different treatment.420  However, the court found
that juveniles charged with a serious felony may be distinguished
because a grand jury made a determination that they probably
committed the felony, while those charged only of the lesser of-
fense “never provided reason to believe that they committed one
of the serious felonies listed in the statute.”421
In Billman v. Anchorage,422 the court of appeals held that the
calculation for Alaska’s speedy trial rule, Criminal Rule 45, re-
409. See Hosier, 957 P.2d at 1362.
410. See id. at 1364.
411. See id. at 1365.
412. See id.
413. 951 P.2d 1220 (Alaska Ct. App. 1998).
414. ALASKA STAT. § 47.12.030(a) (Michie 1996).
415. See id.
416. See Ladd, 951 P.2d at 1226.
417. See id. at 1221.
418. See id.
419. See id. at 1221-22.
420. See id. at 1222.
421. Id. at 1223.
422. 954 P.2d 1380 (Alaska Ct. App. 1998).
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started the day following the court order to return jurisdiction over
the case to the district court.423  That order came in the aftermath
of State v. Zerkel,424 which held that administrative suspension or
revocation of a driver’s license does not constitute a punishment
for double jeopardy purposes.425  The court order instructed that all
cases held in abeyance pending a final decision in Zerkel should be
remanded to the trial courts.426  Restarting the speedy trial clock at
day one, upon remand, resulted in Billman being scheduled for
trial within the time limits of Rule 45.427
In Mustafoski v. State,428 the court of appeals held that Alaska
Criminal Rule 45’s speedy trial clock started anew when the de-
fendant announced his renewed intention to go to trial rather than
enter a plea.429  For purposes of Rule 45, the court drew no distinc-
tion between a defendant withdrawing a formally entered plea and
a defendant merely announcing that he no longer intended to
change his plea.430  In either case, the Rule 45 clock should restart
at day one.431
In Jacobs v. State,432 the court of appeals held that use of a paid
informant does not violate due process, even when the informer’s
fee is contingent upon the outcome of the case.433  The court drew a
distinction between paying an informant to provoke criminal ac-
tivity, as opposed to paying an informant to investigate ongoing
criminal activity by people already known to have a willingness to
break the law, and placed Jacobs’s situation in the latter cate-
gory.434  With respect to informant credibility, the court preferred
to leave the matter to the jury and pointed to the traditional safe-
guard of cross-examination.435
In Nao v. State,436 the court of appeals upheld the constitution-
ality of a statute which declares that delinquency laws do not apply
to sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds who commit serious felonies.437
423. See id. at 1383.
424. 900 P.2d 744 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995).
425. See id.
426. See Billman, 954 P.2d at 1382.
427. See id. at 1383.
428. 954 P.2d 1042 (Alaska Ct. App. 1998).
429. See id. at 1044.
430. See id.
431. See id.
432. 953 P.2d 527 (Alaska Ct. App. 1998).
433. See id. at 532.
434. See id. at 531.
435. See id. at 532-33.
436. 953 P.2d 522 (Alaska Ct. App. 1998).
437. See id. at 524.
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Nao claimed that Alaska Statutes section 47.12.030(a)438 is uncon-
stitutional because it was procedural and conflicted with the De-
linquency Rules promulgated by the Alaska Supreme Court.439
The court first rejected the notion that the statute was procedural.
It ruled that the statute was substantive in that it altered the scope
of the Delinquency Rules, and further stated that “it is the legisla-
ture’s province to decide which prosecutions shall be governed by
the normal criminal laws and which shall be governed by the juve-
nile delinquency laws.”440  As a substantive statute affecting the
scope of the rules, AS 47.12.030(a) does not conflict with the rules,
which themselves declare that their coverage may be modified by
other laws.441
In Mute v. State,442 the court of appeals held that Mute’s rela-
tionship with his court-appointed attorney had not deteriorated to
the point where the attorney was incapable of effective communi-
cation or objective decision-making.443  Furthermore, even if the
relationship suffered a breakdown, it did not invalidate Mute’s
waiver of his right to testify.444  The decision whether to testify or
remain silent at trial resides with the defendant.445  To this end, the
Alaska Supreme Court established the LaVigne rule,446 which re-
quires the trial judge to advise the defendant personally that re-
gardless of the defense attorney’s advice, the choice whether to
testify ultimately rests with the defendant.447  The court acknowl-
edged the conundrum that arises from requiring an on-record, vol-
untary waiver of the right to testify, namely what to do with defen-
dants who are not willing to relinquish knowingly either the right
to testify or the right to remain silent.448  Judges cannot compel de-
fendants to testify.449  To avoid this conundrum, the court con-
cluded that a judge need not question the defendant closely about
his decision not to testify or order the defendant to testify, even if
the judge is convinced that the defendant’s decision is ill-advised.450
The record below showed that Mute understood that he held this
438. ALASKA STAT. § 47.12.030(a) (Michie 1996).
439. See Nao, 953 P.2d at 524.
440. Id. at 525.
441. See id. at 526.
442. 954 P.2d 1384 (Alaska Ct. App. 1998).
443. See id. at 1385.
444. See id. at 1386.
445. See id.
446. See LaVigne v. State, 812 P.2d 217 (Alaska 1991).
447. See Mute, 954 P.2d at 1386.
448. See id. at 1387.
449. See id.
450. See id.
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choice, and in fact he affirmatively asserted his right not to testify,
so his underlying reasons were immaterial.451
In Nathan v. Municipality of Anchorage,452 the court of appeals
held that a deaf defendant knowingly waived his right to an inde-
pendent blood test after being arrested for driving while intoxi-
cated.453  Even though Nathan read at a third-grade level and had
only limited ability to read lips,454 he possessed a basic under-
standing of English.  Additionally, when presented with a pen and
paper, Nathan made no indication that he did not understand, nor
did he request assistance.455  Because the lower court found that ef-
fective communication took place between Nathan and the arrest-
ing officers, no violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act
(“ADA”) occurred as a result of the absence of an interpreter to
accommodate Nathan’s hearing and speech impairment.456  The
court further noted that even if Nathan could establish an ADA
violation, exclusion of the breath test results would not be an ap-
propriate remedy.457
In Newby v. Alaska,458 the court of appeals held that where the
claim concerns a conflict of interest between clients in unrelated
cases, the defendant has the burden of proving counsel had a con-
flict of interest and that the conflict affected representation.459
Newby appealed a murder conviction alleging conflict of interest
and ineffective assistance of counsel.460  His attorney, Madson,
rented office space to a second attorney, Covell, who stood in for
Madson on a number of occasions during Newby’s case in ex-
change for rent deductions.461  Covell, in turn, represented Wood
who was suing the state for possession of money kept on the
premises of the man Newby was charged with murdering.462  Newby
claimed Madson and Covell neglected defense theories that might
have had the effect of implying that the money on the victim’s
premises did not belong to Wood.463  Because Newby’s conflict of
interest claim involved clients in unrelated cases, even where that
conflict was brought explicitly to the trial judge’s attention, LaPi-
451. See id. at 1388.
452. 955 P.2d 528 (Alaska Ct. App. 1998).
453. See id. at 532.
454. See id. at 529.
455. See id. at 531.
456. See id. at 532.
457. See id. at 533.
458. 967 P.2d 1008 (Alaska Ct. App. 1998).
459. See id. at 1014.
460. See id. at 1009.
461. See id.
462. See id. at 1010.
463. See id.
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erre v. Alaska464 determines the allocation of the burden of proof.465
Thus, Newby had to show that his lawyer had a conflict of interest
with Wood via Covell and that this conflict affected the represen-
tation Newby received.466
Although the court found that the details of the relationship
between Madson and Covell appeared to indicate they did not
constitute a firm, Newby’s claims failed for other reasons as well.467
The record showed that Madson had considered and investigated
all the theories Newby felt were neglected before deciding upon a
defense strategy.468  There was no indication of a potential conflict
of interest.469  Similarly, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
failed because nothing suggested Madson did not act competently
or make sound tactical choices in defending Newby.470
In Laverty v. State,471 the court of appeals held that neither the
collateral estoppel doctrine nor double jeopardy rights prohibited
Texas’s second attempt to extradite a fugitive from Alaska.472
Texas sought to extradite Laverty from Alaska for violating his
conditions of probation on a conviction for driving while intoxi-
cated.473  An Alaska district court judge found the extradition re-
quest to be deficient and granted Laverty’s application for habeas
corpus after 165 days in custody.474  Laverty was later arrested and
charged in Alaska for driving while intoxicated.475  Texas filed new
extradition documents, which Laverty challenged on two grounds:
collateral estoppel and double jeopardy.476  Laverty’s collateral es-
toppel argument failed because the district court’s grant of
Laverty’s habeas corpus application, based merely on deficient ex-
tradition papers, was an interlocutory order, rather than a final
judgment, and therefore not subject to collateral estoppel.477  The
double jeopardy claim also failed because such claims can be made
only after a trial on the merits.478
464. 734 P.2d 1997 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987).
465. See Newby, 967 P.2d at 1014.
466. See id.
467. See id. at 1015.
468. See id. at 1016.
469. See id. at 1015.
470. See id. at 1016.
471. 963 P.2d 1076 (Alaska Ct. App. 1998).
472. See id. at 1078-79.
473. See id. at 1077.
474. See id.
475. See id. at 1077-78.
476. See id. at 1078.
477. See id. at 1079.
478. See id.
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B. General Criminal Law
1.   Criminal Procedure.   In Pearce v. State,479 the Alaska
Court of Appeals held that a trial court judge abused his discretion
in refusing to grant the defense attorney’s request to reopen
peremptory challenges before jurors had been sworn.480  After each
side waived its remaining peremptory challenges and accepted the
twelve selected jurors, but before the jurors had been sworn, the
defense attorney received an anonymous tip alleging that one juror
had been dishonest during voir dire.481  Although the court
acknowledged a trial judge’s discretion over whether to allow an
attorney to retract waiver of remaining peremptory challenges, it
stated that a judge should release attorneys from such waivers if
there is good cause for doing so.482  The court found that the
defense attorney acted in good faith and for good cause in seeking
to reopen the peremptory challenges.483  Furthermore, reopening
the peremptory challenges would not have disrupted or delayed
the trial.484
In Bailey v. Municipality of Anchorage,485 the court of appeals
held that receipt of the “Order and Conditions of Release” form at
an arrestee’s initial appearance before a magistrate does not con-
stitute a charging document and therefore does not trigger the
running of time for trial.486  Although Bailey was arrested and
brought before a magistrate who signed an “Order and Conditions
of Release” form, a criminal complaint was not filed by the Mu-
nicipality of Anchorage for over two months.487  Bailey argued that
the form constituted a charging document under Criminal Rule
45(c)(1)488 and therefore triggered the running of time for bringing
her to trial.489  However, the court held that a person’s arrest and
initial appearance before a magistrate does not trigger the running
of time for trial, defining a proper charging document as a
“criminal complaint, indictment, information, or citation - a docu-
479. 951 P.2d 445 (Alaska Ct. App. 1998).
480. See id. at 447.
481. See id. at 446.
482. See id. at 447.
483. See id.
484. See id.
485. 955 P.2d 947 (Alaska Ct. App. 1998).
486. See id. at 948.
487. See id.
488. See ALASKA CRIM. R. 45(c)(1).
489. See Bailey, 955 P.2d at 948.
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ment that is legally sufficient to initiate a criminal lawsuit and sup-
port the ensuing issuance of process.”490
In Fathke v. State,491 the court of appeals held that a criminal
court may not refuse to subpoena finger and palm prints of the
employee of a store that was robbed where the evidence could lead
to a change in the verdict.492  Fathke was convicted of robbing a
store of $80 and a meatball sandwich even though his palm print
did not match the print on the sandwich bag.493  At trial, the court
refused Fathke’s motion to subpoena the store clerk who wrapped
the sandwich to produce finger and palm prints, so that the prints
could be compared with those on the sandwich bag.494  Fathke ar-
gued that if the print on the bag did not belong to the clerk or to
himself, then it must belong to an unknown third person.495  The
court of appeals agreed that discovering the prints of a third per-
son on the bag would have reduced the probability that Fathke was
the robber.496  The evidentiary value of unidentified prints heavily
outweighed any possible embarrassment to the store clerk or intru-
sion of her privacy.497  The court concluded that the evidence could
have led to a change in the verdict, noting that there were enough
inconsistencies in the state’s case that the error was not harmless.498
In Seibold v. State, 499 the court of appeals held that a defen-
dant is entitled to an instruction on the necessity defense where he
presents some evidence in support of its three elements.500  Seibold
had been engaged in a dispute with one of his neighbors immedi-
ately following an accident involving their vehicles.501  During the
altercation, the neighbor’s wife approached carrying a handgun.502
Seibold was able to take the weapon from her and he destroyed it
on the spot.503  He was convicted of criminal mischief of the third
degree for destroying the handgun after the judge refused to in-
struct the jury on the necessity defense.504
490. Id. at 949.
491. 951 P.2d 1226 (Alaska Ct. App. 1998).
492. See id. at 1231.
493. See id. at 1227.
494. See id. at 1228.
495. See id.
496. See id. at 1230.
497. See id.
498. See id. at 1231.
499. 959 P.2d 780 (Alaska Ct. App. 1998).
500. See id. at 782 (citing Degler v. State, 741 P.2d 659, 661 (Alaska Ct. App.
1987)).
501. See id. at 781.
502. See id.
503. See id.
504. See id. at 782.
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To establish a defense of necessity under Alaska law, a defen-
dant must show that he reasonably believed that the charged act
was done to prevent a significant evil, that he reasonably believed
that no adequate alternative existed, and that the harm caused was
not disproportionate to the harm avoided.505  The court held that a
defendant is entitled to a jury instruction on the defense if he pres-
ents some evidence in support of each of the three elements.506  The
court also noted that a trial judge should err on the side of giving
the instruction so as to avoid a needless appeal where the case for
self-defense is weak.507  The case raised the question of whether it
was necessary for Seibold to destroy the weapon in order to avoid
the possibility of its use in an assault.508  Since this turns on the spe-
cific facts of the case, the jury should have been allowed to deter-
mine the sufficiency of this defense.509
In Kailukiak v. State,510 the court of appeals held that a judge’s
decision to allow a witness to testify by telephone at a pre-trial
evidentiary hearing was harmless error.511  When first suspected of
sexual assault, Kailukiak had come in for an interview with a state
trooper and a village public safety officer.512  Kailukiak later sought
to have his statements in this interview excluded because he had
not been advised of his Miranda rights.513  The public safety officer
was on National Guard maneuvers in Hawaii and could not attend
the hearing, but was allowed by the judge to testify by telephone.514
Telephone participation by witnesses is allowed at omnibus
hearings, bail hearings, at trial with the consent of the defendant
and the prosecution, and in other hearings at the discretion of the
court.515  The court held that the evidentiary hearing constituted an
“omnibus hearing” for purposes of the rule and that the superior
court was not authorized to allow telephone testimony over the
objection of the defense.516  However, since the testimony of wit-
nesses suggested that the trial judge would have denied the motion
505. See id. (citing Bird v. Anchorage, 787 P.2d 119, 120-21 (Alaska Ct. App.
1990)).
506. See id.
507. See id.
508. See id. at 783.
509. See id.
510. 959 P.2d 771 (Alaska Ct. App. 1998).
511. See id. at 776.
512. See id. at 774.
513. See id.
514. See id.
515. See id. (citing ALASKA CRIM. R. 38.1).
516. See id. at 775.
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to suppress regardless of the testimony of the public safety officer,
the admission of the telephone testimony was harmless error.517
2.   Evidence.   In Calapp v. State,518 the Alaska Court of
Appeals held that a defendant’s prior convictions must bear a
relevant factual similarity to the offense charged before they can
be admitted to prove intent, knowledge, or absence of accident or
mistake in the current charge.519  Calapp was convicted of second
degree theft on the theory that he had concealed, received, or
disposed of stolen property with the intent to appropriate the
property of another and with reckless disregard that the property
had been stolen.520  The trial judge admitted evidence of Calapp’s
three previous convictions for theft and forgery to rebut his claim
that the disposition and receipt of the property was the result of a
mistake or accident.521
Under Alaska Evidence Rules 403 and 404(b)(1), in order to
be admissible a judge must determine that evidence of prior bad
acts is relevant for purposes other than showing criminal propen-
sity, and that its probative value exceeds its potential for unfair
prejudice.522  The state did not attempt to explain how Calapp’s
prior convictions bore any relevance to whether Calapp knew that
the property in the present case was stolen.523  Consequently, the
jury could have used the evidence only to conclude that Calapp
had a general propensity to lie and steal, and the admission of such
evidence was an abuse of discretion.524
In Sakeagak v. State,525 the court of appeals upheld a first de-
gree murder conviction and ninety-nine-year prison sentence,
holding that it was proper to allow the jury to hear testimony by a
police investigator that he believed the defendant to be guilty be-
fore he interviewed him.526  The court recognized the rule stated in
Flynn v. State,527 that personal opinions of a defendant’s guilt or in-
nocence may not be given.528  The court then distinguished the in-
stant case from Flynn, in that the investigator’s testimony clearly
was given in the context of resolving the peripheral issue of  why
517. See id.
518. 959 P.2d 385 (Alaska Ct. App. 1998).
519. See id. at 388.
520. See id. at 386-87.
521. See id. at 387.
522. See id. at 387-88.
523. See id. at 388.
524. See id.
525. 952 P.2d 278 (Alaska Ct. App. 1998).
526. See id. at 282.
527. 847 P.2d 1073 (Alaska Ct. App. 1993)
528. See id. at 1075-76.
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the investigator adopted a confrontational strategy in the inter-
view.529  In addition, the court noted that other evidence showed
what facts the investigator was aware of at the time of the inter-
view, so that the jurors would be able to determine for themselves
whether the investigator’s suspicion was reasonable.530
In Ballard v. State,531 the court of appeals held that the hori-
zontal gaze nystagmus (“HGN”) test is grounded in generally ac-
cepted scientific theory and thus is admissible as scientific evidence
indicating a person potentially is intoxicated, provided that the test
is not used to show a specific blood-alcohol level or degree of im-
pairment.532  In order for a police officer’s testimony regarding a
person’s performance of the HGN test to be admissible, however,
it must be shown that the officer has been trained adequately to
administer and assess the test.533  Although Ballard’s arresting offi-
cer deviated from proper testing procedures, the deviation was not
significant enough to prevent a jury from finding the test would
yield relevant test results.534  The arresting officer’s testimony that
Ballard’s test performance indicated he was “very impaired” might
have been an impermissible attempt to correlate test results with
the degree of impairment or intoxication, but because the HGN
test was only one of a battery of tests presented as evidence of
Ballard’s intoxication, any such error this statement might have
caused would have been harmless.535
In Clark v. State,536 the court of appeals held that evidence of a
defendant’s proclivity to assault women was inadmissible where
the prior acts were not similar enough to the instant case to draw a
reasonable inference of the defendant’s intent.537  The trial court
convicted Clark of attempted kidnapping, attempted sexual abuse
of a minor, assault, and other crimes for an incident in which he
harassed two young girls and chased them home in his truck.538  At
trial, the court admitted the testimony of three women whom
Clark had sexually assaulted in the past.539  Each woman was an
adult, and each had encountered Clark at or around a bar.540  The
court of appeals found that this distinguished the three prior cases
529. See Sakeagak, 952 P.2d at 282.
530. See id.
531. 955 P.2d 931 (Alaska Ct. App. 1998).
532. See id. at 940.
533. See id. at 941.
534. See id. at 942.
535. Id. at 942-43.
536. 953 P.2d 159 (Alaska Ct. App. 1998).
537. See id. at 162.
538. See id. at 161.
539. See id. at 161-62.
540. See id.
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from the instant case enough that the evidence could not be used
to demonstrate Clark’s intent toward the young girls.541  Instead,
the only purpose of the evidence was to show Clark’s propensity to
engage in similar misconduct, which made the evidence inadmissi-
ble under Alaska Rule of Evidence 404(b)(1).542
In Sivertsen v. Alaska,543 the court of appeals held that admis-
sion of evidence concerning a warning call police received about a
defendant was harmless error, that oral statements taken from a
witness shortly before trial need not have been disclosed in discov-
ery, that comments by a prosecutor indicating that intent may be
inferred from a person’s actions were appropriate, and that a com-
posite sentence in excess of the maximum sentence for any of the
individual charges must be vacated where the sentence is not justi-
fied as necessary to protect the public.544  Sivertsen was convicted
of second degree burglary and second degree theft after being dis-
covered breaking out of the Merchant Wharf building in Juneau
with cash equal to an amount missing from a cruise line office
during the early morning hours.545  He had been followed the entire
night as a result of a warning phone call made by the Ketchikan
Police Department to the Juneau Police Department.
The admission of evidence concerning the phone call from the
Ketchikan police department was appropriate because it was ac-
companied by a limiting instruction that the jury was only to con-
sider it to explain why the police followed Sivertsen the night of
the crime,546 and even if inappropriate, it was harmless.547  Sivert-
sen’s motion for a mistrial when the prosecutor introduced testi-
mony not made available during discovery was properly denied
because Alaska Criminal Rule 16(b)(1)(i) does not mandate dis-
closure of a witness’ oral statements made during trial preparation
close to trial commencement.548  Finally, comments by the prosecu-
tor asserting that intent can be inferred by actions did not imper-
missibly shift the burden of proof because they merely instructed
the jury with regard to what it was permitted to infer.549  Never-
theless, Sivertsen’s sentence was vacated because his six-year com-
posite sentence exceeded the five-year maximum term for either
crime, and a composite sentence can exceed the maximum sen-
541. See id. at 162-63.
542. See id.
543. 963 P.2d 1069 (Alaska Ct. App. 1998).
544. See id. at 1071-74.
545. See id. at 1070.
546. See id. at 1070-71.
547. See id. at 1071.
548. See id at 1072.
549. See id.
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tence for the defendant’s most serious crime only where such a
sentence is necessary to protect the public.550
In Hazelwood v. State,551 the court of appeals held that the er-
roneous admission of an oil tanker captain’s statements and evi-
dence of his intoxication during an accident was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.552  A jury convicted Hazelwood of negligent dis-
charge of oil, but some of the evidence was admitted erroneously
under the inevitable discovery doctrine.553  With respect to Hazel-
wood’s erroneously admitted statements, the court found them to
be cumulative of similar admissible evidence and thus to have had
a negligible evidentiary impact.554  As to evidence of Hazelwood’s
intoxication, the jury acquitted him on the charge of operating a
vessel while intoxicated, and Hazelwood’s conviction for negligent
discharge of oil did not require a showing of intoxication.555  Thus,
the court found no reasonable possibility that the evidence af-
fected the jury’s decision.556
In Patterson v. State,557 the court of appeals held that Evidence
Rule 901(a) does not require the government to rule out all possi-
bility of tampering or produce all persons who had contact with the
evidence.558  At Patterson’s trial for drug possession, the state
sought admission of drugs taken from Patterson.559  Patterson ob-
jected on the ground that the state failed to identify the employee
who packaged the evidence for transport to the lab and the officer
who took the evidence to the lab.560  The court held that for pur-
poses of a prosecution for drug possession, Evidence Rule 901 re-
quires only that the government prove to a reasonable certainty
that the substance identified as a controlled substance is the same
substance that was in the defendant’s possession earlier and that
the substance was not altered before testing.561
3.   Sentencing.   In Scroggins v. State,562 the Alaska Court of
Appeals held that a defendant’s prior conviction for lewd and
lascivious acts upon a child in another state was not a prior felony
550. See id. at 1074.
551. 962 P.2d 196 (Alaska Ct. App. 1998).
552. See id. at 198.
553. See id. at 197.
554. See id. at 199.
555. See id. at 200-01.
556. See id. at 201.
557. 966 P.2d 553 (Alaska Ct. App. 1998).
558. See id. at 555.
559. See id. at 555-56.
560. See id. at 555.
561. See id.
562. 951 P.2d 442 (Alaska Ct. App. 1998).
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conviction for purposes of Alaska’s presumptive sentencing
statute.563  Scroggins had a prior conviction in California for lewd
or lascivious acts upon a child.564  His subsequent Alaska conviction
resulted in the imposition of an aggravated sentence under Alaska
Statutes section 12.55.145(a)(1)(B),565 which provides for an
aggravated presumptive sentence where an offender has a prior
conviction of “an offense having elements similar to those of a
felony defined as such under Alaska law.”566  The California statute
that Scroggins previously had been convicted of violating
prohibited mere contact with a child for the purpose of sexual
gratification.567  However, the analogous Alaska statute, AS
11.81.900(b)(51), prohibited the touching of specific body parts of
a child for the purpose of sexual gratification.568  As a result, the
prior California conviction was not sufficiently similar to the
analogous Alaska felony for a presumptive sentence to be
imposed.569
In Hodari v. State,570 the court of appeals held that a sentence
of fifty-five years of imprisonment was excessive for two counts of
sexual assault in the first degree, robbery in the first degree, and
assault in the second degree.571  The court agreed with the trial
judge’s finding that Hodari had committed technical kidnapping572
and applied the sentencing guidelines of Williams v. State.573  While
the court conceded that Hodari’s behavior was more aggravated
than Williams’ and merited more than a thirty-year sentence, the
court found Hodari’s behavior to be less aggravated than other
conduct that received sentences of forty years or more.574  Thus, the
court refused to approve a sentence greater than forty years.575
In Cragg v. State,576 the court of appeals held that sentencing
courts must strike from a presentence report allegations that have
563. See id. at 444.
564. See id. at 443.
565. ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.145(a)(1)(B) (Michie 1996).
566. Id.
567. See Scroggins, 951 P.2d at 443-44; see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 288(a)
(West 1988).
568. See Scroggins, 951 P.2d at 444.
569. See id.
570. 954 P.2d 1048 (Alaska Ct. App. 1998).
571. See id. at 1049-52.
572. See id. at 1050 n.3.
573. See id. at 1051-52; see also Williams v. State, 800 P.2d 955 (Alaska Ct.
App. 1990), on rehearing, 809 P.2d 931 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991).
574. See Hodari, 954 P.2d at 1051-52.
575. See id. at 1052.
576. 957 P.2d 1365 (Alaska Ct. App. 1998).
YIR.CONVERT.DOC 05/14/99  5:20 PM
154 ALASKA LAW REVIEW [16:1
been litigated and resolved in the defendant’s favor.577  The state
sought to revoke Cragg’s probation on grounds that he failed to
report to his probation officer and was found in possession of nar-
cotics.578  While the judge at the adjudication hearing determined
that the state had not proven the narcotics allegations, the proba-
tion officer’s opinion regarding the alleged possession was in-
cluded in the presentencing report.579  The court of appeals held
that only verified allegations of misconduct could be included in a
presentence report, even if the judge had determined that he
would disregard these unproven allegations at sentencing.580
In Gilley v. State,581 the court of appeals held that sentencing
judges have no authority under Alaska Statutes section
12.55.145(a)582 to ignore prior felony convictions and treat third
felony offenders as second felony offenders.583  Gilley, relying on
the commentary to AS 12.55.145, contended that the statute gives
a sentencing court the discretion to disregard felony convictions
that are more than ten years old.584  However, the statute itself
makes no such distinction.585  Furthermore, the statute’s legislative
history illustrates the legislature’s intent to design a presumptive
sentencing framework to ensure uniformity and predictability in
sentencing.586  Allowing sentencing judges to ignore a defendant’s
prior convictions would undermine this legislative intent.587
In Pickard v. State,588 the court of appeals held that a defen-
dant’s history of violence against the victim and the failure of past
rehabilitative efforts support a sentence more severe than the pre-
sumptive one for a first felony offender.589  Pickard pled no contest
to third degree felony assault after beating his ex-wife and threat-
ening to kill her with a knife.590  He previously had been convicted
of fourth degree assault and third degree criminal mischief in sepa-
rate assaults on his ex-wife.591  While the presumptive term for sec-
ond felony offenders is only two years, the superior court, citing
577. See id. at 1367.
578. See id. at 1366-67.
579. See id. at 1367.
580. See id. at 1368 (citing ALASKA CRIM. R. 32.2(a)(3)).
581. 955 P.2d 927 (Alaska Ct. App. 1998).
582. ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.145(a) (Michie 1996).
583. See Gilley, 955 P.2d at 931.
584. See id. at 929.
585. See id.
586. See id at 930.
587. See id.
588. 965 P.2d 755 (Alaska Ct. App. 1998).
589. See id. at 755.
590. See id. at 757.
591. See id. at 758.
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numerous aggravating factors, imposed a sentence of five years
with one suspended, and Pickard appealed.592  The court of appeals
held that the substantial sentence did not violate the “principle of
parsimony,” the notion that a sentence should be no more severe
than necessary to achieve the sentencing objectives codified in
Alaska Statutes section 12.55.055.593  Although the sentence was
severe for a first time felony offender, the case record adequately
supported the sentence and was not clearly mistaken.594
In Andrews v. State,595 the court of appeals held that for pur-
poses of finding sentencing aggravators, “prior criminal history”
includes acts committed as a juvenile,596 but that two felony convic-
tions stemming from the same criminal episode can be counted
only as one prior felony conviction for the purposes of finding a
sentencing aggravator.597  Andrews was convicted on two counts of
second degree robbery for crimes involving the seizure of a pair of
scissors and a can of soda.598  Because Andrews was a third-time
felony offender, he received a total term of twelve years for two
convictions, onto which two more years were added based on the
sentencing court’s finding of three aggravators.599  The court found
the “aggravator” under Alaska Statutes section 12.55.155(c)(8),
which covers instances of “assaultive behavior” in a defendant’s
“prior criminal history,” encompassed acts committed as a juvenile
even though such acts are not technically crimes.600  Because An-
drews had murdered his adoptive parents as a juvenile, (c)(8) ap-
plied.601  Andrews’s challenge to aggravator AS 12.55.155(c)(10)
was dismissed because it had not been preserved for appeal.602
However, aggravator AS 12.55.155(c)(15), that the defendant has
three prior felony convictions, did not apply.603  Andrews’s 1988
felony convictions for burglary and theft arose from a single crimi-
nal episode and resulted in concurrent sentences, and thus, under
AS 12.55.145(a)(1)(C), the convictions could be treated only as a
single felony conviction for sentencing purposes.604  Because An-
drews’ sentence was lengthy for two class B felonies, and because
592. See id. at 759.
593. Id. at 760-61.
594. See id. at 762.
595. 967 P.2d 1016 (Alaska Ct. App. 1998).
596. Id. at 1019.
597. See id. at 1021.
598. See id. at 1017.
599. See id.
600. Id. at 1019.
601. See id.; see also ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.155(c)(8) (Michie 1996).
602. See Andrews, 967 P.2d at 1020.
603. See id. at 1020-21.
604. See id. at 1020.
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the circumstances presented “mitigated instances of robbery,” the
case was remanded for resentencing on the basis of the overturned
aggravator.605
In Wilson v. State,606 the court of appeals held that a statute re-
quiring juveniles convicted of lesser felonies to assume the burden
of proving amenability to treatment as juveniles is constitutional,
and that, for purposes of presumptive sentencing, a youth coun-
selor could be considered a correctional officer.607  Wilson, an in-
mate at a juvenile facility, was convicted of second degree assault
for attacking a youth counselor in the process of an attempted es-
cape.608  Wilson’s challenges to the constitutionality of Alaska Stat-
utes section 47.12.030(a) failed because State v. Ladd609 affirmed
that the statute does not violate the equal protection and due
process clauses of the Alaska Constitution.610 The court also re-
jected Wilson’s challenge to a two-year presumptive sentence term
based on his assault on a correctional officer carrying out her du-
ties.611  The court found that the youth counselor Wilson assaulted
bore the same responsibilities and risks working at a juvenile insti-
tution that correctional officers working at adult facilities faced
and thus should be considered a correctional officer for purposes
of the sentencing statute.612
In White v. State,613 the court of appeals held that a defendant
can be classified as a “worst offender” based on either the defen-
dant’s criminal history, the circumstances surrounding the present
offense, or both.614  White was arrested for driving while intoxi-
cated (“DWI”), released, ordered not to drive for twenty-four
hours, and then arrested again for the same offense two hours
later.615  During his ride to the police station, White kicked an offi-
cer in the face.616  White had twelve prior DWI convictions and had
three prior assault convictions, two involving police officers.617  He
was convicted of DWI and, based on White’s criminal history, the
superior court found that two aggravators under Alaska Statutes
605. Id. at 1021.
606. 967 P.2d 98 (Alaska Ct. App. 1998).
607. See id. at 105.
608. See id. at 99.
609. 951 P.2d 1220 (Alaska Ct. App. 1998).
610. See Wilson, 967 P.2d at 100.
611. See id. at 103.
612. See id. at 105.
613. 969 P.2d 646 (Alaska Ct. App. 1998).
614. See id. at 648.
615. See id. at 647.
616. See id.
617. See id. at 647-48.
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section 12.55.155(c) applied.618  The court deemed White a “worst
offender” for sentencing purposes, and gave him the maximum
sentence.619  The court of appeals affirmed, holding that a finding of
“worst offender” need not be based on a defendant’s present of-
fense and that White’s record clearly supported a finding that he is
a “worst offender.” 620
4.   Miscellaneous.   In LaParle v. State,621 the Alaska Court of
Appeals held that there was reversible error where a jury was
instructed that showing recklessness on the part of a defendant
would suffice to convict for scheme to defraud and that it is
possible for a spouse to commit theft of marital property.622
LaParle helped his client conceal money from the client’s wife in a
divorce proceeding and was consequently charged and convicted of
scheme to defraud, first degree theft, and perjury.623  Because the
crime of scheme to defraud requires a showing of intent,
instructing the jury that LaParle could be convicted if he either
intended to defraud or acted recklessly with regard to a scheme to
defraud his client’s wife was a reversible error.624  With regard to
the charge of theft, LaParle claimed that because the money
hidden in his client’s undisclosed bank account was jointly owned
by his client and his wife, his client could not steal it and LaParle,
accordingly, could not steal it either under a complicity theory.625
However, the court held that it is possible for a spouse to commit
theft of jointly owned property where one spouse infringes upon
another’s interest in marital property without privilege to do so.626
Concealing property to prevent it from being inventoried at the
end of a marriage constitutes such an unprivileged infringement.627
In State v. ABC Towing,628 the court of appeals held that a sole
proprietorship is not an organization and thus may not be prose-
cuted as an organization under Alaska’s vicarious liability stat-
ute.629  ABC Towing, a sole proprietorship, was charged with vio-
lating an anti-pollution statute under the theory of vicarious
liability when one of its employees dumped gasoline on the
618. ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.155(c) (Michie 1996).
619. See White, 969 P.2d at 647-48.
620. See id. at 648.
621. 957 P.2d 330 (Alaska Ct. App. 1998).
622. See id. at 332, 335, 336.
623. See id. at 332.
624. See id.
625. See id. at 333.
626. See id. at 333-34.
627. See id. 335.
628. 954 P.2d 575 (Alaska Ct. App. 1998).
629. See id. at 576.
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ground.630  The state charged ABC as an “organization,” which is
defined by statute as “a legal entity . . . or any other group of per-
sons organized for any purpose.”631  The trial court ruled that a sole
proprietorship is not a legal entity because it has “no legal signifi-
cance apart from its sole proprietor.”632  The court of appeals
agreed, noting that “[i]n a sole proprietorship, all of the proprie-
tor’s assets are completely at risk, and the sole proprietorship
ceases to exist upon the proprietor’s death.”633  The court also re-
jected the state’s claims that a sole proprietorship becomes an or-
ganization by hiring employees as did ABC, arguing that employ-
ees do not direct the conduct of the business and do not become
partners by being hired.634
In State v. District Court,635 the court of appeals held that the
offense of custodial interference in the first degree does not re-
quire that a child first be removed from the state.636  In July 1997,
B.R. traveled to California for scheduled visitation with his
mother.637  She did not return B.R. as scheduled, but instead aban-
doned her residence, quit her job, and fled to an unknown destina-
tion with B.R.638  Under Alaska Statutes section 11.41.330(a), cus-
todial interference is committed when a relative of a child keeps
the child from a lawful custodian, “if the relative knows that they
have no legal right to do so.”639  Under AS 11.41.320(a), violations
of AS 11.41.330 become first degree custodial interference, a fel-
ony, if the offender causes the child to be removed from the
state.640  The court held that the two elements of first degree custo-
dial interference need not be committed in any particular se-
quence.641  The offense is proven where the offender committed
custodial interference and causes the child to be removed from
Alaska.642
In Whitescarver v. State,643 the court of appeals held that a de-
fendant’s claim of ownership did not justify or excuse an attempt
630. See id.
631. ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.900(b)(39) (Michie 1996).
632. ABC Towing, 954 P.2d at 577.
633. Id. at 578.
634. See id. at 578-79.
635. 962 P.2d 895 (Alaska Ct. App. 1998).
636. See id. at 896.
637. See id.
638. See id.
639. Id.
640. See id.
641. See id.
642. See id. at 897.
643. 962 P.2d 192 (Alaska Ct. App. 1998).
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to recover property by assault.644  In the early hours of the morning,
Whitescarver and four friends entered his grandmother’s house in-
tending to take possession of his Alaska Permanent Fund dividend
check.645  While Whitescarver’s friends guarded the door bran-
dishing a shotgun, Whitescarver argued with his grandmother, who
claimed she did not have the check and asked him to return the
following day.646  Whitescarver appealed his robbery and assault
convictions, contending that the jury should have been instructed
to acquit him if they found he acted under the honest belief that he
was recovering a check that belonged to him.647  The court rejected
his “claim of ownership” defense to robbery.648  That defense is
limited to three specific types of extortion and is not allowed in
cases of extortion by threat of future injury.649  Because robbery is
most closely analogous to extortion by threat of future injury, the
court found it “inconceivable” that the legislature intended to al-
low the defense in the more aggravated circumstances of rob-
bery.650  Furthermore, the court found Whitescarver’s purported
good-faith belief that the check belonged to him irrelevant because
the belief that the property taken from a victim is the property of
another is not an element of robbery.651
In Webb v. Alaska Dep’t of Corrections,652 the court of appeals
held that a parole board anticipatorily can revoke a scheduled pa-
role.653  A sentencing judge ordered Webb to complete a sex of-
fender treatment program while serving an eight-year sentence for
sexual abuse of a minor.654  Webb participated for a year and a half
and then withdrew against the advice of his treatment team.655  The
board, finding that Webb had violated the treatment order, de-
cided to revoke Webb’s scheduled parole.656  Webb challenged the
decision, arguing that the board could not revoke parole until
Webb formally became a parolee.657  The court of appeals rejected
that argument, reasoning that since the sentencing court has
644. See id. at 193.
645. See id.
646. See id.
647. See id. at 194.
648. Id. at 195.
649. See id. at 194.
650. Id. at 195.
651. See id.
652. 963 P.2d 1074 (Alaska Ct. App. 1998).
653. See id. at 1075.
654. See id.
655. See id.
656. See id. at 1076.
657. See id.
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authority to revoke the probation of defendants who formally have
not begun probation, the board by analogy has similar power.658
In Gwalthney v. State,659 the court of appeals held that the state
parole board anticipatorily may revoke the scheduled parole re-
lease of sex offenders who fail to complete court-ordered sex of-
fender treatment.660  In doing so, the court reaffirmed its holding in
Webb v. Dep’t of Corrections.661  In Webb, the court held that the
parole board anticipatorily can revoke the scheduled mandatory
parole release for those prisoners who “engage in behavior that
would warrant revocation of their parole.”662  The court rejected
Gwalthney’s argument that he was never required to undergo the
sex offender treatment.663 The statute providing the authority to
mitigate his presumptive prison term664 requires the three-judge
panel to order Gwalthney to complete appropriate rehabilitative
treatment.665
In Eppenger v. Alaska,666 the court of appeals held that a de-
fendant could not be convicted of vehicle theft of the first or sec-
ond degree where he had oral permission to use the vehicle.667  Ep-
penger was convicted of first degree vehicle theft for possession of
a car, even though the owner apparently had given Eppenger per-
mission to use the car for a few hours in exchange for what the
owner believed was cocaine.668  Eppenger was found guilty of a
class C felony for driving a vehicle he had no right to possess.  If
Eppenger had been given written, instead of oral, permission to
use the vehicle, Eppenger could have been found guilty of only a
class A misdemeanor.669  The court found this result unreasonable
and found that the legislative history of the applicable statutes re-
vealed that the legislature did not intend to criminalize the conduct
of a person who obtained a vehicle under the authority of a verbal
agreement.670
658. See id.
659. 964 P.2d 1285 (Alaska Ct. App. 1998).
660. See id. at 1286.
661. 963 P.2d 1074 (Alaska Ct. App. 1998).
662. Gwalthney, 964 P.2d at 1286 (quoting Webb v. Dep’t of Corrections, 963
P.2d at 1075).
663. See id. at 1289.
664. See ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.175(e)(2) (Michie 1996).
665. See Gwalthney, 964 P.2d at 1289.
666. 966 P.2d 995 (Alaska Ct. App. 1998).
667. See id. at 998.
668. See id. at 995.
669. See id. at 995-96.
670. See id. at 996, 998.
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In Allridge v. State,671 the court of appeals held that a defen-
dant could be charged with both first degree theft and first degree
vehicle theft.672  Allridge stole a vehicle and was indicted for first
degree theft and first degree vehicle theft.673  Allridge claimed that
only the vehicle theft indictment should apply.674  The court re-
jected Allridge’s argument that the theft statutes do not apply to
motor vehicles, based on statutory language and legislative in-
tent.675  Allridge argued in the alternative that the crime of vehicle
theft is a specific form of theft generally, and only the vehicle theft
statute should apply.676  The court again disagreed, finding that the
two crimes are distinct and require proof of elements not necessary
to prove the other.677  First degree vehicle theft, or “joyriding,” in-
volves taking a vehicle without permission but not necessarily with
an intent to deprive the owner of possession permanently, whereas
first degree theft includes an intent to appropriate possession as
one of its elements.678
In Veeder v. Municipality of Anchorage,679 the court of appeals
held that Alaska Evidence Rule 101(c)(2), which precludes the ap-
plication of other evidentiary rules to proceedings relating to pro-
bation, applies to probation revocation hearings in misdemeanor
cases.680  Veeder faced revocation of his probation for an alleged
domestic assault.681  At the hearing, Veeder objected that certain
statements introduced by the prosecution were inadmissible hear-
say.682  Alaska Evidence Rule 101(c)(2) provides that other evi-
dence rules are not applicable to “[p]roceedings relating to extradi-
tion or rendition; sentencing, probation, or parole.”683  The court
found this language to be “clear and unambiguous,” and placed a
heavy burden on Veeder to establish that the rule was not in-
tended to apply in misdemeanor cases.684  Veeder based his posi-
tion on the commentary to Rule 101(c)(2), which the court found
insufficient to demonstrate a contrary intent.685
671. 969 P.2d 644 (Alaska Ct. App. 1998).
672. See id. at 645-46.
673. See id. at 645.
674. See id.
675. See id.
676. See id.
677. See id. at 645-46.
678. See id. at 645.
679. 969 P.2d 642 (Alaska Ct. App. 1998).
680. See id. at 644.
681. See id. at 643.
682. See id.
683. ALASKA R. EVID. 101(c)(2).
684. Veeder, 969 P.2d at 643.
685. See id.
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VII. EMPLOYMENT LAW
A. Workers’ Compensation
In Hodges v. Alaska Constructors, Inc.,686 the Alaska Supreme
Court held that a petition for modification of a Workers’ Compen-
sation Board decision concerning a worker’s job-related lower
back injuries properly was rejected.  However, the court also held
that the Board improperly denied the claimant reimbursement for
travel costs.687  Hodges was awarded permanent disability benefits
as a result of suffering a job-related back injury and sought a vari-
ety of modifications of the Board’s order.688  The court held that
Hodges’s application for adjustment was both timely and appro-
priately treated as a petition for modification.689  However, Hodges
was denied compensation for upper back injuries because evidence
linking those injuries to work could have been introduced at the
original Board hearing.690  Hodges also was denied reimbursement
for medication he failed to purchase from a Board-specified, mail-
order drug company.691
In Hammer v. City of Fairbanks,692 the supreme court upheld a
Worker’s Compensation Board penalty for late payment of per-
manent partial impairment (“PPI”) benefits.693  In doing so, it ruled
that a dispute between the employer and employee over guidelines
to use in calculating benefits did not justify the late payment where
the employer controverted the employee’s claim privately but not
with the Board.694  Alaska Statutes section 23.30.155695 requires an
employer receiving notice of a PPI claim to make payment to the
employee within twenty-one days unless the employer controverts
the claim by official notice to the Board.696  The City disputed
Hammer’s initial request for PPI benefits on the ground that
Hammer’s doctor used the wrong edition of the medical guidelines
to calculate benefits.697  However, the City did not file a controver-
sion;698 rather, it disputed the claim privately with Hammer’s doc-
686. 957 P.2d 957 (Alaska 1998).
687. See id. at 958-59.
688. See id. at 959.
689. See id. at 960-61.
690. See id. at 961.
691. See id. at 962-63.
692. 953 P.2d 500 (Alaska 1998).
693. See id. at 502.
694. See id. at 506-07.
695. ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.155 (Michie 1996).
696. See id.
697. See Hammer, 953 P.2d at 502.
698. See id. at 505.
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tor and did not make payment within twenty-one days.699  The
court ruled that to allow an employer to dispute the PPI claim pri-
vately would thwart the policy of AS 23.30.155, “to promote
prompt payment by the employer to the injured employee.”700  The
court rejected the City’s contention that it was not bound to make
payment until it received a claim using the proper guidelines, on
the ground that the City should have controverted the PPI lump
sum payment by filing a notice of controversion with the Board
while it sought clarification of the claim.701
B. Grievance Claims
In Ross v. City of Sand Point,702 the Alaska Supreme Court
held that a mayor’s refusal to reinstate a city employee despite the
decision of a grievance committee violated the employee’s em-
ployment contract and constituted wrongful discharge as a matter
of law.703  After having been fired by the mayor, Public Works Di-
rector Ross filed a grievance pursuant to the city’s personnel man-
ual.704  The grievance committee ruled in Ross’s favor and ordered
his reinstatement.705  The mayor, however, refused.706  The court
found that neither state nor municipal law invested the mayor with
authority to override the grievance process that had been incorpo-
rated into the employment contract.707
In Nyberg v. University of Alaska,708 the supreme court held
that an employee who has filed a grievance related to her supervi-
sor’s conduct cannot be found insubordinate by the Statewide
Grievance Council merely because she refused the supervisor’s or-
der to discuss with her the problem included in her grievance.709
An employee’s intentional refusal to comply with reasonable writ-
ten and oral directives issued by the supervisor will support a
finding of insubordination.710  Nyberg requested that any communi-
cations about her specific grievance with her supervisor go through
her attorney.711  This request prompted her supervisor to discharge
699. See id. at 503.
700. Id. at 506.
701. See id.
702. 952 P.2d 274 (Alaska 1998).
703. See id. at 276-77.
704. See id. at 275.
705. See id. at 275-76.
706. See id. at 276.
707. See id. at 277.
708. 954 P.2d 1376 (Alaska 1998).
709. See id. at 1380.
710. See id. at 1378.
711. See id.
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Nyberg for insubordination, and the Grievance Council and Uni-
versity President agreed.712  However, because the supervisor failed
to clarify that Nyberg was not required to discuss the grievance
specifically, nor did she specify the non-grievance issues she
wished to discuss, the supervisor’s oral directives were not suffi-
ciently clear to support a finding of insubordination.713
In State v. Beard,714 the supreme court held that an employee’s
failure to exhaust his administrative remedies was not excused by
his union’s failure to pursue his grievance.715  Beard had com-
plained to his union representative that Beard’s supervisors were
harassing him and making his work environment intolerable.716  Af-
ter being informed by the representative that this conduct was out-
side the grievance procedure because the substance of the com-
plaint fell within management’s prerogative under the collective
bargaining agreement, Beard resigned and brought suit.717
Under Alaska law, employees first must exhaust administra-
tive remedies before they can pursue judicial action against their
employers.718  However, the employee may be excused from ex-
hausting remedies if his union failed to participate in the grievance
process or if the process is tainted.719  Beard asked the union to
grieve his work conditions several months before he resigned, and
he never asked the union to grieve his resignation as a termination
or a constructive discharge.720  The court held that where an ongo-
ing pattern of workplace harassment leads to the employee’s resig-
nation, the employee must attempt to grieve the termination even
if the union previously had been unresponsive to the harassment
complaints.721  Consequently, Beard’s failure to exhaust his reme-
dies was not excused.722
In Linstad v. Sitka School District,723 the supreme court held
that a school board’s bill of particulars, coupled with a clarifying
letter from the board’s attorney, fairly apprised a teacher of the
basis for her non-retention.724  Linstad, a tenured special education
teacher, was not retained by the Sitka School District after re-
712. See id.
713. See id. at 1380.
714. 960 P.2d 1 (Alaska 1998).
715. See id. at 8.
716. See id. at 2.
717. See id.
718. See id. at 5.
719. See id.
720. See id. at 6-7.
721. See id. at 7.
722. See id.
723. 963 P.2d 246 (Alaska 1998).
724. See id. at 248.
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peated warnings of the need to improve her teaching perform-
ance.725  The supreme court held that the bill of particulars required
by Alaska Statutes section 14.20.180(a) need not include all spe-
cific allegations of improper performance, because Linstad had
been given actual notice of the allegations at issue.726
C. Wages
In Ganz v. Alaska Airlines, Inc.,727 the Alaska Supreme Court
held that a work schedule of fourteen twelve-hour days followed
by fourteen days off under a collective bargaining agreement was
exempt from the overtime provisions of the Alaska Wage and
Hour Act (“AWHA”).728  Alaska Airlines and the union repre-
senting customer service agents, mechanics, and ramp workers en-
tered into a collective bargaining agreement under which Prudhoe
Bay employees work for fourteen consecutive twelve-hour days
followed by fourteen days off.729  The employees later filed an
AWHA complaint when the airlines refused to pay overtime for
work in excess of forty hours a week or eight hours a day.730  In
reaching its decision, the court was required to interpret Alaska
Statutes section 23.10.060(d)(13),731 which allows an exemption
from the overtime provisions where work is performed under a
flexible work arrangement as part of a collective bargaining
agreement.732  The court examined the exemption in AS
23.10.060(d)(14), contrasting it with the language used in subsec-
tion (d)(13), to determine that “subsection (d)(13) unambiguously
exempts the employees’ work schedule from AWHA’s overtime
requirements.”733
In Piquniq Management Corp. v. Reeves,734 the supreme court
held that “a court converting annual salary to a regular rate of
hourly pay under 8 Alaska Administrative Code 15.100(a)(2) must
use the regular rate as a basis for computing total earnings for all
hours actually worked.”735  Reeves was paid an annual salary to
work a schedule of two weeks of 12-hour days followed by two
725. See id. at 246-47.
726. See id. at 247-48.
727. 963 P.2d 1015 (Alaska 1998).
728. See id. at 1015.
729. See id. at 1016.
730. See id.
731. See ALASKA STAT. § 23.10.060(d)(13) (Michie 1996).
732. See Ganz, 963 P.2d at 1017.
733. Id. at 1019.
734. 965 P.2d 755 (Alaska 1998).
735. Id. at 738.
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weeks off.736  After working an average of 98-hour weeks but re-
ceiving no overtime pay, Reeves sued Piquniq Management for
overtime wages.737  The superior court calculated an overtime rate
based on Reeves’s salary as straight-time wages at 52 weeks of
forty hours per week and awarded Reeves the full amount of cal-
culated overtime as damages.738  The supreme court reversed,
holding that a salaried worker’s award for unpaid overtime should
be calculated by (1) determining the employee’s weekly salary; (2)
assuming that a week of salary represents pay for a week of
straight-time work; (3) using this amount to determine the
worker’s total compensation for all the hours which were worked;
and (4) deducting all amounts of salary paid from this amount.739
Since Reeves only worked half the weeks of the year, the trial
court’s decision to treat all earned overtime pay as unpaid over-
time pay would yield Reeves twice his regular rate for straight-
time hours actually worked.740
D. Miscellaneous
In Moody-Herrera v. State Dep’t of Natural Resources,741 the
Alaska Supreme Court held that an employer’s failure to provide
reasonable accommodation to a disabled employee can amount to
an actionable disability discrimination claim under the Alaska
Human Rights Act (“AHRA”), but upheld the lower court’s de-
termination that the plaintiff failed to make a prima facie showing
of discrimination.742  Moody claimed that the Department of Natu-
ral Resources (“DNR”) discriminated against her by failing to
provide reasonable accommodation for her hearing problems.743
The court was asked to interpret Alaska Statutes section
18.80.220744 to determine if the legislature intended to impose a
duty of reasonable accommodation on employers.745  Though the
AHRA does not explicitly impose a duty of reasonable accommo-
dation, the court felt that the legislative history and purpose of the
statute suggested a legislative intent to impose such a duty.746  The
court considered the fact that the legislature previously considered
736. See id. at 733.
737. See id.
738. See id. at 733-34.
739. See id. at 737.
740. See id. at 738.
741. 967 P.2d 79 (Alaska 1998).
742. See id. at 80.
743. See id. at 81.
744. ALASKA STAT. § 18.20.220 (Michie 1996).
745. See Moody-Herrera, 967 P.2d at 82.
746. See id. at 85-86.
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adopting legislation that would have eliminated the duty of rea-
sonable accommodation.747  The court nonetheless agreed with the
trial court that Moody did not present a prima facie case for dis-
crimination because the record showed that DNR made
“extraordinary efforts” to accommodate Moody.748
In University of Alaska v. University of Alaska Classified Em-
ployees Association,749 the supreme court held that a union waived
its right to bargain on policies within the scope of a collective bar-
gaining agreement where the agreement’s language, scope and his-
tory suggested that the agreement had been fully bargained.750  The
union representing University of Alaska employees assented to a
collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) with the university
shortly after the university refused the union’s request to bargain
the university’s restrictive smoking policy.751  The final agreement
included a clause stating that the union waived its right to bargain
over policy decisions by agreeing to the CBA.752  The court applied
this clause to the instant case.753  The CBA also contained a man-
agement-rights clause reserving the university’s right “to issue,
amend and revise policies,” and a zipper clause stating that the
agreement was the entire agreement between the parties.754  These
clauses, as well as the fact that the union was represented by an
experienced negotiator, bolstered the court’s opinion that the un-
ion knew, or should have known, that it had contractually waived
its right to bargain the smoking policy by agreeing to the CBA.755
In Bliss v. Bobich,756 the supreme court held that a retaliatory
discharge claim properly was submitted to a jury757 and that an
overtime damages award properly was limited to two years.758  Pat-
rick and Barbara Bliss sued Bobich for overtime violations and re-
taliatory harassment and discharge, and both parties appealed a
number of issues from the lower court ruling.759  Because the evi-
dence surrounding the discharge of the Blisses was disputed, the
Blisses’ retaliatory discharge claim was a matter for the jury.760
747. See id.
748. Id. at 88.
749. 952 P.2d 1182 (Alaska 1998).
750. See id. at 1187.
751. See id. at 1184.
752. See id. at 1186.
753. See id.
754. Id.
755. See id.
756. 971 P.2d 141 (Alaska 1998).
757. See id. at 145-46.
758. See id. at 146.
759. See id. at 143.
760. See id. at 145-46.
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However, the award of two years overtime damages, instead of
three, was appropriate because no evidence indicated that Bo-
bich’s failure to pay overtime for the third year at issue was will-
ful.761
VIII. FAMILY LAW
A. Child Custody
In West v. Lawson,762 the Alaska Supreme Court held that
when one parent moves to a distant locale, it should be presumed
that a six-month alternating custody schedule is not in the best in-
terests of a young child.763  In 1994, West and Lawson separated
and agreed to share custody of their daughter on an alternating
week basis.764  Lawson then moved to Nevada and sought to modify
the custody schedule to alternate custody every six months.765  The
superior court held a hearing and approved the modified custody
schedule,766 but the supreme court vacated and remanded.767  It
ruled that the lower court abused its discretion by placing too
much weight on the prior agreement768 and by not focusing its de-
termination on the key fact of Lawson’s move.769  The supreme
court noted that prevailing opinion among experts was that a sta-
ble environment is crucial for a child’s healthy development770 and
such stability would be thwarted by relocating to a new community
every six months.771
In Gaston v. Gaston,772 the supreme court held that a mother
was estopped from relying on a custody agreement’s time limits as
a basis for refusing to abide by a dispute resolution provision.773
The custody agreement contained a dispute resolution provision
that either party could invoke within one year.774  Nine months af-
ter signing the custody agreement, the parents agreed to try a new
761. See id. at 146.
762. 951 P.2d 1200 (Alaska 1998).
763. See id. at 1206.
764. See id. at 1202.
765. See id.
766. See id.
767. See id. at 1206.
768. See id. at 1203.
769. See id.
770. See id. at 1204.
771. See id. at 1206.
772. 954 P.2d 572 (Alaska 1998).
773. See id. at 574.
774. See id. at 573.
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visitation schedule.775  Approximately one year later, Mrs. Gaston
sought to return to the original schedule.776  In response, Mr. Gas-
ton invoked the dispute resolution clause, but Mrs. Gaston refused
to comply because more than one year had passed since the origi-
nal agreement.777  The court reasoned that Mr. Gaston should be
allowed to invoke the dispute resolution clause, because his failure
to do so within one year of the agreement stemmed from his reli-
ance on his ex-wife’s agreement to the new custody schedule.778
In Lashbrook v. Lashbrook,779 the supreme court held that an
earlier hearing in a domestic violence proceeding did not satisfy
notice and hearing requirements for a child custody modification
proceeding.780  Gary Lashbrook was denied a hearing in a custody
modification proceeding awarding full custody of his children to
their mother when the superior court consolidated that proceeding
with an earlier domestic violence proceeding.781  Although the cus-
tody modification and domestic violence proceedings both
stemmed from the same incident, the court found the two pro-
ceedings to be distinct and directed to different objectives such
that the due process requirements of one could not be satisfied by
the other.782
In Acevedo v. Liberty,783 the supreme court held that a father
made a sufficient showing of changed circumstances to warrant an
evidentiary hearing to consider modifying visitation rights in the
child’s best interests.784  Acevedo alleged a change of circumstances
that resulted from his former wife and daughter’s move from
Bethel to Fairbanks, making supervised visitation impractical.785  In
addition, Acevedo had moved out of a living situation involving
three male roommates and had completed an anger management
program.786
In I.J.D. v. D.R.D.,787 the supreme court held that a trial court
acted within its discretion in awarding sole custody of a child to the
father, based on the mother’s personality disorder and her contin-
ued efforts to interfere with the child’s relationship with his fa-
775. See id.
776. See id.
777. See id.
778. See id. at 574.
779. 957 P.2d 326 (Alaska 1998).
780. See id. at 328-29.
781. See id. at 328.
782. See id. at 329-30.
783. 956 P.2d 455 (Alaska 1998).
784. See id. at 458.
785. See id. at 457.
786. See id.
787. 961 P.2d 425 (Alaska 1998).
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ther.788  The father, D.R.D., faced difficulties visiting his son who
lived with his mother, I.J.D., and I.J.D.’s daughter from a previous
marriage.789  While both parents suffered from mental health
problems, I.J.D.’s personality disorder and emotional instability
were deemed more likely to impair her capacity to meet the child’s
needs than would D.R.D.’s depression.790  Although granting
D.R.D. custody would separate the child from his mother and sis-
ter, the trial court concluded that D.R.D. would make efforts to
ease the transition while sustaining the relationship between the
children.791  I.J.D.’s efforts to prevent a relationship from develop-
ing between D.R.D and his son influenced the award of sole cus-
tody.792
In C.R.B. v. C.C.,793 the supreme court held that a parent must
show a substantial change in circumstances in order to modify a
custody order even where the order awarded custody to a nonpar-
ent.794  Roberto divorced Catherine, leaving her as legal custodian
of their two children.795  Catherine’s drug problems led her parents
to move for and gain custody of the children.796  Roberto sought to
acquire custody, alleging a substantial change in circumstance
based on, among other things, the stability of his second marriage
and business, his renewed contact with his children, and the dis-
covery of a 1980 Child in Need of Aid (“CINA”) investigation in-
volving Catherine’s mother.797  The superior court dismissed Rob-
erto’s motion without a hearing.798
On appeal, Roberto argued that a parent need not show as
substantial a change in circumstances in cases involving non-
parents in comparison with cases involving parents only.799  Al-
though parental custody is preferred over non-parental custody,
once custody has been transferred to a non-parent, the interest in
meeting a child’s need for stability supports applying the substan-
tial change of circumstance standard for custody modification.800
The court found that Roberto’s resumed contact with his children,
the stability of his marriage and business, and the disclosure of the
788. See id. at 429, 431.
789. See id. at 427.
790. See id. at 429.
791. See id. at 430.
792. See id. at 431.
793. 959 P.2d 375 (Alaska 1998).
794. See id. at 377.
795. See id.
796. See id.
797. See id.
798. See id. at 378.
799. See id. at 379.
800. See id. at 379-81.
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CINA case fell short of a finding of substantial change in circum-
stances.801
In J.R. v. J.W.,802 the supreme court held that, in a custody dis-
pute between a parent and a nonparent, custody must be awarded
to the parent unless such custody is “clearly detrimental to the
child.”803  That the child’s best interests would be served by re-
maining with her stepfather was insufficient grounds for denying
custody to her natural father, absent a showing that the father had
abandoned the child, was unfit, or that the child’s welfare required
that the nonparent receive custody.804  The court concluded that the
Indian Child Welfare Act (“ICWA”)805 applied to the lower court’s
proceedings.806  The provisions of 25 U.S.C. § 1912(e)807 prohibit the
removal of a child from the custody of a parent or Indian custodian
absent clear and convincing evidence that continued custody would
result in clear emotional or physical damage.  These provisions ap-
ply even where the father previously did not have physical custody
of the child.808  While a stepparent is not considered a parent for
purposes of the ICWA, the superior court may deem a stepparent
an “Indian custodian” under 25 U.S.C. § 1903(6).809  Since section
1912(e) does not express a preference between parents and Indian
custodians, it will not favor either.810  Instead, the Alaska standard
for disputes between parents and nonparents should apply.811
However, absent a finding that the stepfather is an Indian custo-
dian, section 1912(e) will create a statutory preference for the fa-
ther.812
In Siekawitch v. Siekawitch,813 the supreme court held that al-
though a scheduled hearing in the lower court ostensibly deter-
mined visitation times, the father had adequate notice for proce-
dural due process purposes of the potential consequences of a
hearing altering the physical custody arrangements of the chil-
dren.814  When Amy and Daniel Siekawitch divorced, they agreed
that Daniel would have physical custody of the children while visi-
801. See id. at 384.
802. 951 P.2d 1206 (Alaska 1998).
803. Id. at 1210.
804. See id. at 1211.
805. 25 U.S.C. § 1901 (1997).
806. See J.R.., 951 P.2d at 1213.
807. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(e) (1997).
808. See J.R., 951 P.2d at 1213.
809. See id. at 1214 (citing 25 U.S.C. § 1903(6) (1997)).
810. See id. at 1215.
811. See id.
812. See id.
813. 956 P.2d 447 (Alaska 1998).
814. See id. at 449-50.
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tation times would be worked out amicably in the future.815  Failure
to arrive at a mutually agreeable visitation schedule led to a hear-
ing to resolve the issue.816  Daniel challenged the court order
granting Amy custody of the children half of the time on the
grounds that he had no notice the court would decide anything
other than a visitation schedule.817  However, the court ruled that
even if the time Amy sought was not characterized as physical cus-
tody, Daniel had notice that Amy sought equal time with the chil-
dren through her memorandum in support of a specific custody
schedule and because the issue had been raised at the hearing.818
In In the Matter of J.A.,819 the supreme court held that de novo
review was the appropriate standard for appellate review of a trial
court’s probable cause determination with respect to Child in Need
of Aid (“CINA”) petitions for temporary child custody.820  Joseph
A. had an automobile accident while his minor child J.A. was in
the car.821  After failing a field sobriety test, Joseph A. was arrested
for driving while intoxicated and J.A. was taken into emergency
custody.822  The Department of Health and Social Services filed a
CINA petition.823  The superior court dismissed the petition and
ordered J.A.’s return to his parents’ custody, ruling that although
probable cause existed to believe that J.A. was a CINA at the time
of the accident, probable cause ceased upon Joseph A.’s release.824
The supreme court reviewed the CINA probable cause determina-
tion de novo, as it would a criminal probable cause determina-
tion.825  It justified use of the de novo standard upon the need for
appellate courts to maintain control of legal principles.  It also con-
sidered the court’s consistent use of the de novo standard in recent
CINA cases.826  Furthermore, the court interpreted probable cause
as “substantial chance.”827  Applying this standard to the “totality
of the circumstances,”828 which included a history of domestic vio-
lence and alcohol abuse by the parents, the court concluded that
probable cause continued to exist at the time of the hearing to be-
815. See id. at 448.
816. See id. at 449.
817. See id.
818. See id. at 450.
819. 962 P.2d 173 (Alaska 1998).
820. See id.
821. See id. at 174.
822. See id. at 175.
823. See id.
824. See id.
825. See id.
826. See id. at 175-76.
827. Id. at 176.
828. Id. at 179.
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lieve that J.A. was a CINA.829  Two strong dissents urged that the
court review CINA probable cause determinations under a
“clearly erroneous” standard and that probable cause be inter-
preted as “more likely than not.”830
In Karen L. v. State,831 the supreme court held that state work-
ers owed no duty of care to a mother at risk of losing her child in a
Child in Need of Aid (“CINA”) proceeding to prevent psychologi-
cal and emotional injury.832  State youth officials determined Karen
L.’s son to be a CINA based on the boy’s claims that Karen abused
him.833  This determination eventually caused Karen to lose custody
of her son for a period of about seven months.834  Karen brought
several claims against the officials, including negligent and inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress.835  The court applied the
multi-factor D.S.W. test for determining whether a duty of care
exists.836  The key factor for the court was the foreseeability of
harm to the plaintiff.837  The court did not reject Karen’s assertion
that it was foreseeable that a parent undergoing CINA proceed-
ings would experience distress over the well-being of her child; in-
stead, the court ruled that this was insufficient to establish a duty.838
Noting that the duty to prevent emotional distress is normally im-
posed only in cases involving accidents, the court reiterated that an
actionable distress claim can lie only if the parent contemporane-
ously observes the child’s injury or trauma.839  In this case, the child
did not suffer the type of injury that normally generates acute
shock, nor was there an allegation that the parent contemporane-
ously observed such an injury.840
829. See id. at 178-79.
830. See id. at 181.
831. 953 P.2d 871 (Alaska 1998).
832. See id. at 872.
833. See id.
834. See id. at 872-73.
835. See id. at 873.
836. See D.S.W. v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough Sch. Dist., 628 P.2d 554, 555
(Alaska 1981) (holding that the existence of a duty of care rests on, among other
things, “[t]he foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that
the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defen-
dant’s conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defen-
dant’s conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, the extent of the burden to
defendant and consequences to the community of imposing a duty [of] care . . .
and the availability, cost and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved”).
837. See Karen L., 953 P.2d at 875-76.
838. See id.
839. See id. at 876.
840. See id.
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In L.H. v. Y.M.,841 the supreme court held that where a father
seeking custody failed to assert his constitutional right against self-
incrimination before the superior court, he could not raise it on
appeal.842  When L.H. and Y.M. were divorced in 1992, Y.M. re-
ceived custody of their daughter, R.H.843  Y.M. later sought to ter-
minate L.H.’s visitation with R.H. following accusations of sexual
abuse by another of L.H.’s children, C.C.844  L.H. failed to comply
with discovery requests and court orders for production of psy-
chological records.845  After the deadline passed and Y.M. moved
for sanctions, L.H. asserted his privilege against self-
incrimination.846  The court granted Y.M.’s motion for sanctions
and terminated visitation.847  In the present case, L.H. brought a
change-of-custody motion seeking legal custody of R.H. following
a recantation by C.C.848
The court upheld the superior court’s denial of the motion for
several reasons.  First, the original order denying custody was not a
punishment for asserting a constitutional privilege, but rather a
sanction for disregard of discovery orders and failure to assert the
privilege in a timely fashion.849  Second, L.H.’s disregard of the
court’s order to establish his basis for resisting discovery in the
original proceeding amounted to a waiver of any claim of privi-
lege.850  Finally, L.H. did not mention his psychological records and
again failed to assert his self-incrimination privilege in his change-
of-custody motion until his appeal.851
In Coleman v. Coleman,852 the supreme court upheld an award
of attorney’s fees in a child custody case, holding that the superior
court had authority to award fees based on relative need rather
than prevailing-party status,853 and that this authority existed de-
spite the silence of the parties’ custody agreement regarding fees.854
The first issue was whether the superior court was required to ap-
ply the prevailing-party rule.855  The court held that it was not, on
841. 961 P.2d 414 (Alaska 1998).
842. See id. at 416.
843. See id.
844. See id.
845. See id.
846. See id.
847. See id.
848. See id.
849. See id. at 417.
850. See id.
851. See id. at 417-18.
852. 968 P.2d 570 (Alaska 1998).
853. See id. at 573.
854. See id. at 576-77.
855. See id.
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the ground that the Michigan divorce made the litigants unmarried
people litigating an initial custody dispute.856  Prior case law estab-
lished that in this situation the court should use the relative need
rule it applies in custody disputes.857  The second issue was whether
the motion was timely, given that it was filed after the custody dis-
pute was settled.858  The court held that it was timely because the
mother requested fees in her original complaint, thus satisfying the
requirement that an application for attorney’s fees be filed during
the pendency of the action.859
In Tompkins v. Tompkins,860 the supreme court held that it is
proper for a court determining custody to consider evidence of a
parent’s relationship with a stepchild after the parents were sepa-
rated.861  The superior court awarded custody of Eric Tompkins’s
three natural children to his ex-wife Delynn, on the ground that
Eric was less able to meet the children’s emotional needs.862  The
court pointed to Eric’s failure to have any meaningful contact with
Delynn’s daughter from a previous marriage after their separa-
tion.863  The supreme court affirmed, declining to make a general
rule that a parent’s relationship with a stepchild is never relevant
to a custody dispute over a parent’s natural children.864  Instead, the
court declared that the proper methodology “is to consider the fac-
tual circumstances underlying the parent-stepchild relationship in
assessing its relevance.”865  The court then noted the absence of
evidence that the rift between Eric and his stepdaughter was
caused by her own wrongdoing or any external factor, and con-
cluded that the rift could be considered indicative of Eric’s par-
enting skills.866
In Walker v. Walker,867 the supreme court held that the supe-
rior court must conduct an evidentiary hearing before granting an
opposed motion to modify a child custody and support decree.868
The Walkers incorporated a custody and support decree into their
divorce settlement.869  Six years later, the father filed a motion to
856. See id.
857. See id.
858. See id. at 573-74.
859. See id. at 574.
860. 961 P.2d 419 (Alaska 1998).
861. See id. at 423.
862. See id.
863. See id.
864. See id.
865. Id.
866. See id.
867. 960 P.2d 620 (Alaska 1998).
868. See id. at 622.
869. See id. at 621.
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modify custody, alleging his wife’s voluntary relinquishment of cus-
tody and her drug habit.870  The mother responded with an affidavit
contesting the allegations, and she requested a continuance to ob-
tain counsel.871  The superior court extended the mother’s time to
file any supplemental opposition, but the mother missed the dead-
line because the court sent the order to the wrong address.872  After
the deadline passed, the court granted the father’s motion.873  The
supreme court reversed, finding that once the wife opposed the
motion by submitting her affidavit, she was not obligated to pres-
ent any further opposition to earn a right to an evidentiary hear-
ing.874
B. Child Support
In Dunn v. Dunn,875 the Alaska Supreme Court held that Indi-
vidual Retirement Account (“IRA”) dividends may be considered
as income for the purposes of calculating child support.876  Larry
Dunn challenged the superior court’s decision to include IRA
earnings in calculating his income for the purpose of paying child
support.877  The court noted that this was an issue requiring its in-
dependent judgment, and that it would consider the rule “that is
most persuasive in light of precedent, reason, and policy.”878  It
found that other jurisdictions calculate IRA earnings for the pur-
pose of child support,879 and that the Alaska Rules of Civil Proce-
dure consider many similar types of benefits as income.880
In Marine v. Marine,881 the supreme court held that Alaska
Civil Rule 90.3(b)(2) allowed a superior court to vary its award of
child support where the percentage of time that each parent has
physical custody does not correspond to the percentage of the
child’s expenses that each parent will pay.882  The factual findings of
the trial court in a child support proceeding are reviewed under a
“clearly erroneous” standard and will not be set aside unless the
870. See id.
871. See id.
872. See id.
873. See id.
874. See id. at 622.
875. 952 P.2d 268 (Alaska 1998).
876. See id. at 272.
877. See id. at 270.
878. Id. at 271.
879. See id. at 272.
880. See id.
881. 957 P.2d 314 (Alaska 1998).
882. See id. at 318.
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appellate court is left with “a definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been made.”883
In Rowen v. Rowen,884 the supreme court held that the lower
court abused its discretion in altering a provision of a child custody
and support agreement that was unrelated to the father’s refusal to
disclose his financial information.885  Under their custody agree-
ment, Robert and Sandra Rowen shared custody of their three
children.  Sandra had custody during the school year and Robert
had custody during vacations and paid the children’s transporta-
tion costs.886  In addition, at age fourteen, each child could elect to
live with whichever parent they desired.887  If a child chose to live
with Robert, the transportation costs would shift to Sandra.888
When the eldest child decided to live with his father, Robert
sought to modify the support agreement but refused to disclose his
income because he was under investigation by the Internal Reve-
nue Service.889  Robert offered to have his income calculated based
upon the $60,000 cap under Rule 90.3(c)(2), but the superior court
refused to shift transportation costs to Sandra, citing Robert’s fail-
ure to disclose income.890  The supreme court reversed the superior
court, holding that because transportation costs were covered by
the previous custody agreement, the failure to disclose financial in-
formation was irrelevant.891
In Hendren v. State,892 the supreme court held that a parent is
not liable to the state for public assistance paid to the child when
that parent is not obligated to pay child support under a court or-
der.893  When David Hendren divorced Vallrie, he received custody
of their child while Vallrie paid child support.894  Later, the child
lived with Vallrie, who collected Aid to Families with Dependent
Children grant payments.895  The Child Support Enforcement Divi-
sion sought reimbursement from David.896  However, according to
Alaska Statutes section 25.27.120(a), only a parent obligated to pay
883. Id. at 316 (quoting Nass v. Seaton, 904 P.2d 412, 414 (Alaska 1995)).
884. 963 P.2d 249 (Alaska 1998).
885. See id. at 255-56.
886. See id. at 251.
887. See id.
888. See id.
889. See id. at 252.
890. See id.
891. See id. at 256.
892. 957 P.2d 1350 (Alaska 1998).
893. See id. at 1353.
894. See id. at 1351.
895. See id.
896. See id.
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child support pursuant to a court order can be obligated to reim-
burse public assistance.897
In Monette v. Hoff,898 the supreme court held that the lower
court must calculate the child support obligations of a non-
custodial parent de novo, and may not deferentially review the
Child Support Enforcement Division’s prior calculation of such an
obligation.899  The court affirmed previous holdings that it reviews
a trial court’s custody award under an abuse of discretion standard
and that the trial court has the discretion to assess witness credi-
bility.900  Furthermore, the court affirmed that the trial court has
the discretion to require supervised visitation when credible evi-
dence suggests that unsupervised visitation is contrary to the
child’s best interests and that such decisions will be reviewed under
an abuse of discretion standard.901
In Beard v. Morris,902 the supreme court held that the superior
court should have provided calculations to show the basis for its
decision not to modify an ex-husband’s child support payments.903
The superior court failed to describe the method it used to arrive
at its conclusion that Beard’s decision to move into Coast Guard
barracks and lose his housing allowance did not result in a material
change in financial circumstances.904  The supreme court deter-
mined that on remand, the trial court should include a determina-
tion as to whether Beard had a valid economic reason, other than
reducing his child support obligation, for choosing to move and
forgoing his housing allowance payment from his employer.905
In Robinson v. Robinson,906 the supreme court remanded a
lower court’s modification of child support payments on the
grounds that further findings were needed in support of the modi-
fication.907  Cynthia Robinson brought three objections to the supe-
rior court’s order reducing her husband Dennis’s child support ob-
ligation: (1) the court failed to consider all of Dennis’s sources of
income; (2) the court should have considered potential rather than
actual earnings; and (3) the court failed to consider the parties’
897. See id.; see also ALASKA STAT. § 25.27.120(a) (Michie 1996).
898. 958 P.2d 434 (Alaska 1998).
899. See id. at 437.
900. See id. at 436 (citing Holl v. Holl, 815 P.2d 379 (Alaska 1991); Hanlon v.
Hanlon, 871 P.2d 229, 232 (Alaska 1994)).
901. See id. at 436-37.
902. 956 P.2d 418 (Alaska 1998).
903. See id. at 420.
904. See id.
905. See id.
906. 961 P.2d 1000 (Alaska 1998).
907. See id. at 1003.
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understanding about cost of living differences in their initial
agreement.908
The court found merit with Cynthia’s first argument, holding
that the lower court failed to consider two sources of income.909
This is consistent with the language of Alaska Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 90.3,910 which exempts income used to pay child support and
alimony from prior relationships, but does not exempt income
used to pay arrears for the same child.911  Further, the court sug-
gested that where a party voluntarily reduces income by underem-
ployment, lowering child support may be inappropriate.912  Finally,
the court supported Cynthia’s last argument, stating that the lower
court must consider the parties’ initial intent when the award re-
flects differences in cost of living for the parents.913
In Robinson v. Robinson,914 the supreme court held that a child
support agreement involving an amount greater than that required
by Civil Rule 90.3 must include an explanation of the parties’ in-
tentions and/or expectations of contingent future events.915  In the
absence of such findings, a court cannot deny as a matter of law a
petition to modify the award on the ground of changed circum-
stances.916  In this case, Jim Robinson agreed to pay his ex-wife an
amount greater than that required, at a time when he was under
investigation for fraud.917  Jim eventually was incarcerated for ten
months, during which time he attempted to reduce his child sup-
port obligation.918  The superior court denied Jim’s request, but the
supreme court remanded for findings regarding the parties’ as-
sumptions underlying the original agreement.919  Finding that an
agreement above the minimum is “essentially a contract,”920 the
court ruled that the circumstances surrounding the contract must
be known before the court can decide on a motion for modifica-
tion.921
908. See id. at 1001.
909. See id. at 1003.
910. ALASKA R. CIV. P. 90.3(a)(1).
911. See Robinson, 961 P.2d at 1003.
912. See id. at 1004.
913. See id.
914. 953 P.2d 880 (Alaska 1998).
915. See id. at 885.
916. See id. at 886.
917. See id. at 882-83.
918. See id. at 883.
919. See id. at 887.
920. Id. at 884.
921. See id. at 885.
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In Hilderbrand v. Hilderbrand,922 the supreme court held that
the rental value of an owner-occupied apartment is not counted in
determining a parent’s income for child support purposes923 and
that depreciation deductions for such property are not allowed
where such deductions would not be allowed for federal tax pur-
poses.924  When Joe and Deborah divorced, Joe was given title to
and continued to live in the apartment the couple had jointly
owned when married.925  In general, the rental value of an apart-
ment occupied by the owner is not counted in determining income
for child support purposes absent good cause.926  In order to find
good cause, the obligor must be found to be acting in bad faith to
shield his or her income.927 Joe was found not to be living in the
apartment solely to reduce his child support payments.928  Because
Joe could not deduct an amount from his income for tax purposes
based on annual depreciation of the property, he was disallowed
from deducting depreciation from income calculations for child
support purposes.929
In Hermosillo v. Hermosillo,930 the supreme court held that
Child Insurance Benefit (“CIB”) payments made on a child’s be-
half should be incorporated in the calculation of a parent’s support
arrears and that visitation sanctions cannot be offset against sup-
port arrears.931  Richard and Mary Hermosillo had one child, Paul,
before divorcing.932  Richard was ordered to pay $150 per month in
child support but failed to do so.933  In 1984, Paul became eligible
for CIB payments when Richard became disabled.934  Additionally,
Mary refused to return Paul for visitation with Richard, for which
she incurred $12,000 in sanctions.935  The court held that social se-
curity benefits paid to the child should be credited toward Rich-
ard’s support arrearage.936  In addition, the court held that under
Alaska Statutes section 25.27.080 a non-custodial parent’s support
922. 962 P.2d 887 (Alaska 1998).
923. See id. at 888.
924. See id. at 890.
925. See id. at 888.
926. See id.
927. See id. at 889.
928. See id.
929. See id. at 890.
930. 962 P.2d 891 (Alaska 1998).
931. See id. at 892.
932. See id.
933. See id.
934. See id.
935. See id. at 892-93.
936. See id. at 893-94 (citing Miller v. Miller, 890 P.2d 574, 577 (Alaska 1995)).
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obligation may not be reduced due to a custodial parent’s interfer-
ence with visitation rights.937
In Boone v. Boone,938 the supreme court held that a child’s
change in residence constituted a material change in circumstances
that justified modification of a child support order and entitled the
father to recover child support arrearages.939  After Larry and Re-
becca Boone divorced, Rebecca had sole legal custody of their two
children and Larry paid her $700 a month in child support.940  Six
years later, the children moved into Larry’s home, and Larry
sought a modification of support in the form of arrearages.941  The
superior court may modify a child support award upon a showing
of a “material change of circumstance.”942  The court found that the
children’s move, though not ordered by the court, was sufficiently
permanent to constitute a material change in circumstance.943
In Bendixen v. Bendixen,944 the supreme court held that incar-
ceration did not amount to voluntary unemployment for purposes
of child support payments.945  The commentary to Alaska’s Civil
Prodecure Rule 90.3, which governs child support awards, ex-
pressly endorses imputing income in certain situations involving
voluntary unemployment.946  Voluntary unemployment arises
where a parent acts with the purpose of becoming or remaining
unemployed.947  Implicit in the commentary is the presupposition
that the parent has some actual prospect of earning income.948  Un-
employed incarcerated parents rarely have actual job prospects,
however, nor can they alter their situations.949  Furthermore, al-
though they made a conscious decision to engage in criminal activ-
ity, rarely do they desire incarceration and the enforced unem-
ployment that accompanies it.950  Due to these “significant, real-life
distinctions” between unemployed parents who are incarcerated
and those who are not, the court refused to equate incarceration
with voluntary unemployment.951
937. See id. at 894.
938. 960 P.2d 579 (Alaska 1998).
939. See id. at 583.
940. See id. at 581.
941. See id.
942. ALASKA R. CIV. P. 90.3(h)(1).
943. See Boone, 960 P.2d at 583.
944. 962 P.2d 170 (Alaska 1998).
945. See id. at 171.
946. See id.
947. See id. at 172.
948. See id.
949. See id. at 173.
950. See id.
951. Id.
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In State ex rel. Gause v. Gause,952 the supreme court held that
the statute of limitations on actions set out in Alaska Statutes sec-
tion 09.10.040(b) does not apply to actions to collect child support
arrears because such actions seek only to enforce judgments al-
ready established.953  The original version of AS 09.10.040 placed a
ten-year statute of limitations on “an action upon a judgment or
decree of a court.”954  Two Alaska superior court judges held that
AS 09.10.040 barred the Child Support Enforcement Division
(“CSED”) from collecting child support payments over ten years
past due.955  In response, the Alaska legislature passed an amend-
ment to AS 09.10.040 that allowed actions to bring judgment for
child support payments so long as such actions were begun before
the youngest child included in the child support order turned
twenty-one years old.956  Subsequently, the supreme court dealt
with CSED’s appeal of the lower court’s interpretation of AS
09.10.040, holding that because CSED’s efforts to collect owed
payments involved enforcing already existent judgments, such ef-
forts did not constitute “bringing an action” within the terms of the
old version of AS 09.10.040.957
CSED brought an action against Thomas Gause for child sup-
port arrears which Gause opposed because the action was not filed
until a month after the Gause’s youngest child had turned twenty-
one.958  When a lower court denied CSED’s motion to collect, it
appealed.959  The court found that the amendment, AS
09.10.040(b), had been passed by the legislature in response to the
erroneous interpretation of the original version of the statute by
superior court judges.960  Noting that “[a] statute passed based on a
mistaken premise does not change the legal rule in effect before its
passage,”961 the court held that actions to collect child support ar-
rears did not fall under the terms of the amended statute.962  The
court also refused to find that the doctrine of estoppel prevented
CSED from seeking reimbursement for AFDC payments because
Gause failed to show detrimental reliance.963
952. 967 P.2d 599 (Alaska 1998).
953. See id. at 604.
954. Id. at 601 n.6 (quoting former version of ALASKA STAT. § 09.10.040).
955. See id. at 601.
956. See id.
957. See id.; see also State ex rel. Inman v. Dean, 902 P.2d 1321 (Alaska 1995).
958. See Gause, 967 P.2d at 600.
959. See id.
960. See id. at 601.
961. Id. at 603.
962. See id.
963. See id. at 604.
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In State ex rel. Wallace v. Delaney,964 the supreme court held
that a Washington state agency’s letter to a husband that recalcu-
lated his child support arrearage without including accrued interest
did not supersede an Alaska court’s child support order that re-
quired payment of accrued interest.965  Pursuant to Donald De-
laney and Karen Wallace’s divorce, an Alaska support order re-
quired Donald to pay monthly child support.966  The order imposed
interest on late payments.967  When Donald fell into arrearage,
Alaska’s Child Support Enforcement Division sought enforcement
aid from the Office of Support Enforcement (“OSE”) in Donald’s
home state of Washington.968  OSE sent a letter to Donald that re-
calculated his past-due child support debt without interest.969  The
court held that this letter did not supersede the Alaska order under
Alaska’s Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act.970  The
OSE letter was not a court order, nor did it specify that it modi-
fied, nullified or superseded the Alaska order.971
In State v. Beans,972 the supreme court held that judicial review
of a driver’s license suspension due to delinquent child support
payments under Alaska Statutes section 25.27.246 did not require a
jury trial.973  After failing to make his child support payments,
Beans was notified by the Child Support Enforcement Division
(“CSED”) that his license would be suspended.974  Under AS
25.26.247(i) such licensees may request judicial relief from CSED’s
decision.975  Beans argued that the suspension is punitive, and thus
criminal in nature, entitling him to a jury trial under the Alaska
Constitution.976  The court held that review by a judge of CSED’s
determination is constitutionally sufficient.977  The court distin-
guished the license suspension from the license revocations in
Baker v. City of Fairbanks978 in three ways.979  First, Beans did not
face any of the collateral consequences of a formal criminal convic-
964. 962 P.2d 187 (Alaska 1998).
965. See id. at 191-92.
966. See id. at 188.
967. See id.
968. See id.
969. See id.
970. See id. at 189.
971. See id. at 190-91.
972. 965 P.2d 725 (Alaska 1998).
973. See id. at 731.
974. See id. at 726.
975. See id. at 727.
976. See id. at 729.
977. See id. at 731.
978. 471 P.2d 386 (Alaska 1970).
979. See Beans, 965 P.2d at 730.
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tion.980  Second, the loss of a license is only coercion to meet an ob-
ligation, not punishment for past misconduct.981  Third, granting
additional safeguards to delinquent obligors risks impairing the
practical interests of children and their custodial parents.982
In Maloney v. Maloney,983 the supreme court held that a child
support award could be reduced where an obligor voluntarily re-
tired from the military in order to improve his chances of securing
better future civilian employment.984  Michael Maloney sought to
have his child support award substantially reduced following his
retirement from the Air Force.985  He presented evidence that he
would have been passed over for promotion due to health prob-
lems, and that this significantly would have harmed his civilian
employment prospects.986  He further testified to his unsuccessful
efforts at finding employment following retirement.987  The court,
applying an abuse of discretion standard, affirmed the superior
court’s order modifying support.988  In addition, the court held that
the earnings of the custodial parent, Donalita Maloney, could be
considered where the non-custodial obligor, Michael, had shown
grounds for reducing child support.989
In Wright v. Shorten,990 the supreme court held that an ex-
husband’s letter to the court denying paternity in response to a
child support claim should have been treated as an answer ade-
quate to avoid a default judgment.991  While married to Jason
Wright, Kelly Shorten delivered a child and named Wright as the
father.992  After the couple divorced, Shorten sought child support
from Wright.993  Wright was served with Shorten’s complaint in
California and responded with a letter to the court in which he de-
nied paternity and offered to support his denial with medical
documentation.994  The standing master treated the letter as an ap-
pearance, not an answer, and the court below entered a default
judgment against Wright for failure to plead in or otherwise de-
980. See id.
981. See id.
982. See id. at 731.
983. 969 P.2d 1148 (Alaska 1998).
984. See id. at 1151-52.
985. See id. at 1150.
986. See id. at 1150-52.
987. See id. at 1152.
988. See id.
989. See id. at 1152-53.
990. 964 P.2d 441 (Alaska 1998).
991. See id. at 442.
992. See id.
993. See id.
994. See id.
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fend the action.995  The supreme court reversed, finding that
Wright’s letter should have been considered an answer because it
furnished a timely and direct response to the complaint.996  Because
Wright showed mistake or excusable neglect and submitted an an-
swer containing a meritorious defense, he deserved Rule 60(b)(1)
relief from the default judgment.997
In Bostic v. State,998 the supreme court held that the Child
Support Enforcement Division (“CSED”) violated a father’s due
process rights in two ways: By failing to give him notice and an op-
portunity to participate in a file review, and by basing its final de-
termination of child support on evidence not presented at the for-
mal hearing.999  The CSED calculated Bostic’s child support
obligation by imputing to him the average income of a fifty-year
old Alaskan male, despite his contention that he was unable to find
work after his release from prison.1000  The court considered Bos-
tic’s claims that he was denied notice and an opportunity to pres-
ent his case in both informal and formal hearings at the administra-
tive level.1001
The court found due process violations at both levels.1002  First,
the court concluded that CSED could not substitute a unilateral
file review without notice to Bostic in place of an informal hear-
ing.1003  CSED also had failed to give Bostic notice that he had not
submitted sufficient documentation to support his case.1004  Second,
the court found that the formal hearing failed to cure the earlier
violations, because the hearing examiner’s final determination was
based on evidence presented after the hearing.1005
In Elsberry v. Elsberry,1006 the supreme court held that the
First Amendment did not forbid a court from imputing a divorced
father’s income for the purposes of calculating child support, de-
spite the father’s assertion that the court hold a hearing on the sin-
cerity of his anti-tax religious beliefs.1007  Keith Elsberry claimed to
have an income below the poverty level but produced no tax rec-
995. See id. at 442-43.
996. See id. at 444.
997. See id.
998. 968 P.2d 564 (Alaska 1998).
999. See id. at 569.
1000. See id. at 565.
1001. See id. at 567-68.
1002. See id. at 569.
1003. See id. at 568.
1004. See id.
1005. See id. at 569.
1006. 967 P.2d 1004 (Alaska 1998).
1007. See id. at 1004.
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ords to support his claim.1008  He asserted that his religious beliefs
prevented him from paying federal taxes, and requested a hearing
on the sincerity of his beliefs after the court imputed to him the in-
come of an average Alaskan man his age.1009  The Child Support
Enforcement Division produced evidence indicating that Els-
berry’s income as a self-employed mechanic, though difficult to de-
termine, was higher than he claimed.1010  The supreme court af-
firmed the lower court’s ruling, holding that no hearing was
necessary because the court did not base its conclusion on a pre-
sumption of the insincerity of his religious beliefs.1011  Instead, the
supreme court found that the lower court “simply observed that
[Elsberry] had failed to submit any documentation of his asserted
income”1012 and found the other evidence regarding his earning ca-
pacity to be more credible than Elsberry’s affidavit claiming pov-
erty.1013
C. Marital Property
In Broadribb v. Broadribb,1014 the Alaska Supreme Court held
that the property award by the superior court in a divorce pro-
ceeding will be reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.1015
Under this standard, the court rejected a petitioner’s numerous
appeals to reduce the award of property to his ex-wife.1016  The
court, citing Ms. Broadribb’s long-time absence from the work-
force and the need to maintain a home for their children, refused
to reduce the monthly alimony award granted by the superior
court or to order the sale of the family home.1017  In addition, the
court refused to reverse the superior court’s inclusion of Mr.
Broadribb’s survivor benefits in its calculation of his total assets.1018
Furthermore, the court affirmed the superior court’s order to cash
in stock options at particular times, noting that the superior court
is required to consider only immediate tax consequences when
making such orders, and not long-term tax strategies.1019
1008. See id. at 1005.
1009. See id. at 1005-06.
1010. See id.
1011. See id. at 1007.
1012. Id.
1013. See id.
1014. 956 P.2d 1222 (Alaska 1998).
1015. See id. at 1225.
1016. See id.
1017. See id. at 1226-27.
1018. See id. at 1227.
1019. See id. at 1227-28.
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In Dodson v. Dodson,1020 the supreme court held that a prom-
issory note transferred to both spouses during marriage could not
become one spouse’s personal liability to the other after separa-
tion.1021  Both Jim and Robin signed papers authorizing the transfer
of the promissory notes, and Robin’s past participation in trust-
related matters indicated that she was “fully aware” of the signifi-
cance of transferring the stocks to herself and her husband as indi-
viduals.1022  Thus the promissory notes should not have been en-
forced against Jim as his separate debt and in favor of Robin as her
separate property.1023
In Horchover v. Field,1024 the supreme court held that an order
requiring a divorced spouse to provide an accounting to the other
spouse merely enforced, and did not alter, the property agreement
between the spouses when the accounting was necessary to ascer-
tain whether the spouse was in compliance.1025  Sylvia claimed that
her ex-husband Robert was not complying with their property set-
tlement and requested an order requiring Robert to provide an ac-
counting.1026  The order was granted,1027 and Robert claimed on ap-
peal that the order modified the terms of the agreement and
therefore was outside of the court’s jurisdiction.1028  The supreme
court upheld the order, ruling that the purpose of the accounting
was to determine if Robert was complying with the property set-
tlement.1029  Thus, the order merely enforced the property settle-
ment, and could be reversed only if there was an abuse of discre-
tion.1030
In Zito v. Zito,1031 the supreme court held that a court has in-
herent authority to enforce the division of retirement benefits
through a qualified domestic relations order,1032 and that an agree-
ment for equitable division of retirement benefits earned during a
marriage is presumed to encompass survivor benefits.1033  The Zitos
agreed to divide equitably William’s retirement fund when the
couple divorced in 1988, but disagreed over whether the agreement
1020. 955 P.2d 902 (Alaska 1998).
1021. See id. at 905-07.
1022. Id. at 907.
1023. See id.
1024. 964 P.2d 1278 (Alaska 1998).
1025. See id. at 1283-84.
1026. See id. at 1280.
1027. See id.
1028. See id. at 1282.
1029. See id. at 1283-84.
1030. See id. at 1282.
1031. 969 P.2d 1144 (Alaska 1998).
1032. See id. at 1146.
1033. See id. at 1148.
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incorporated benefits accrued during the marriage.1034  Kathleen
obtained a qualified domestic relations order that resolved the
disagreement in her favor and also awarded survivor benefits to
her.1035  Affirming this order, the supreme court first held that the
order enforced the original agreement between the parties, and
therefore was within the lower court’s inherent authority.1036  The
court then held that the award of survivor benefits was proper,
noting that it implicitly had held in an earlier case that survivor
benefits are an intrinsic part of retirement benefits and should be
presumed to be included in an agreement dividing retirement
benefits.1037
D. Miscellaneous
In C.T. v. J.S. and C.B.,1038 the Alaska Supreme Court held that
a mother was not equitably estopped from withdrawing consent to
adoption merely by stating that the would-be adopting father was
the child’s father.1039  C.T. told her daughter that her father was
C.T.’s boyfriend C.B., when in fact the natural father was J.S.1040
J.S. and C.B. wished to terminate J.S.’s parental rights and declare
the girl adopted by C.B.1041  The court rejected their assertion that
C.T.’s statements to her daughter estopped her from withdrawing
consent to the adoption.1042  The court declined to rule on whether
a mother ever can be equitably estopped from withdrawing her
consent to an adoption.1043
In In re Adoption of A.F.M.,1044 the supreme court vacated an
adoption decree because the child’s natural father did not fail
“significantly without justifiable cause . . . to provide for the care
and support of the child as required by law.”1045  Alaska Statutes
section 25.23.050(a)(2)(B) provides for the waiver of a natural par-
ent’s consent in adoption when the parent has failed to support the
child for the period of at least one year.1046  However, the statute
1034. See id. at 1145.
1035. See id.
1036. See id. at 1146.
1037. See id. at 1147-48 (citing Wahl v. Wahl, 945 P.2d 1229 (Alaska 1997)).
1038. 951 P.2d 1199 (Alaska 1998).
1039. See id.
1040. See id.
1041. See id.
1042. See id.
1043. See id.
1044. 960 P.2d 602 (Alaska 1998).
1045. Id. at 604-05.
1046. See ALASKA STAT. § 25.23.050(a)(2)(B) (Michie 1994).
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does not specify a method to calculate the year of nonsupport.1047
Bruce Farley, the natural father, had made one support payment
on August 15, 1995, and the next payment on August 16 of the
following year.  Strictly construing AS 25.23.050 in favor of the
natural parent, the court rejected the adoptive parent’s argument
that Farley missed the year requirement by one day.1048  Instead,
the court found that Farley had missed only eleven months and
thus had not violated the statute.1049
In Hernandez v. Lambert,1050 the supreme court held that issu-
ance of a new birth certificate by the state effectively recognized a
tribal court’s adoption order as a customary adoption of an Indian
child and accordingly triggered the one-year time limit for pater-
nity suits.1051  Hernandez, the putative father, sought to escape the
bar imposed on paternity suits by Alaska Statutes section
25.23.140(b)1052 by challenging the legitimacy of an adoption order
issued by a tribal court.1053  Regardless of whether the tribal court
had jurisdiction to issue an adoption order, the issuance of a new
birth certificate by the Bureau of Vital Statistics gave the tribal
court’s order legal color.1054  The court dismissed claims that the
adoption order was invalid on the grounds of fraud and lack of no-
tice because such grounds explicitly were time-barred by the stat-
ute.1055
In Grober v. State,1056 the supreme court held that the statute
of limitations for paternity actions tolls during a child’s minority.1057
This tolling occurs whether the action is brought by either a parent
or a guardian ad litem such as the Child Support Enforcement Di-
vision.1058  The court further held that the standing order, which re-
quired a putative father to submit to a blood test without notice or
hearing, was unconstitutional.1059
In Sielak v. State,1060 the supreme court held that the Child
Support Enforcement Division’s (“CSED’s”) newly granted
authority to disestablish paternity did not extend to fathers for
1047. See A.F.M., 960 P.2d at 605.
1048. See id.
1049. See id.
1050. 951 P.2d 436 (Alaska 1998).
1051. See id. at 441.
1052. ALASKA STAT. § 25.23.140(b) (Michie 1996).
1053. See Hernandez, 951 P.2d at 439.
1054. See id. at 441.
1055. See id. at 440.
1056. 956 P.2d 1230 (Alaska 1998).
1057. See id. at 1232 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 09.10.140 (Michie 1996)).
1058. See Grober, 956 P.2d at 1232.
1059. See id. at 1234-35.
1060. 958 P.2d 438 (Alaska 1998).
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whom the statute of limitations for contesting paternity expired
prior to the law’s implementation.1061  After Sielak separated from
his wife in 1984, she had children by another man in 1986 and
1987.1062  Since he was still married to the mother, Sielak received a
notice of financial responsibility from CSED in 1988 and he did
not contest this order until 1996.1063  Under Alaska Statutes section
25.27.166, effective January 1, 1996, CSED has authority to dises-
tablish paternity, provided that the petition is brought within three
years of the child’s birth.1064  The court held that CSED lacked the
authority to disestablish paternity.1065  Sielak’s argument that this
constituted an unconstitutional ex post facto law was rejected be-
cause the statute does not change the legal consequences of actions
prior to its passage, but simply fails to include Sielak in “the class
of putative fathers who may take advantage of CSED’s new
authority.”1066
In H.C. v. State,1067 the supreme court held that the parental
rights of a father who had abandoned his child for over a year
could be terminated on the ground that the daughter was a child-
in-need as a result of parental conduct, but not as a result of sub-
stantial risk of physical harm.1068  D.K. had visiting rights to see his
daughter, H.C., who was in state custody because he was unable to
care for her.1069  When D.K. moved to Texas and failed to commu-
nicate with H.C. for more than a year, the Division of Family and
Youth Services moved to terminate D.K.’s parental rights.1070
D.K.’s departure from Alaska and lack of communication with his
daughter evidenced a disregard of parental obligations that de-
stroyed any possibility of developing a parent-child relationship.1071
Because D.K. had not accepted treatment for the mental illness
that motivated his behavior, the court held that his conduct was
likely to continue.1072  Accordingly, H.C. was determined to be a
child-in-need as a result of parental conduct and D.K.’s parental
rights were terminated.1073  However, because there was no evi-
dence that H.C. had ever suffered physical harm from D.K., she
1061. See id. at 440.
1062. See id. at 439.
1063. See id.
1064. See id. (citing ALASKA STAT. § 25.27.166 (Michie 1996)).
1065. See id. at 440.
1066. Id.
1067. 956 P.2d 477 (Alaska 1998).
1068. See id. at 485.
1069. See id. at 479-80.
1070. See id. at 480.
1071. See id. at 482, 484.
1072. See id. at 484.
1073. See id. at 485.
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was held not to be a child-in-need due to substantial risk of physi-
cal harm.1074
In E.M. v. State,1075 the supreme court held that termination of
the parental rights of an Indian child was appropriate where suffi-
cient evidence existed that the father failed to obtain court-
ordered substance abuse treatment, the child was frequently left
alone, and people in the father’s house posed a danger to the
child.1076  The court applied a clearly erroneous standard when re-
viewing the factual finding of a trial court regarding termination of
parental rights.1077  Under Alaska Statutes section
47.10.080(c)(3),1078 termination requires a showing by clear and
convincing evidence that the child is in need of aid due to parental
conduct and that the parental conduct is likely to continue to exist
if parental rights are not terminated.1079  The Indian Child Welfare
Act requires a finding by a preponderance of the evidence that
“active efforts have been made to provide remedial services and
rehabilitative programs designed to prevent the breakup of the In-
dian family and that these efforts have proved unsuccessful,”1080
and a finding “beyond a reasonable doubt, including the testimony
of qualified expert witnesses, that custody of the child by the par-
ent or Indian custodian is likely to result in serious emotional or
physical damage to the child,”1081 before terminating parental rights
for an Indian child.
E.M. previously had abandoned the child, but custody was re-
stored to him contingent upon compliance with a case plan that in-
cluded parenting classes, drug screening, and home visits.1082  In the
present proceeding, a social worker testified that E.M. was not in
compliance with the substance abuse program, that the child had
been left alone on numerous occasions, that the house was dirty
and unsafe for the child, and that E.M. had been attacked by visi-
tors while the child was present.1083  A psychologist testified that
E.M.’s unstable conduct was likely to continue and that this would
be harmful to the child.1084  Taken together, this evidence demon-
1074. See id. at 484-85.
1075. 959 P.2d 766 (Alaska 1998).
1076. See id. at 766-67.
1077. See id. at 768 (citing In Re S.A., 912 P.2d 1235, 1237 (Alaska 1998)).
1078. ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.080(c)(3) (Michie 1996).
1079. See E.M., 959 P.2d at 768.
1080. Id. (citing 25 U.S.C. § 1912(d) (1997)).
1081. Id. (citing 25 U.S.C. § 1912(f) (1997)).
1082. See id. at 767.
1083. See id. at 769.
1084. See id. at 770.
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strated that the factual findings of the trial court were not clearly
erroneous.1085
In O.R. v. State,1086 the supreme court held that the failure of
parents to provide for their child’s physical needs constituted sub-
stantial physical neglect warranting termination of parental rights,
even if the child did not experience any actual physical harm.1087
When A.R. was born to C.R. and O.R., she tested positive for co-
caine and temporarily was placed in the custody of the state.1088
The parents visited A.R. only sporadically and between them
missed nearly 150 scheduled visits with the child.1089  The court re-
lied on D.H. v. State,1090 a case based on nearly identical facts, in
which the court held that the parents’ failure “to make any sus-
tained effort to establish a parent-child relationship” supported a
finding of substantial neglect.1091  C.R. and O.R. argued nonetheless
that Alaska Statutes section 47.10.010(a)(6),1092 which allows termi-
nation of parental rights for substantial physical neglect, requires a
showing that the child actually suffered harm.1093  The court ruled
that this issue was decided in D.H., where the court focused its in-
quiry on the conduct of the parents, and not the actual harm to the
child.1094
IX. INSURANCE LAW
In Progressive Insurance v. Simmons,1095 the Alaska Supreme
Court held that statutory amendments to the Motor Vehicle Safety
Responsibility Act implicitly repealed the unaltered statutory
definition of “underinsured motor vehicle” (“UMV”).1096 Simmons,
a minor passenger injured in an automobile accident, suffered
damages exceeding the insurance policy’s liability limits.1097  She
sought to recover underinsured motorist (“UIM”) benefits under
the policy.1098  The insurance company refused, claiming that the
automobile did not qualify as a UMV because its UIM limits did
1085. See id.
1086. 968 P.2d 93 (Alaska 1998).
1087. See id. at 97.
1088. See id. at 95.
1089. See id. at 95-96.
1090. 929 P.2d 650 (Alaska 1996).
1091. O.R., 968 P.2d at 97 (quoting D.H., 929 P.2d at 653).
1092. ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.010(a)(6) (Michie 1996).
1093. See O.R., 968 P.2d at 97.
1094. See id. at 97-98.
1095. 953 P.2d 510 (Alaska 1998).
1096. See id. at 512.
1097. See id.
1098. See id.
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not exceed its liability limits.1099  The insurance company pointed to
Alaska Statutes section 28.20.445(h), which defines a UMV as one
whose liability coverage is “less than the limit for . . . underinsured
motorist coverage under the insured’s policy.”1100
The supreme court rejected the insurance company’s argu-
ment, reasoning that subsection (h) implicitly had been repealed
by the state legislature’s adoption in 1990 of an “excess approach”
to automobile insurance coverage.1101  Prior to these amendments,
Alaska law had operated under a narrow “reduction scheme” for
compensating those injured by UIMs.1102  The reduction scheme
precluded injured persons from combining liability and UIM cov-
erage, even when neither amount alone would fully pay the per-
son’s actual damages.1103  In 1990, however, the Alaska Legislature
adopted a broader “excess approach” that permitted an injured
person to supplement available liability coverage with UIM pay-
ments up to the extent of actual damages or combined policy lim-
its, whichever was less.1104  In the present context of excess cover-
age, the narrow UMV definition found in AS 28.20.445(h)
“serve[d] no rational purpose” and failed to comport with the
amendments’ legislative history, suggesting that its “continued ex-
istence was not contemplated” at the time of the 1990 amend-
ments.1105
In National Chiropractic Mutual Ins. Co. v. Doe,1106 the United
States District Court for the District of Alaska held that a declara-
tory judgment action filed by an insurer seeking to determine its
liability for an insured doctor’s alleged sexual assault should be
stayed pending the outcome of the tort suit against the doctor in
state court.1107  The insurance company sought declaratory judg-
ment in federal court, claiming that its coverage did not apply to a
sexual assault committed by the insured doctor.1108  The court de-
cided to exercise its discretionary authority under the Declaratory
Judgment Act1109 and hear the claim, but the court determined that
it would be impossible to resolve the insurance coverage claim
without first resolving whether the doctor had acted intentionally
1099. See id.
1100. Id. at 513.
1101. See id. at 519.
1102. See id. at 514.
1103. See id.
1104. See id. at 515.
1105. Id. at 518.
1106. 23 F. Supp.2d 1109 (D. Alaska 1998).
1107. See id. at 1124.
1108. See id. at 1113.
1109. 28 U.S.C. §2201(a) (1997).
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or negligently.1110  Consequently, the court held that the declaratory
judgment should be stayed pending the outcome of the underlying
state court litigation.1111
In Ace v. Aetna Life Ins. Co.,1112 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that an insurer’s conduct sup-
ported a finding of bad faith liability,1113 a damage award for emo-
tional distress,1114 and punitive damages,1115 but that the amount
awarded in punitive damages was excessive.1116 Ace, an Alaska
resident, was injured in a sledding accident and brought suit
against Aetna after her attempts to claim long-term disability
benefits were frustrated.1117  Because Aetna had based its denial of
Ace’s claim on an illegal claim eligibility standard, lied about its
claim adjustment guidelines, and refused to investigate the claim,
the court found clear and convincing evidence of outrageous con-
duct on Aetna’s part.1118  Accordingly, an award of punitive dam-
ages was warranted.1119  Aetna’s conduct further supported a find-
ing of bad faith liability on the insurer’s part.1120
Nevertheless, because the jury awarded punitive damages in
an amount 130 times larger than the amount awarded for compen-
satory damages, and because no Alaska courts have approved
amounts similar in size, the court held the award to be excessive
and instructed the lower court to determine an appropriate figure
on remand.1121  In addition, the court rejected Aetna’s appeal that
the jury was not properly instructed that the plaintiff must show
severe emotional distress to receive a damage award.1122  A re-
quirement of severe emotional distress does not apply to a breach
of good faith and fair dealing by an insurer to an insured.1123
1110. See National Chiropractic, 23 F. Supp.2d at 1124.
1111. See id.
1112. 139 F.3d 1241 (9th Cir. 1998).
1113. See id. at 1249.
1114. See id.
1115. See id. at 1247.
1116. See id. at 1248.
1117. See id. at 1242-46.
1118. See id. at 1246.
1119. See id. at 1247.
1120. See id. at 1249.
1121. See id. at 1248-49.
1122. See id. at 1249.
1123. See id. at 1250.
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X. PROPERTY
A. Restrictions on Use
In Dickerson v. Williams,1124 the Alaska Supreme Court held
that a lower court did not abuse its discretion in enforcing a set-
tlement agreement that provided a landowner with an extended
easement area to build a road across another landowner’s lot.1125  A
roadway easement across the upper 200 feet of Williams’s lot was
recorded for the benefit of adjacent owners and the public.1126  The
new road built across that area began sinking into what was dis-
covered to be federal wetlands and further road building would be
complicated by the need to secure permits under federal law.1127
Dickerson sued, seeking restoration of the easement area to its
original size, and the case was settled with an agreement to expand
the easement area by fifty feet onto which a new road could be
built.1128  When this land also was discovered to contain federal
wetlands, Dickerson sought relief from enforcement of the settle-
ment agreement, alleging mistake, excusable neglect, newly dis-
covered evidence and misrepresentation.1129
The lower court denied relief because under the settlement
agreement Dickerson expressly assumed the risk of wetlands.1130
The supreme court affirmed.  While Dickerson may have neglected
the risk of wetlands, such neglect was not excusable because Dick-
erson had been aware of the risk of wetlands for years.1131 Dicker-
son’s claim that the newly discovered evidence of wetlands nulli-
fied the agreement failed because the evidence was discoverable
before the settlement with due diligence and there was no proof
that threatening behavior on Williams’ part prevented exercise of
such diligence.1132
In Gerstein v. Axtell,1133 the supreme court held that a cable
company’s claim, under the Cable Communications Policy Act of
1984, to access a private easement was moot because the company
had obtained access through eminent domain.1134  Gerstein Com-
munications sought access to a private easement owned by the
1124. 956 P.2d 458 (Alaska 1998).
1125. See id. at 464.
1126. See id. at 460.
1127. See id.
1128. See id. at 460-61.
1129. See id. at 462, 464.
1130. See id. at 464-65.
1131. See id. at 466.
1132. See id. at 467.
1133. 960 P.2d 599 (Alaska 1998).
1134. See id. at 600.
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Golden Valley Electric Association (“GVEA”) and located on the
Axtell family’s property.1135  When the Axtells denied Gerstein ac-
cess, Gerstein sued GVEA and the Axtells seeking a declation that
the Cable Act gave it access.1136  In the alternative, Gerstein asked
the court to exercise its eminent domain power to condemn a suffi-
cient portion of the Axtell’s property as an easement through
which Gerstein could run its cable line.1137  The superior court held
that the Cable Act did not authorize Gerstein’s use of the ease-
ment but granted Gerstein’s eminent domain request.1138
In Hayes v. A.J. Associates Inc.,1139 the supreme court held that
state-reserved mineral interests are open to exploration under
Alaska Statutes section 38.05.185(a) even where the surface inter-
est is owned by a private party.1140  A.J. Associates brought an
ejectment action after Hayes staked mining claims to minerals un-
der land owned by A.J. Associates.1141  The property where the
claim was staked was created by dumping crushed rock onto sub-
merged lands.1142  A.J. Associates received the surface rights from
the state, but the state reserved the mineral rights.1143  The court
held that the mineral rights retained by the state constituted “state
land” for purposes of AS 38.05.195,1144 which states that “[r]ights to
deposits of minerals in or on state land that is open to claim stak-
ing may be acquired by discovery, location, and recording.”1145 The
court rejected the argument that this would interfere with the quiet
enjoyment of the surface rights, noting that surface owners must
anticipate that the state’s reserved right someday may be exer-
cised.1146
In Leisnoi, Inc. v. Stratman,1147 the supreme court held that a
previously established injunction only barred a rancher’s horse-
back riding activities and did not affect his right to extract gravel
from lands under a quitclaim deed.1148  Stratman consented to a
permanent injunction preventing the operation of a horse riding
business on land owned by Leisnoi, Inc., to which Stratman held
1135. See id. at 599.
1136. See id.
1137. See id. at 600
1138. See id. at 600-01.
1139. 960 P.2d 556 (Alaska 1998).
1140. See id. at 562-63.
1141. See id. at 559.
1142. See id.
1143. See id.
1144. See id. at 562.
1145. ALASKA STAT. § 38.05.195 (Michie 1996).
1146. See Hayes, 960 P.2d at 563.
1147. 956 P.2d 452 (Alaska 1998).
1148. See id. at 455.
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grazing leases, in exchange for Leisnoi waiving a claim for attor-
ney’s fees and costs in a lawsuit against Stratman.1149  When Strat-
man began removing gravel from the land, Leisnoi sought an order
to show cause why Stratman was not in violation of the injunc-
tion.1150  The injunction was treated as a negotiated contract be-
cause both parties drafted its language and because the surrender
of a claim for attorney’s fees and costs in exchange for consent to
the injunction constituted consideration.1151  The court found that
extrinsic evidence and the failure of the injunction to address the
quitclaim deed indicated that the parties did not intend for the in-
junction to affect Stratman’s subsurface rights to the land.1152
In Stratman v. Leisnoi, Inc.,1153 the supreme court held that a
quiet title action should be stayed while a separate action that
could affect title to the parcel was pending under the Alaska Na-
tive Claims Settlement Act (“ANCSA”).1154  In 1974, the Secretary
of the Interior certified Leisnoi as the village corporation for
Woody Island.1155  In 1976, Stratman filed an action in federal dis-
trict court seeking to decertify Leisnoi.1156  After a disputed settle-
ment agreement, the federal court reopened the decertification
suit in 1995.1157  In 1996, Leisnoi brought suit in superior court to
quiet title to a parcel of land patented to it in 1985.1158  The superior
court granted summary judgment to Leisnoi.1159  The supreme court
held that, because the decertification action may affect title to the
property and because the superior court may not determine the
merits of the decertification action, the quiet title action should
have been stayed pending the outcome of the decertification ac-
tion.1160
In Leisnoi, Inc. v. Stratman,1161 the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit held that under the Alaska Native
Claims Settlement Act (“ANCSA”),1162 a Village Corporation may
withhold consent to mining operations by an owner of the subsur-
face estate only where such mining occurs within land physically
1149. See id. at 453.
1150. See id. at 452.
1151. See id. at 454.
1152. See id. at 454-55.
1153. 969 P.2d 1139 (Alaska 1998).
1154. See id. at 1139.
1155. See id.
1156. See id. at 1140.
1157. See id.
1158. See id. at 1140-41.
1159. See id. at 1139.
1160. See id. at 1143.
1161. 154 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 1998).
1162. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1629(a) (1997).
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occupied by the Native village.1163  Under ANCSA, the subsurface
estate in much of the lands awarded to Alaskan Natives belonged
to Regional Corporations while the surface estate belonged to
smaller Village Corporations.1164  Stratman received subsurface
rights from a Regional Corporation to land possessed by the Vil-
lage Corporation of Leisnoi, Inc.1165  Leisnoi sought to prevent
Stratman from mining lands on Kodiak Island.1166  The court found
that under ANCSA, the consent of the Village Corporation was
required for mining only where such mining occurred on land
within the boundaries of the Native village.1167  The land constitut-
ing a Native village, as opposed to the land to which the Village
Corporation holds title, is determined by “physical evidence of oc-
cupancy,” and not by historic use of the land.1168  Because the Na-
tive village of Woody Island failed to demonstrate evidence of oc-
cupancy of Kodiak Island, Stratman did not need the Village
Corporation’s consent in order to mine there.1169
B. Transfers and Conveyances
In Swiss v. Chignik River Ltd.,1170 the Alaska Supreme Court
held that occupants of land used as subsistence campsites may be
entitled to more than one campsite for a given subsistence use un-
der the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (“ANCSA”).1171
ANCSA requires village corporations to convey title to the surface
estate to any occupant of tracts of land used “as a primary place of
residence, or as a primary place of business, or as a subsistence
campsite.”1172  Under past precedent, occupants may claim only one
primary place of business.1173  However, the court found that no
such limit should be imposed for subsistence campsites.1174  First,
the plain language of the statute does not place limits on the num-
ber of subsistence campsites, as it does for residences and busi-
nesses.1175  Second, as a practical matter, many natives leading tra-
ditional subsistence lifestyles must move among several campsites,
1163. See Lesnoi, 154 F.3d at 1066-68.
1164. See id. at 1065.
1165. See id.
1166. See id.
1167. See id. at 1068.
1168. Id.
1169. See id at 1071-72.
1170. 951 P.2d 433 (Alaska 1998).
1171. See id.
1172. 43 U.S.C. § 1613(c)(1) (1997).
1173. See Swiss, 951 P.2d at 434.
1174. See id. at 436.
1175. See id. at 435.
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due to their reliance on more than one species for their livelihood
and to the migratory nature of prey.1176  The court did not deter-
mine whether a site used for subsistence and for other purposes
qualified as a subsistence campsite under ANCSA.1177
In Frost v. Ayojiak,1178 the supreme court held that the misi-
dentification of a parcel of real property was not merely a “clerical
error” within the meaning of Rule 60(a),1179 but instead related to a
substantive defect in the initial judgment.1180  Frost had purchased a
house located on a parcel of land, Lot 3, that Ayojiak believed he
owned.1181  Ayojiak later brought a successful action for ejectment
against Frost.1182  Following this judgment, Frost discovered that
their house was not in fact on Lot 3, but on Lot 3B, which had been
owned by the city but had been deeded to Ayojiak subsequent to
the ejectment action.1183  The superior court amended its earlier
ruling, holding that the misidentification of the lot was “clerical er-
ror” pursuant to Rule 60(a).1184  The supreme court held that the
amendment of the judgment changed it substantively and was not
within the scope of Rule 60(a).1185
C. Landlord-Tenant
In Ostrow v. State,1186 the Alaska Supreme Court held that a
previous landowner had forfeited her possessory interest in per-
sonal property left on the land and was barred from bringing a
conversion action against the state.1187  Ostrow contracted with the
state to purchase and improve a plot of agricultural land.1188  Os-
trow defaulted on several payments and failed to adhere to the de-
velopment plan, so the state terminated the contract.1189  The state
notified Ostrow that she had sixty days to remove all chattels from
the property.1190  Ostrow, however, left several pieces of metal cul-
1176. See id.
1177. See id. at 436.
1178. 957 P.2d 1353 (Alaska 1998).
1179. See ALASKA R. CIV. P. 60(a) (“Clerical mistakes in judgments . . . may be
corrected . . . at any time”).
1180. See Frost, 957 P.2d at 1357.
1181. See id. at 1355.
1182. See id.
1183. See id.
1184. See id. at 1356.
1185. See id. at 1357.
1186. 963 P.2d 1021 (Alaska 1998).
1187. See id. at 1025.
1188. See id. at 1021.
1189. See id. at 1022.
1190. See id. at 1021.
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vert (“multiplate”) on the land for over sixty days.1191  After the
state proceeded to remove the multiplate from the land, Ostrow
filed a conversion lawsuit.1192  The court found that Ostrow lacked a
possessory interest in the multiplate at the time of alleged conver-
sion.1193  Because she had failed to remove her property from the
land within the sixty-day period, she had forfeited her possessory
rights.1194  Without a possessory interest in the property at the time
of the wrongful act, Ostrow could not maintain a cause of action
for conversion.1195
D. Miscellaneous
In Falke v. Council of the City of Fairbanks,1196 the Alaska Su-
preme Court held that the entry of summary judgment does not
violate the right to a jury trial because the Alaska Constitution’s
takings provisions1197 do not apply to public property.1198  Falke and
other Fairbanks property owners challenged the sale of the Fair-
banks Municipal Utilities System (“FMUS”) by the city of Fair-
banks.1199  The court rejected Falke’s claim that because property
owners had funded the construction of FMUS, they were its de
facto owners.1200
In Native Village of Eyak v. Trawler Diane Marie, Inc.,1201 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the
federal paramountcy doctrine bars a Native village’s claim of abo-
riginal title to a portion of the outer continental shelf of the United
States.1202  The federal paramountcy doctrine vests property rights
to offshore waters, including the outer continental shelf, in the
federal government.1203  The doctrine evolved from a series of dis-
putes between coastal states and the federal government regarding
the extent of control states could exercise over adjacent seas.1204
The Ninth Circuit applied the doctrine to the village’s claim, rea-
soning that “[i]f, as a matter of constitutional law, the federal gov-
1191. See id. at 1022.
1192. See id. at 1023.
1193. See id. at 1024.
1194. See id. at 1025.
1195. See id. at 1024-25.
1196. 960 P.2d 589 (Alaska 1998).
1197. See ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 18 (1997).
1198. See Falke, 960 P.2d at 590.
1199. See id. at 589-90.
1200. See id. at 590.
1201. 154 F.3d 1090 (9th Cir. 1998).
1202. See id. at 1097.
1203. See id. at 1092-94.
1204. See id.
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ernment must be possessed of paramount rights in offshore waters,
it makes no difference whether the competing domestic claimant is
a state or tribe of American natives.”1205  The villagers claimed a
right to exclusive use of the outer continental shelf due to their
tribe’s thousand-year history of fishing and hunting there prior to
the founding of the United States.1206  The court rejected this argu-
ment, concluding that right was lost upon the ascension of the
Union.1207
XI. TORT LAW
In M.A. v. United States,1208 the Alaska Supreme Court held
that medical malpractice may be found where a healthy child is
born due to a physician’s negligent failure to diagnose a preg-
nancy.1209  Ordinary tort damages may be recovered for proxi-
mately caused injuries through the time of childbirth, but not for
the costs of raising a healthy child.1210  Additionally, the court held
that a relative may not claim damages for emotional distress re-
sulting from misdiagnosis of a patient’s pregnancy unless a preex-
isting duty is owed by the patient’s physician to the relative, or cir-
cumstances create bystander liability.1211
In Bolieu v. Sisters of Providence in Washington,1212 the su-
preme court held that a health care facility owes a duty of care to
the spouses of its nursing employees to take reasonable measures
to minimize the spread of infection.1213  Two men claimed to have
contracted staph infections through contact with their wives who
worked in a health facility.1214  The court reversed the trial court’s
ruling that the hospital owed no duty of care toward the spouses of
employees.1215  Applying the factor-based test used in D.S.W. v.
Fairbanks North Star Borough School District1216 to decide whether
a duty of care exists, the court found that the spread of infectious
disease to spouses is a foreseeable harm1217 which can be reduced
with little difficulty, since health facilities already are required to
1205. Id. at 1096.
1206. See id.
1207. See id.
1208. 951 P.2d 851 (Alaska 1998).
1209. See id. at 854.
1210. See id. at 856.
1211. See id. at 856-57.
1212. 953 P.2d 1233 (Alaska 1998).
1213. See id. at 1241.
1214. See id. at 1234.
1215. See id. at 1241.
1216. 628 P.2d 554 (Alaska 1981).
1217. See Bolieu, 953 P.2d at 1236.
YIR.CONVERT.DOC 05/14/99  5:20 PM
202 ALASKA LAW REVIEW [16:1
satisfy high regulatory standards.1218  The court emphasized that a
duty of care exists regardless of the severity or ubiquity of the in-
fectious disease involved, although severity and ubiquity may bear
on what types of precautions satisfy the duty.1219
In Miller v. Phillips, CNM,1220 the supreme court held that a
treating physician may express expert opinions formed as a super-
visory participant, and that evidence showing a midwife’s lack of
panic in prior deliveries was admissible to demonstrate compe-
tence and to answer an alleged tendency to panic.1221  Gage Miller’s
parents appealed an unsuccessful malpractice suit against his mid-
wife for injuries Gage suffered during his delivery.1222  The Millers
alleged reversible error because a physician listed as a general wit-
ness offered expert testimony, and because character evidence was
improperly admitted.1223  The court noted that where the treating
physician testifies on matters concerning a patient, “the distinction
between an expert witness and a fact witness inevitably becomes
blurred.”1224  Although Dr. Newton had no personal contact with
the patient before or during the delivery, his role as supervisor of
the midwife left him “involved intimately in the events surround-
ing Gage’s birth.”1225  The court also found evidence that the mid-
wife had not panicked on prior child delivery occasions was admis-
sible because it served to show professional competency with
regard to the procedures at issue and because it responded to the
suggestion that the midwife could not deal with panic situations.1226
In any event, the court held that to the extent that such evidence
was inadmissible character evidence, it was harmless.1227
In Ward v. Lutheran Hosp. & Homes Soc’y of Am.,1228 the su-
preme court held that a hospital is not liable under either the non-
delegable duty to provide quality emergency care or the theory of
apparent agency where the physicians are independent contractors
selected by the patient1229 and the operator of a blood bank has no
duty to obtain informed consent from prospective donees.1230  Ward
was admitted to Fairbanks Memorial Hospital (“FMH”) in order
1218. See id. at 1238.
1219. See id. at 1239-41.
1220. 959 P.2d 1247 (Alaska 1998).
1221. See id. at 1248.
1222. See id. at 1249.
1223. See id. at 1249-50, 1252.
1224. Id. at 1250.
1225. Id. at 1251.
1226. See id. at 1253.
1227. See id.
1228. 963 P.2d 1031 (Alaska 1998).
1229. See id. at 1034.
1230. See id. at 1036.
YIR.CONVERT.DOC 05/14/99  5:20 PM
1999] YEAR IN REVIEW 203
to give birth.1231  There she was treated by Dr. Dunlap, who had
provided her prenatal care, and two assisting physicians, none of
whom were employed by the hospital.1232  In the course of her
treatment, she required blood transfusions supplied by FMH’s
blood bank.  These transfusions later turned out to be contami-
nated with hepatitis C.1233  Ward brought suit against FMH for
failing to obtain her informed consent before her physicians or-
dered blood transfusions.1234  However, FMH had neither a non-
delegable duty to provide quality emergency care nor any liability
under an apparent agency theory to Ward because she chose her
physicians and they were not hospital employees.1235  In determin-
ing the appropriate standard of care for blood banks, the court
looked to industry custom and official guidelines1236 and decided
that simple presentation of expert testimony was not enough to es-
tablish a duty.1237
In Reid v. Williams,1238 the supreme court upheld a statute that
precludes a successful medical malpractice plaintiff from recover-
ing medical expenses already paid by the plaintiff’s insurer.1239
Reid won a favorable verdict in his malpractice action against Dr.
Williams; however, the trial court reduced Reid’s damage award
for medical expenses by nearly $6,000, on the ground that Reid’s
insurer already had paid that amount.1240  Reid claimed that the
statute authorizing the reduction of damages, Alaska Statutes sec-
tion 09.55.548(b),1241 violated his rights under substantive due proc-
ess and equal protection.1242  First, the court rejected Reid’s due
process argument, holding that the statute bears a reasonable rela-
tionship to a legitimate government purpose.1243  Looking to the
legislative history, the court found that AS 09.55.548(b) was en-
acted in response to a vast increase in medical malpractice actions,
which the legislature believed was leading insurers to raise premi-
ums or decline to offer coverage to would-be defendants.1244  The
court then rejected Reid’s equal protection argument, holding that
1231. See id. at 1033.
1232. See id.
1233. See id.
1234. See id.
1235. See id. at 1035.
1236. See id. at 1037.
1237. See id. at 1036.
1238. 964 P.2d 453 (Alaska 1998).
1239. See id. at 455.
1240. See id.
1241. ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.548(b) (Michie 1996).
1242. See Reid, 964 P.2d at 455-56.
1243. See id. at 455.
1244. See id. at 456-57.
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the legislature’s classification between doctors and other tort de-
fendants bears a fair and substantial relation to attainment of a le-
gitimate government objective.1245
In Hildebrandt v. City of Fairbanks,1246 the supreme court  held
that a city may not be held liable for failing to train a police officer
adequately absent a constitutional violation by the officer,1247 and
that mere negligence by a state official does not implicate the Due
Process Clause.1248  Hildebrandt sought recovery under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 and common law tort principles after a police officer’s vehicle
struck and injured him during a high speed chase.1249  The court
noted that, while a municipality may face liability under section
1983 for failure to train employees, a successful plaintiff must show
that (1) his constitutional rights have been violated, (2) a municipal
policy constitutes deliberate indifference to these constitutional
rights, and (3) the policy was the cause of the constitutional viola-
tion.1250  For a bystander to sustain a section 1983 claim for injuries
of this nature, the officer must have violated the bystander’s con-
stitutional rights.1251  The court held that the officer’s actions consti-
tuted negligence but failed to “shock the conscience,” and there-
fore Hildebrandt did not suffer a constitutional violation.1252
In Adams v. City of Tenakee Springs,1253 the supreme court
held that a city’s fire department staffing decisions are a matter of
resource allocation entitled to discretionary function immunity.1254
Adams sued Tenakee Springs claiming that because the city negli-
gently understaffed the fire department, a fire was allowed to
spread until it destroyed their inn.1255  However, the court noted
that a fire department’s staffing decisions which allocate scarce re-
sources are immune from judicial review.1256  Although the city had
no designated fire chief, in violation of a municipal ordinance,
enough evidence had been introduced at trial relating to the lack
of a leader at the fire, so any exclusion of evidence on negligence
was harmless.1257
1245. See id. at 455.
1246. 957 P.2d 974 (Alaska 1998).
1247. See id. at 977-78.
1248. See id. at 979-80.
1249. See id. at 975.
1250. See id. at 977 (citing City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389-90
(1989)).
1251. See id. at 978.
1252. Id. at 978-80.
1253. 963 P.2d 1047 (Alaska 1998).
1254. See id. at 1051.
1255. See id. at 1049.
1256. See id. at 1051.
1257. See id. at 1053.
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In Mesiar v. Heckman,1258 the supreme court held that the state
owed no actionable duty to resource users to exercise reasonable
care in fisheries data collection and management.1259  A class com-
prised of subsistence fishermen sued the Alaska Department of
Fish & Game (“ADF&G”) alleging negligent operation of a sonar
fish counter on which ADF&G relied to make fishery closure deci-
sions.1260  The court found that ADF&G had no duty to the re-
source users.1261  Even though harm to the resource users was fore-
seeable, almost all such management decisions adversely affected
one group or another.1262  The harm remained purely economic and
thus was not highly morally blameworthy.1263  Imposing a duty on
ADF&G would risk impeding its ability to manage resources by
encouraging decisions based on the demands of a single group.1264
In Arctic Tug & Barge, Inc. v. Raleigh, Schwarz & Powell,1265
the supreme court held that summary judgment is appropriate in
tort cases where the undisputed facts only reasonably permit an in-
ference that one party owes the other no duty whatsoever or owes
a duty of considerably smaller scope than what the other party
claims.1266  Arctic Tug & Barge, Inc. sued Raleigh, Schwarz & Pow-
ell, an insurance broker, alleging negligent misrepresentation for
not having disclosed to Arctic that a policy taken out by another
party to insure goods Arctic was transporting did not waive subro-
gation.1267  The supreme court upheld the trial court’s grant of
summary judgment that found no disputes of material fact and no
duty to disclose on the part of Raleigh, because Arctic had failed
to make clear any concern with a waiver of subrogation.1268  While
summary judgment is disfavored where the scope of duty is at issue
or where it is unclear if particular conduct constitutes a breach of
such duty,1269 it was appropriate in this case because the undisputed
facts allowed only the conclusion that no tort duty existed.1270
In Kooly v. State,1271 the supreme court held that the public
owner of a highway right-of-way bore no duty to make it safe for
1258. 964 P.2d 445 (Alaska 1998).
1259. See id. at 447.
1260. See id.
1261. See id. at 450.
1262. See id.
1263. See id. at 451.
1264. See id.
1265. 956 P.2d 1199 (Alaska 1998).
1266. See id. at 1203.
1267. See id. at 1200.
1268. See id. at 1201-03.
1269. See id. at 1203.
1270. See id. at 1204.
1271. 958 P.2d 1106 (Alaska 1998).
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sledding.1272  Kooly brought suit when his son died while sledding
on a state owned right-of-way commonly used for this purpose.1273
In determining whether a duty should be imposed, the court con-
sidered several factors including: closeness of connection between
the injury suffered and defendant’s conduct; moral blame attached
to defendant’s conduct; policy of preventing future harm; extent of
community consequences and burden to defendant resulting from
imposition of such a duty; and the cost, prevalence, and availability
of insurance for the risk involved.1274  The court concluded that
there was not a close connection between the state’s conduct and
the accident, that little moral blame could be assigned to the state,
and that imposing liability would not further the goal of preventing
such future harms.1275  Most importantly, the court found that im-
posing such a duty on the state would inflict heavy damage judg-
ments without appreciably improving public safety.1276
In Power Constructors Inc. v. Taylor & Hintze,1277 the supreme
court held that a defendant law firm was not estopped from argu-
ing in a malpractice action that the client’s damages in the under-
lying suit would have been less than the firm’s original estimate.1278
It also held that interest must be allocated separately to the mal-
practice judgment and to the judgment in the underlying case,1279
and that the jury’s verdict was acceptable even though the plaintiff
relied on a total cost approach to calculate damages.1280  In addi-
tion, the court adopted a rule imposing upon defendants the bur-
den of proving uncollectability when legal malpractice results in
the loss of a meritorious claim.1281
Power Constructors Inc. (“PCI”), a general contractor,
brought the underlying claim against the engineer and designer of
a construction project.1282  The case languished for several years
and ultimately was dismissed with prejudice for lack of prosecu-
tion.1283  PCI then brought a malpractice action against its counsel,
Taylor & Hintze (“T&H”).1284  T&H made an offer of judgment for
1272. See id. at 1109-10.
1273. See id. at 1107.
1274. See id. at 1108.
1275. See id. at 1109.
1276. See id.
1277. 960 P.2d 20 (Alaska 1998).
1278. See id. at 27.
1279. See id. at 36.
1280. See id. at 44.
1281. See id. at 31-32.
1282. See id. at 24.
1283. See id.
1284. See id. at 25.
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one million dollars, which PCI refused.1285 The jury’s verdict was
less favorable than T&H’s offer.1286
At trial, T&H claimed that the value of PCI’s underlying
claim was no more than $115,000, even though while it represented
PCI it estimated the value to be in excess of five million dollars.1287
The court found that T&H had issued the latter figure as a tenta-
tive estimate and was not estopped from changing its position.1288
The court went on to observe that two judgments are at issue in a
legal malpractice case – the judgment sought against the attorney,
and the underlying cause – and each must be considered separately
in computing and allocating prejudgment interest.1289  On the issue
of jury calculation of damages, the court acknowledged its prefer-
ence for the actual cost method, where each element of extra ex-
pense incurred for the alleged breach is added up.1290  In the pro-
ceedings below, the jury heard evidence related to the total cost
amount, but it also heard other evidence and was carefully in-
structed to ignore all that was not evidence of actual amount, so
the verdict was proper.1291
In General Motors v. Farnsworth,1292 the supreme court held
that the defense of comparative negligence in strict liability cases
extends to those cases where a plaintiff misuses a product and that
misuse is a proximate cause of his injuries.1293  Farnsworth was a
passenger in a General Motors vehicle that was struck by a driver
under the influence of narcotics.1294  Farnsworth’s seatbelt restraint
caused her severe abdominal injuries and a fracture of the spine.1295
The superior court refused to give a comparative negligence in-
struction or require the jury to allocate fault to the driver who
caused the accident, and the jury returned a large verdict against
General Motors.1296  The supreme court held that comparative neg-
ligence is a defense to strict liability in tort, and that a comparative
negligence instruction should have been given.1297  In addition, the
court held that an instruction should have been given that the im-
paired driver caused Farnsworth’s injuries as a matter of law, since
1285. See id.
1286. See id. at 26.
1287. See id.
1288. See id. at 27.
1289. See id. at 35.
1290. See id. at 41.
1291. See id. at 44.
1292. 965 P.2d 1209 (Alaska 1998).
1293. See id. at 1215.
1294. See id. at 1211-12, 14.
1295. See id. at 1212.
1296. See id. at 1211.
1297. See id. at 1215.
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original tortfeasors are considered the proximate cause of subse-
quent injuries resulting from foreseeable negligent acts.1298  How-
ever, the court did note that the apportionment of damages in-
struction given by the superior court was appropriate to guide the
jury in the event it chose to reject the parties’ contention that ei-
ther all or none of Farnsworth’s injuries were caused by the defec-
tive seat belt.1299  Where damages are to be apportioned, the bur-
den of limiting liability belongs with the defendants.1300
In Neary v. McDonald,1301 the supreme court held that sum-
mary judgment dismissing a negligent entrustment claim is appro-
priate where no evidence shows that the parents supplied the vehi-
cle to or had control over the vehicle driven by their adult son.1302
Neary brought a negligent entrustment claim against McDonald
because the vehicle involved in the collision had registration pa-
pers listing McDonald’s mother as a co-owner.1303  However, there
was no evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether McDonald’s parents had helped him purchase the vehi-
cle.1304  Further, McDonald’s parents never had control of the vehi-
cle such that they could prevent him from driving it, and the
mother’s status as co-owner did not establish the superior right of
control necessary to find liability.1305  The dissent argued that a
genuine issue of material fact arose as to whether the mother had
superior control of the vehicle because her son’s unlicensed status
limited his right to possess and control the vehicle.1306
In Brent v. Unicol, Inc.,1307 the supreme court held that an in-
dependent contractor can be liable to a third party injured by a
dangerous condition created by the contractor, even though the
injury occurred after the contractor left the worksite and the prop-
erty owner accepted the work.1308  ARCO hired Unicol as an inde-
pendent contractor to perform excavation as part of a construction
project.1309  Before leaving the completed job, Unicol placed rig
mats over the excavated squares but left gaps along the edges.1310
Later, Brent, an employee of another independent contractor, in-
1298. See id. at 1217-18.
1299. See id. at 1219.
1300. See id. at 1220.
1301. 956 P.2d 1205 (Alaska 1998).
1302. See id. at 1212.
1303. See id. at 1207.
1304. See id. at 1212.
1305. See id. at 1209, 1211.
1306. See id. at 1213.
1307. 969 P.2d 627 (Alaska 1998).
1308. See id. at 628.
1309. See id.
1310. See id.
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jured himself after falling into one of the excavated squares.1311  In
deciding whether Unicol owed Brent a duty of care, the court
adopted the majority rule that a contractor must exercise reason-
able care for the protection of third parties who foreseeably may
be endangered by its negligence, and the contractor may be held
liable even after the work has been accepted.1312 Unicol did not
meet any of the conditions that would discharge its duty, such as
Unicol having disclosed fully the harm to ARCO or ARCO having
recognized the harm.1313  Nor would any independent duty on
ARCO’s part to inspect the site and detect the condition relieve
Unicol of liability.1314  The court remanded the case for determina-
tion of material facts as to the condition of the site when Unicol
left it.1315
In Safeway, Inc. v. Mackey,1316 the supreme court held that a
reasonable factfinder may accept an expert’s opinion on the causes
of a medical condition, even where the expert admits that the
causes of the condition generally are unknown.1317  The Workers’
Compensation Board denied Mackey benefits based on the testi-
mony of a rheumatologist who admitted that the causes of fibro-
myalgia are unknown, but nonetheless testified that Mackey’s em-
ployment was not a substantial factor in causing the condition.1318
Mackey argued that medical testimony should not rebut the pre-
sumption of compensability in employee benefits cases because
any theory on causation of the condition is speculative.1319  The
court disagreed, stating that if it were to adopt Mackey’s argument
as a rule, it would create an irrebuttable presumption against em-
ployers whenever employees claimed a condition whose causes are
unknown by the medical community.1320
In Buchea v. United States,1321 the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit held that a child who is adopted before
the death of her natural parents cannot recover as a beneficiary of
1311. See id.
1312. See id. at 630.
1313. See id.
1314. See id.
1315. See id. at 632.
1316. 965 P.2d 22 (Alaska 1998).
1317. See id. at 28.
1318. See id.
1319. See id. at 27.
1320. See id. at 28.  The court ruled similarly in Norcon, Inc. v. Alaska Workers’
Compensation Bd., 880 P.2d 1051 (Alaska 1994), where a doctor’s analysis of risk
factors for heart attacks was allowed to rebut a presumption even though the
causes of heart attacks are unknown.
1321. 154 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir. 1998).
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the natural parent under Alaska’s wrongful death statute.1322  Laura
was adopted by her grandparents pursuant to Savoonga tribal cus-
tom several months before her natural father died.1323  After the fa-
ther’s death, the representative of his estate brought wrongful
death claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act and the Alaska
wrongful death statute on behalf of Laura as beneficiary.1324  The
court held that Alaska law severs entirely all legal relationships be-
tween an adopted child and her natural parents, including the right
to bring a claim as a child under Alaska’s wrongful death statute.1325
The court rejected several other claims advanced by the plaintiff,
including the argument that Savoonga custom, which does not
terminate parental rights, should apply.1326  The court ruled that
since the plaintiff sought the protection of an Alaska statute, the
legal relationship between natural parent and child must be deter-
mined by Alaska law.1327
XII. TRUSTS AND ESTATES
In Evancoe v. Evancoe (In re Estate of Evanco),1328 the Alaska
Supreme Court held that the joint tenancy designations on stock
certificates constituted valid and effective will substitutes.1329
Alaska Statutes section 13.31.0701330 declares certain will substitutes
to be non-testamentary and thereby not subject to the formal re-
quirements of a will.1331  The court identified stock certificates as
written instruments within the meaning of AS 13.31.070.1332
Moreover, the statute had been superseded by AS 13.33.101,1333 a
similar provision that clearly encompassed stock certificates.1334
Thus, the court found nothing improper about the distribution of
joint tenancy stocks outside of probate to the named joint ten-
ants.1335
1322. See id. at 1116.
1323. See id. at 1115.
1324. See id.
1325. See id. at 1116.
1326. See id.
1327. See id. at 1116-17.
1328. 955 P.2d 525 (Alaska 1998).
1329. See id. at 528.
1330. ALASKA STAT. § 13.31.070 (Michie 1996).
1331. See Evancoe, 955 P.2d at 527.
1332. See id.
1333. ALASKA STAT. § 13.33.101 (Michie 1996).
1334. See Evancoe, 955 P.2d at 527.
1335. See id. at 526.
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